After the Russia-Ukraine War, which started on February 24, 2022, the Minsk administration is at the forefront of the actors that drew the reaction of the West due to its closeness to the Moscow administration. As a matter of fact, Russia targeted Kiev over Belarus in the first days of the war; however, Minsk has developed an approach that avoids being a direct party to the war after being subjected to various sanctions. In this process, Minsk even tried to mediate between Moscow and Kiev. However, a fruitful result could not be obtained from the process carried out due to the inability to meet the impartiality, which is the main criterion expected from the mediating actor.
It can be stated that the fragility of the Belarusian economy played a decisive role in the change in question. Because Minsk thought that Russia, which was dealing with the war in Ukraine and under heavy sanction, could not provide the necessary economic support. Thus, although Belarus supports Russia, it has developed a certain sensitivity about not getting involved in hot conflicts.
In fact, Minsk’s proximity to Moscow is closely related to the protests that broke out in the country in 2020. Because although Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has tried to position Belarus as a “buffer zone” between Russia and the West by trying to conduct a neutral policy for many years, it has been seen that Belarus has moved away from the West after the protests in question and has moved towards acting in accordance with the spirit of the “Treaty on the Union State” signed with Russia in 1997.[1] In other words, Belarus has rapidly moved away from being a “buffer zone” in recent years. In this sense, it can be stated that the document signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Lukashenko on social and economic integration at the Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Union State on November 4, 2021 developed and deepened the dependence relationship on the Minsk-Moscow line.
On the other hand, after Russia’s failure to achieve the desired results on the field, especially in the war in Ukraine, allegations that it could turn Belarus into a frontline country began to be discussed.[2] This is because the war in Ukraine is concentrated in the east and south of the country. In the current situation, the Kiev administration has achieved a balance in the defense of the country. Western aid also increases Ukraine’s resilience and motivation. In short, things are not going as the Kremlin wanted.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Moscow administration aims to turn Belarus into a frontline country and to ensure that the Ukrainian Army takes a defensive position in the north of the country. In other words, Russia is carrying out a strategy to distract Kiev’s attention and focus, and therefore it is trying to draw Minsk into the war. Moreover, the involvement of Belarus in the war may bring about Russia’s re-targeting Kiev through air operations. This may serve the goal of overthrowing the President of Ukraine, Vladimir Zelensky, in line with the argument of “De-Nazification of Ukraine” voiced by Moscow.
In addition, the transformation of Belarus into a front country will also put pressure on Poland and the Baltic states. In this way, Moscow can get the opportunity to send the message to the West that the field of war can expand and conflicts can spread to its own territory.
On the other hand, Misnk is looking for a way out. It is known that Belarus does not want to be a party to the war. Moreover, a decision to be taken in this direction may cause protests that will put the Lukashenko administration in trouble, as it did in 2020. Because the Belarusian people do not want to be involved in the war. Moreover, the protests in question clearly demonstrated that the pro-Western segments in the country have a substantial capacity to lead the streets. Therefore, the Lukashenko administration is showing a resistance to Moscow’s demands. However, it is highly debatable how long Minsk can maintain this stance.
As a matter of fact, some developments in April 2023 create the impression that Belarus can act in accordance with Russia’s demands. For example, in his statement on April 9, 2023, Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that the talks between Putin and Lukashenko will give a new impetus to the development of cooperation between the two countries.[3] At this point, considering the frequency of the meetings between the leaders, it can be said that Peskov’s message is that the integration between the parties will deepen in accordance with the spirit of the “Union State” understanding. At the same time, this message is the message of Minsk, “Moscow’s war is my war.” it also includes a strong expectation that they will internalize such an approach.
On the other hand, Lukashenko, in his statement dated April 10, 2023, said that they expect to receive assurances from Moscow that in case of any attack, Russia will defend Belarus as its own territory.[4] As can be understood, Lukashenko’s words indicate that Belarus can accept to become a frontline country and expects some security guarantees for this.
As a result, Russia is in an effort to open a new front in the war in Ukraine from the north. Thus, the Ukrainian Army will also have to focus on the north of the country, Poland and the Baltic Countries will feel more intense pressure. For this, Moscow is trying to persuade Belarus. The available data can be interpreted as Minsk’s acceptance of this request. Even though Belarus tried to stay away from the war, especially after the protests in 2020, the integration within the context of the “Union State” concept gained momentum and an asymmetrical dependency relationship was formed between the parties. This means that Belarus’ resistance to stay out of the war may be broken.
[1] “About Union State”, Information Analysis Portal of the Union State, https://soyuz.by/en/about-union-state, (Date of Accession: 11.04.2023).
[2] Doğacan Başaran, “Zelensky’s Visit to the US: What is the Future of the Russian-Ukrainian War?”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/zelenskys-visit-to-the-us-what-is-the-future-of-the-russian-ukrainian-war/?lang=en, (Date of Accession: 11.04.2023).
[3] “Putin-Lukashenko Talks to Give Fresh Impetus to Russian-Belarusian Cooperation-Kremlin”, TASS, https://tass.com/politics/1601781, (Date of Accession: 11.04.2023).
[4] “Минск хочет получить гарантии защиты со стороны России, заявил Лукашенко”, News Mail, https://news.mail.ru/politics/55767691/, (Date of Accession: 11.04.2023).
