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Reflection of the Growing Insecurity on the Moscow-Tehran Line: Vienna Crisis

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On February 24, 2022, the Russian military operation against Ukraine drew international reaction and Russia was subjected to severe sanctions. The sanctions put the country at risk of a fast-track isolation from the international community. There have been several problems in relations with allies with whom Moscow has cooperated under “The Other Alliance.” The most discussed issue in this context was China not to confront Russia; The abstention of Ukraine also emphasizes its territorial integrity. Moreover, Iran’s stance revealed certain problems on the Moscow-Tehran line after an unanimous objection to the resolution in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to reproach Russia.

In fact, disagreements between the two countries are hardly new. Because Moscow was disturbed by Iran’s influence obtained through Shi’a militias during the Syrian Civil War. The positive content of Russia-Israel relations is also influential in this disorder. As a matter of fact, the failure to activate the Russian S-300s was repeatedly debated in Israel’s air strikes against Shiite militia groups, particularly in the Golan Heights.

A similar situation occurred in the Second Karabakh War, when Iran backed Armenia. She has also been seen in shifting away from the traditional Russian policy towards a more neutral position and acting as a mediator. Likewise, there are conflicts in the Caspian territories between the parties. Also, the policy towards Afghanistan of the parties differs substantially.

Currently, Moscow and Tehran stand out as two capitals that cooperate against the pressure of the United States of America (USA) and speak of a multi-polar world. However, despite expectations to extend the term of the 10-year agreement signed with Russia in March 2001, which had been extended until 2021, this agreement has not yet been signed. In a sense, the Moscow leadership demonstrated Tehran’s unease with the 25-Year Extensive Cooperation Agreement with Beijing.

In fact, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ibrahim Reisi, visited Moscow on January 19, 2022 and there was no explanation regarding the agreement that was supposed to be signed during this visit. Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approach to his regime established a body language that stated serious problems in bilateral relations.

On the current level, a new crisis has occurred in Iran’s negotiations with P5+1 countries on returning to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna. As is known, Iran has been subject to serious sanctions since the unilateral withdrawal of Donald Trump, the former U.S. President, from the JCPOA. Meanwhile, U.S. President Joe Biden raised many accusations during the campaign, saying Trump’s stance undermined U.S. credibility. In this context, negotiations in Vienna began shortly after Biden’s election victory. Although the eighth session of the negotiations suggested that a text of agreement was forged on the return to the JCPOA, the requests by the Moscow administration blocked the announcement of the agreement.

Accordingly, Russia requested written guarantees from the US that the sanctions imposed on it in relation to the Ukrainian War will not harm its cooperation with Iran. To that demand, the French, UK and German administrations said, “No one should try to take advantage of negotiations to obtain additional guarantees from the Iran Nuclear Agreement. This increases the risk that the agreement will collapse.” [1] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stressed that Moscow’s demands were irrelevant to the contents of the conversation.[2]  All this means that Moscow’s demands were not accepted by the Western actors who were parties to the negotiations. In this environment, the foreign ministry of Iran indicated[3]  that it would not accept imposition of external factors in the negotiations, claiming that the Moscow-Tehran line was extremely difficult to repair. In fact, Iranian Foreign Minister Hüseyin Emir Abdullahiyan stressed that no foreign actor would be allowed to harm Iran’s national interests. [4]  The West’s and Iran’s view of the treaty must be mentioned here. This would also make it more difficult for Russia to reach an agreement.

As will be remembered, before the JCPOA was signed in 2015, Iran was facing heavy sanctions from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) concerning its program to acquire nuclear weapons. In 2014, these sanctions were lifted and the JCPOA was signed by Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, annexing Crimea in violation of international law. The West chose to sign the JCPOA with Iran to diversify its energy suppliers when it was sanctioning Russia. Although Iran is not currently subject to UNSC sanctions, U.S. sanctions make it difficult for many Western companies to do business in the Iranian market. However, Russia once again intervened in Ukraine by 2022. Moreover, this time there is a more comprehensive military operation. For this reason, Western governments, believing that Russia’s actions might threaten the European security architecture, again impose heavy sanctions on Russia. This means that the West once again needs to increase the number of energy suppliers.

In this sense, Russia and Iran are in alliance due to the marginalization policy of the USA; however, there are two competing countries for the supply of energy. While the West cut back the pressure on Russia during the periods sanctioned by Iran, the pressure on Tehran was also decreasing when the name of Moscow was written on the target board. Thus, the sanctions faced by Russia due to the war in Ukraine present a serious opportunity for Iran, which is struggling with serious economic problems. The opportunity, however, shows that the friendly discourse on the Moscow-Tehran line was a rhetoric and both sides were acting in their own national interests. At this point, the Vienna Crisis in Russia-Iran relations seems to harbor more critical tensions in the future.

[1] “Rusya’nın Müzakere Dışı Talepleri İran Anlaşması’nı Tehlikeye Soktu”, Euronews, https://tr.euronews.com/2022/03/12/rusya-n-n-muzakere-d-s-talepleri-iran-anlasmas-n-tehlikeye-soktu, (Date of Accession: 14.03.2022).

[2] “İran Nükleer Müzakerelerinde Rusya’nın Talebi Belirsizlik Yarattı”, TRT Haber, https://www.trthaber.com/haber/dunya/iran-nukleer-muzakerelerinde-rusyanin-talebi-belirsizlik-yaratti-661663.html, (Date of Accession: 14.03.2022).

[3] “Rusya Viyana’da Güvence Talebinde Israrcı, İran ‘Dayatmaları’ Reddediyor”, Şarkul Avsat, https://turkish.aawsat.com/home/article/3518436/rusya-viyana%E2%80%99da-g%C3%BCvence-talebinde-%C4%B1srarc%C4%B1-i%CC%87ran-%E2%80%98dayatmalar%C4%B1%E2%80%99-reddediyor, (Date of Accession: 14.03.2022).

[4] Ibid.

Dr. Doğacan BAŞARAN
Dr. Doğacan BAŞARAN
Dr. Doğacan BAŞARAN, 2014 yılında Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü’nden mezun olmuştur. Yüksek lisans derecesini, 2017 yılında Giresun Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı’nda sunduğu ‘’Uluslararası Güç İlişkileri Bağlamında İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Hegemonik Mücadelelerin İncelenmesi’’ başlıklı teziyle almıştır. Doktora derecesini ise 2021 yılında Trakya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı‘nda hazırladığı “İmparatorluk Düşüncesinin İran Dış Politikasına Yansımaları ve Milliyetçilik” başlıklı teziyle alan Başaran’ın başlıca çalışma alanları Uluslararası ilişkiler kuramları, Amerikan dış politikası, İran araştırmaları ve Afganistan çalışmalarıdır. Başaran iyi derecede İngilizce ve temel düzeyde Farsça bilmektedir.