



# ANKASAM

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## ANKASAM OUTLOOK

# Another Name for Power Struggle: ‘Corridors’ and ‘Side Belt’

21st century witnesses a deepening and widening geopolitical power struggle between the land and naval Powers. The aim of the “empire on which the sun never sets”, which is identified with England and stamped the period of the end of 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, has once again involve with the countries which has the power already, and the ones who are candidate for this. It seems

that progress of this power struggle between oversea powers and land powers will be determined by “side belts” and “corridors.” Current and potential geopolitical earthquakes of Ukraine to Taiwan are the most significant indicator of this.

This line definitely shows the quick transformation of the geopolitical idea, which is based on



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land and territorial dominance including side belt, from the theory to the practice. In that regard, the increasing acts of controlling water ways/routes, parallel to strengthening mercantile marine and navies, and strategic documents and doctrines established in that sense, especially by China and partway Russia, are quite important.

That's why, we are facing geopolitical rivalry, which is multi-dimensional/targeted, would depolarize the status, and even perpetuity of naval powers, as much as land powers.

Except the "World Island" (Afro-Asia), in this process, which is based on the reallocation of the seas with polars and oceans, therefore a new geopolitical map, "slippery ground" in the international arena, and "slippery relationship" between the actors seem that they will be replaced with new alliances or powerful strategic cooperation, as it happened before the First World War.

One of the most important and salient issues are the determinant role of the losers of the First and Second World Wars in the new process and "Historical Empires", who show a tendency to come back to international politics even they are late for the struggle of colonialism/hegemony.

It is aimed to surround and exulcerated China, as well as to "exit/outflow" and to fail the "hegemony building" project of China which includes Indo-Pacific. Moreover, it is aimed to fail "Asian Era/Challenge", that is tried to be customized with China.

#### **The one who controls corridor will rule the world**

Therefore, increasing number of actors, make the web of relations more complicated as spreads the geography in a wider area. At that point, we see that the Russian-Ukrainian War is aiming not only Eastern Europe, but also the line starting from the Arctics to Caspian, even Central Asia. Here it creates the center of the power struggle not only based on Eurasia, but also Arctics.

A simultaneous project towards "North-South" and "East-West" corridors, which is based on land and coastal regions that the two countries carry out, as well as surrounding of Russia and partly China, is implied.

"Taiwan Crisis, developments in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Myanmar and even Pakistan, emerge as a part of power struggle from South China Sea to Malacca, and from there to Red Sea (Indo-Pacific) and Mediterranean Sea emerges as a part of power struggle over sea corridors.

It is needed that to think about US policy towards Pakistan not unrelated from policy towards India. At the end, India is a member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, which challenges unipolarity of the US. Even China and Russia will not be in the same polar, it seems that they aim to take place in a multipolar world, over the leadership of "New Neutrals/Non-Aligned."

#### **Kissenger responses**

This shows us why the US is placed in Afghanistan in the post 9/11 and that it pushed the region to a big dangerous uncertainty with the advantage of the capability of power projection here. Therefore, the European-Pacific cantered crisis, which shows the tendency of deepening-widening, and which the US put into practice, point outs that the Washington watches a global strategy, in contrast with the points that Henry Kissinger expressed in his interview in the Wall Street Journal.

As US wants to eliminate the strategic loneliness over those crises, current/possible cooperation between those powers try to sabotage alliance process -as can be seen in Germany-EU/Russia and the others- establish its own alliance and make it unbeatable of its hegemony with lower cost.

In that sense, the US wants to control "First Ring" (Inner Crescent) with the operation it started over the "Second Ring" (Outer Crescent) in side belt with Taiwan crisis. At that point, the US policy aims to close the breach in the side belt; moreover, tries to re-establish its power in those regions with direct-indirect interventions and "threatening" the process going to challenge, and preventing it with crises.

As Germany-centred European Union (EU), the initiatives of including the South Asia and Far East countries, including Pakistan to the side belt are also quite important. The latest developments in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, even Japan and European countries should be evaluated in that sense.

Movements in the axis of Iran can be accepted as an important indicator of the continuation of widening operations towards other countries, which are seen as out of system by the US.

It is not possible that the US will give New Delhi a chance to be a third power center as even it is non-aligned/unbiased. That's why, India needs a new strategy. New Delhi's realization of this will destroy the new big game in the region. However, "strategic blindness" should be overcome.

#### **Hard choice over India**

India's position in "Quadrilateral Dialogue", where the US, Australia, and Japan take place, emerges as a part of an act against deterring China's power and increasing threat in the territorial-maritime borders. Here, especially Himalayans, China-Pakistan relations and geopolitics of Indian Ocean are effective in the multipolar world seeking based on SCO and BRICS, as well as the process of New Delhi-Washington.

Parallel to China's provocation and starting to turn into an aggressive power, India's membership to AUKUS can be more than a possibility. QUAD-AUKUS can be concrete steps towards a regional NATO structure, and in that sense, India's alliance is primarily important for the US. The terminologic/conceptual preferences of the US give quite important clues, such as Indo-Pacific.

Therefore, India is facing a tough choice in this new geopolitical equation. Whether it will take place in "Asian Alliance", which defends multipolarism, or play the role of regional power seems as global power such as Germany and Japan.

#### **Tit-for-tat struggle in near belts-corridors**

It clearly feels that China and Russia adapt attack strategy against the policy of the US targeting side belt and corridors, and they venture tit-for-tat struggle in that sense. With the latest doctrine, it appeared that Russia's territorial challenge over Ukraine will continue in the dimension of maritime. Except China and India, Russia's trial to be a naval power (although here it is seen that some of the European states have tendency towards this) and in that regard, "Naval Doctrine of Russian Federation" declared on July 31, 2022 is significant. To repeat, this issue points out that power struggle will spread to "Maritime Corridors" and "Side Belt", including Arctics, polars, oceans and maritime areas.

As a result, a new structure of geopolitical balance-equation from a wider geography from the West to East and North to South and future of the process is about whom to control those corridors. Here, we are facing a bigger game-challenge which includes new/modern corridors including Spice Way and Silk Road, stands out with the Belt-Road Initiative.

This process, which is seen as equivalent to the end of the domination based on the seas for the US-led Western world, means the change of hegemony in the context of the East-West. It will not be a surprise for both sides that the power struggle based on the "World Island" and its surroundings, including the Arctic, will intensify in the upcoming period and follow a course towards the depths of Eurasia, including the inland seas. Because it will be this central geography and the "others" here that will determine the future of the process to a large extent.

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<https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/guc-mucadelesinin-diger-adi-koridorlar-ve-kenar-kusak/2673536>



## ANKASAM ANALYSIS

# EU Visa Restrictions for Russian Citizens

Some European Union (EU) member states are increasingly demanding that visa restrictions for Russian citizens should be applied as a policy of EU. In this context, European Commission Spokesperson Anitta Hipper stated that EU member states should act in a coordinated manner on the restriction of visas for Russian tourists.[1] According to Hipper, Brussels wants to facilitate a coordinated response to Russia and to this end, it negotiates with member

states at the political and technical level. Expressing that their main objective is to ensure that the measures taken are coordinated and to promote European principles, Hipper once again reminded that issuing visas in humanitarian situations should be protected throughout the EU.[2] She also said that the issue will be discussed at the EU Foreign Ministers Meeting will be held in Prague on 30-31 August 2022.[3]



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The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, on August 9, 2022, called on Western countries to ban the entry of Russians. He stated that Russians should "live in their own world until they change their philosophy".[4] But Zelenskyy's statement is to blame the war on the people of Russia. However, it is impossible for all the Russian people, whose population is 144 million, to support the state. However, Zelenski seems to be turning the needle in the wrong direction with his explanation.

On the other hand, the potential of Russian citizens to carry out propaganda or espionage activities in European countries is also considered. So that; on August 21, 2022, four Czechs, two Russians and a Ukrainian were arrested for alleged spying in Albania. These individuals were caught while taking pictures near an arms factory in Poliçan in Southern Albania.[5] It is possible that more such incidents will occur.

According to the European Commission, Russia is one of the largest source countries for Schengen visa applications. That's why, Russians accounted for 24% of all Schengen visa applications before the Covid-19 pandemic outbreak. In addition, while the Schengen visa issuance process in 2019 took only three working days; this period has lasted two weeks or more recently.[6]

While active discussions continue the need to ban tourist visas for Russian citizens; with this ban, the EU hopes to increase the pressure on Moscow and put an end to Russia's "special military operation" in Ukraine, which started on February 24, 2022. The data, on the other hand, indicate that such a ban would be a significant loss for the Russian people. While the EU probably aims to prevent Russian citizens from operating in the Schengen Area in favor of the Moscow administration; on the other hand, it wants a pressure from the public to the political elites in Russia.

As part of the seventh sanctions package adopted by the Council of Europe in July 2022, a draft resolution on the ban has been submitted for discussion. Already shortly after the start of the war, that is, on February 26, 2022, the EU suspended the facilitated visa regime with Russia. However, during this period, the European Commission refused to completely ban Schengen tourist visas for Russians as it was against EU norms.[7] Therefore, the adoption of such a ban at the meeting to be held in August 2022 will be contrary to EU norms and contradict the previous statements of the European Commission.

Various states, including the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Belgium, and Denmark, have restricted or stopped the processing of certain types of entry documents for Russians following the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Latvia, Lithuania, and the Czechia have called for the ban on issuing visas to tourists which comes from Russia, at EU level. While Finland announced that the visas issued for Russians would be reduced by 90%; Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania have taken similar decisions. Already, Lithuania is one of the first countries to restrict issuing visas to Russian citizens.[8] The fact that they are border neighbors to Russia also has an effect on the decisions of these states. [9] In other words, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czechia, Denmark, Norway and Poland, which are among the Schengen Area countries, are the countries that support the ban on Russian tourists.[10] On the other hand, Germany does not support such a practice, stating that most of the tourists and immigrants fled the country because they did not support the current regime in Russia.[11]

Such a restriction is not unusual, except for the temporary travel bans imposed during the intense period of the Covid-19 outbreak. Approval of the ban, although unlikely, could be a move that will push Europe further into the corner. Currently, "maintenance" works on the Nord Stream-1 Pipeline increase the expectation that a "cold winter" will be experienced throughout the region. In this case, Russia's response to the visa ban will be through energy issue.

The ban, of course, may lead to social unrest in Russia as well, and even to an increase in illegal entry into Europe. It can be predicted that the Russians, who cannot travel through most of the countries in the West, will try to go abroad through neighboring countries such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, China, and Georgia. This may lead to an increase in illegal activities and adversely affect the security dynamics in the region.

In conclusion, the EU's approval of the visa ban is not positive; can create a negative environment. Although the visa means a diplomatic relationship and a contract, the ban in question targets the Russian people rather than the Moscow administration. This, in turn, may increase anti-Europeanism in Russian society. Moreover, such a ban could have the effect of confirming Russian President Vladimir Putin's rhetoric based on the European racism argument. So not the one who ended the war; prolonging results may occur. In addition to all these, it is possible that the tension between the Russians living in Europe and the peoples of the countries they live in may increase. Therefore, it can be said that the possible ban decision is not rational for the union. Moreover, it can be argued that the ban would contradict the EU's image in the international arena.

[1] "EU to Discuss Visa Restrictions for EU Citizens at End of August", News.am, <https://news.am/eng/news/716580.html>, (Date of Accession: 21.08.2022).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] "Zelensky Calls on West to ban all Russian Travelers", Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/08/ukraine-zelensky-interview-ban-russian-travelers/>, (Date of Accession: 21.08.2022).

[5] "Four Czechs, Two Russians, Ukrainian Arrested for Alleged Espionage in Albania", Euronews, <https://www.euronews.com/2022/08/21/two-russians-ukrainian-arrested-for-alleged-espionage-in-albania>, (Date of Accession: 21.08.2022).

[6] "EU Looks to Russian Tourist Visa Ban as Means to Help End Ukraine War", Anadolu Agency, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/eu-looks-to-russian-tourist-visa-ban-as-means-to-help-end-ukraine-war/2662744>, (Date of Accession: 22.08.2022).

[7] Ibid.

[8] "These EU&Schengen Countries Support an Entry Ban on Russian Tourists So Far", Schengen Visa Info, <https://www.schengenvisa.info.com/news/these-eu-schengen-countries-support-an-entry-ban-on-russian-tourists-so-far/>, (Date of Accession: 22.08.2022).

[9] "Russians Scramble for Visas as EU Mulls Travel Restrictions", The Moscow Times, <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/08/16/russians-scramble-for-visas-as-eu-mulls-travel-restrictions-a78570>, (Date of Accession: 21.08.2022).

[10] "These EU&Schengen...", a.g.m.

[11] "European countries introduce bans on the movement of Russians", Visit Ukraine, <https://visitukraine.today/blog/725/european-countries-introduce-bans-on-the-movement-of-russians>, (Date of Accession: 23.08.2022).



## ANKASAM ANALYSIS

# Russia, China, and India in the Same Drill: Vostok-2022

Recently, it has been observed that military and political tensions have increased at the global level. For this reason, states take care to keep their armies and navies ready through various drills. Moreover, the nature of the drills is now changing. In the past, while symbolic drills aiming to give strategic messages were generally carried out; today, technically, higher-level military action preparations are being tested.

Looking at the routine military drills of Russia, it can be stated that the drills are held in a stra-

tegic region of the country periodically in September every year. One of these is the Vostok Drills, which are held in every four years. As a matter of fact, it has been announced that Vostok-2022 will be held on between the dates of August 30 and September 5, 2022, in the Eastern Military Zone, which is close to China and Japan. It is stated that the drill is planned to include 13 military training areas, including Kuril Islands. It has been announced that China, India, Mongolia, Tajikistan, and Belarus will also participate in this drill. It should be noted that;



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China also participated in Vostok-2018. On August 17, 2022, the Chinese Ministry of Defense confirmed the information that the Chinese Army will take part in Vostok-2022.[1]

The drill in question aims to give the message that Russia, which is fighting Ukraine in the West, is also ready for a war in the East. At the same time, the drill is very important due to the current developments in the Asia-Pacific region in the context of the Taiwan Crisis. It can be said that Russia aims to reveal its role in East Asia through this drill. Thus, the Kremlin reveals that it has the capacity to respond to various threats from the east of the country.

As it is known, the influence of the United States of America (USA) and its allies is prominent in the Asia-Pacific region and these states are implementing a containment strategy against China. Moreover, Japan's desire to rapidly develop its military capacity indicates that the region may turn into a crisis and conflict zone. For this reason, the purpose of such drills for Moscow is to show its rivals the costs of an attack on Russia or, in other words, to remind the Kremlin's deterrence.

On the other hand, Russia is aware that the Eastern Military Region is a geography where some problems can be experienced during the war in terms of population, infrastructure, and capacity. For example, it is easy to provide support to the Central Military District; however, due to the inadequacy of the military infrastructure, the lengthening of the supply line, and the presence of countries in the region that are politically closer to the West, Kremlin thinks that it should not be caught unprepared for the risks and threats that may arise on its eastern borders.

Considering the increasing influence of the West and especially the USA in the region, it can be stated that the Chinese Army's participation in Vostok-2022 carries a strong message. Therefore, the two countries are determined to confirm their message that they act together against the West, through military cooperation.

For Russia, China's participation in military drills is a development that will show that the diplomatic or military isolation applied to Moscow was not successful despite the tension with the West. Because although it is foreseen that the interests of the two states will coincide in the medium and long term, both Russia and China continue to act together against the USA and its allies.

For China, such drills are an important opportunity to benefit from the experience of the Russian Army in modern warfare conditions. Because the most important disadvantage of the Chinese Army is its lack of war experience. Because China has not faced a real war since its border war with Vietnam in 1979. Moreover, although China has invested heavily in modernizing its army since the 1990s, the competence level of the Chinese Army has not been tested yet. Therefore, the Beijing administration can analyze the content of the drills and draw some conclusions about its own military capacity. In addition, large-scale drills such as Vostok-2022 are extremely important for China due to the increasing tension in Taiwan.

Another advantage that the drill will provide China is that the Indian Army will also take part in Vostok-2022. Thus, the important power of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will give the message that they act together in defense and security policies. This will mean that the influence of the SCO will increase. Of course, this will cause the SCO to be perceived as a stronger bloc.

At this point, it should be noted that; The Indian Army's participation in Vostok-2022 is quite interesting. Because India is an actor that stands out with its closeness to the West against China. Even there are serious border disputes on the Beijing-New Delhi line. For example, in 2020, clashes took place on the de facto Control Line in the Galwan Valley of the Ladakh Region of India, and both sides massed troops on the border. Negotiations between the parties on the border issue have not been resolved yet. Moreover, it has been announced that the US and India will conduct a drill in September 2022, only 100 km away from the disputed border between China and India. Despite this, India's participation with China in Vostok-2022 is an extremely remarkable development. Here, the Russian factor is effective. As a matter of fact, it is known that there are strong ties between Moscow and New Delhi.

On the other hand, despite all the problems with China, India tries not to attract Beijing's reaction. For example, it opposes attributing a military meaning to QUAD, despite the wishes of the USA. In addition, New Delhi is standing side by side with China within the framework of the BRICS and the SCO. Therefore, India's participation in Vostok-2022 carries a strong message. This is in line with India's pursuit of strategic autonomy in its foreign policy. At the same time, New Delhi, thanks to these steps, gives the message that it can get closer with Russia and China if the West is subjected to sanctions pressure.

Beijing, on the other hand, is pleased with the development of cooperation on the New Delhi-Moscow line to prevent or at least maintain a certain level of rapprochement between India and the United States. Therefore, it can be argued that Russia is positioned as an actor that maintains the balance in China-India relations. This balance was once again confirmed with the move to invite both China and India to Vostok-2022. As a matter of fact, if one of the parties was invited; a scenario where the other is ignored may serve a process that will deepen the threat perception of both actors. Especially if India is not involved in the joint drill between Russia and China, it is possible that New Delhi would think that this drill was conducted against it. This, in turn, would lead India to improve relations with the United States. Moscow prevented this possibility by inviting New Delhi as well.

In short, the nature of the drills organized by the states has changed in recent years and both the military capacity of these drills has increased and the strategic nature of the messages given has come to the fore. Therefore, a process that can be called "drills diplomacy" has started in international politics. In this process, states give messages about alliance relations and show that they can fight if necessary. In this sense, the drills also contain important clues about the consequences that may arise if the problems in international relations are not resolved through negotiations.

As a result, on Vostok-2022, Russia is making a show of strength stating that it can fight if necessary and wage a war on two sides at the same time to protect its interests in East Asia. But this is not the only message that was given. Through the drill in question, Moscow highlights its alliance relations and reveals that it is not alone despite the sanctions imposed. Bringing China and India together is also a development that cannot be ignored.

[1] "Китай примет участие в российских учениях «Восток-2022»", RBC RU, <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/17/08/2022/62fcc1209a79473841d65a7d>, (Date of Accession : 18.08.2022).



ANKASAM ANALYSIS

# Upcoming Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Future of the Dayton Regime

After the death of Josip Broz Tito, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia experienced a bloody process that lasted for nearly 20 years due to the increasing ethnic conflicts, economic depressions, and the change in the balance of power in Eastern Europe and was divided into seven different countries.

The most painful process in the division took place during the founding period of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this period, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) suggested holding a referendum for the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The vast majority of those who participated in the referendum held in 1992, which boycotted by the Serbs voted for the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, this referendum caused a civil war by triggering

ethnic and religious fault lines in the region. In the same year, with the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina by both the EU and the United States (US), some bloody events took place between the Serbian Federal Army and the Bosnians. At a time when the Dayton Negotiations started, the Serbian Army attacked Srebrenica on the eve of the Serbian Holiday to gain an advantage in the negotiations, and the "Srebrenica Massacre", the biggest massacre after the Second World War, happened.

Although the Dayton Peace Agreement signed on December 14, 1995 ended the civil war, it was insufficient to meet the needs of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This treaty led to the formation of a weak central authority and a cumbersome state apparatus in Bosnia and Herze-



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govina.

The heavy economic conditions brought by the period of Covid-19 pandemic, on the other hand, caused the regions, especially the Balkan geography, where the central authority is weak, to face a system crisis. Bosnia and Herzegovina is also one of the states that have felt this crisis most closely with its current cosmopolitan structure and the Dayton Order, which is no precedent for it in the world. The ethnic and religious fault lines between the Serbian Entity and the Bosnians in the country clearly invite foreign interventions.

On the other hand, the EU proposes to make some changes in the election law of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to revise the Dayton Agreement. The elections to be held on October 2, 2022, in the shadow of these discussions.

On the Dayton Peace Treaty, two autonomous regions were established within the country, namely the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian Entity. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly inhabited by Bosniaks and Croats, covers 51% of the country's surface area; while the region inhabited by Serbs constituted 48%. In addition, there is Brčko region consists the %1 of the territory of the country that has autonomous government and not belong to any entity. The region called "Eastern Slavonia" was left under the control of Croatia. Thus, it was aimed to achieve a consensus among Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats, especially in foreign policy and economy.

In this context, it was decided that the two autonomous regions established within the country would have their own constitution, parliament and government. According to the treaty, the Presidential Council represents the highest political authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A structure was built in which three people representing the three founding elements in the country are elected for a period of four years and carry out the Presidency in rotations for eight-month periods. It has been decided that the Prime Minister will take office as a result of the voting in the House of Representatives, provided that he is proposed by the Presidential Council.[1] The Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, includes a bicameral structure, the People's Assembly with 15 members (5 Bosniaks, 5 Serbs, 5 Croats) and the Chamber of Representatives with 42 members (28 Members Bosnian Federation, 14 Serb Entities). Members of the People's Assembly are elected by the assemblies of the entities.[2]

The Dayton Agreement does not only constitute political institutions; has also activated an international mechanism to ensure the continuity of the process. A 55-member Peace Implementation Council consisting of states and international organizations was established, which is responsible for implementing the re-

quirements of the Treaty. The Office of the High Representative, of which Council is responsible, appointed by the Council and constitutes the executive wing of the council.

The High Representative has the power to impeach anyone who does not comply with the Dayton Agreement, including the President.[3] With the agreement, an "Implementation Force (IFOR)" of 60,000 people was deployed to the region under the leadership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to establish peace in the region. Parallel to the developments in the region, some changes were made in said military association. Until 2004, the "Stabilization Force (SFOR)," which was a simplified form of this military structure, operated in the region. Later, the task was given to the "Operation Althea" led by the EU.[4]

The Current Political Condition

Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina will go to the polls on October 2, 2022, under the shadow of the election law debates. In the elections to be held, in addition to the Presidential Council and the Parliament, members of parliament will be determined in two autonomous regions, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS), and 10 cantons within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the highest authority operating in the country, has been held by the German politician Christian Schmidt since August 1, 2021.[5] In the last Presidential Council elections held in 2018, Milorad Dodik from the Serbian Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, Šefik Džaferović from the Bosniak Democratic Action Party and Zeljko Komsic from the Croatian Democratic Front took the lead.[6]

Nine candidates are expected to compete for the Presidential Council in the elections. Bakir Izetbegović, the Presidential Council candidate of the Democratic Action Party (SDA), the largest political party of Bosniaks in the country; The opposition bloc, which consists of eleven political parties, declared that they support Denis Bećirović, the candidate of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The group calling itself the "State Coalition" nominated Mirsad Hadžikadić.

The current Croatian member of the council, Zeljko Komsic, has been the joint candidate of the Democratic Front (DF) and Popular Unity (GS) coalition. While the candidate of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ) is expected to be the party's leader, Dragan Covic, it is claimed that Komsic's opponent in this race will be Borjana Kristo.

The Union of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), headed by the Serbian member of the council, Milorad Dodik, nominated Zel-

jka Cvijanovic, the current president of Republika Srpska, for the council membership. Former Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations Mirko Sarovic became the candidate of the Serbian Progressive Party (SDS); Vojin Mijatovic, the candidate of the SDP, and Nenad Nesic, the candidate of the Democratic People's Union (DNS).[7]

No results could be obtained from the negotiations on the election law amendments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were desired to be held with the efforts of the West, especially the EU. The current ethnic and religious Dayton Order in the country is one of the most important obstacles to the country's EU membership. For this reason, electoral law debates remain up-to-date, and no concrete progress can be made between the parties. The state's budget for 2022 could not be accepted for a long time due to the inability to obtain a result from the negotiations between the parties, and this situation also prevented the availability of the necessary resources for the elections to be held.

The budget allocated to the Central Election Commission from the budget adopted after a long delay on June 6, 2022, was vetoed by the Minister of Finance, Vjekoslav Bevanda. At the session, with the initiative of Bevanda, a temporary solution was found for the financing of the elections and only a certain part of the amount needed for the elections was transferred to the Central Election Commission. With the intervention of Christian Schmidt, High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 6.5 million euros were allocated to the Central Election Commission for the elections.[8]

As a result of the meetings held in Bonn, Germany on December 9, 1997, the High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina was equipped with very broad powers and these powers were recorded in the literature as "Bonn Powers".

Thanks to these powers, the High Representative obviously intervenes in many processes in the country. As a matter of fact, the deadline Schmidt gave to political leaders to amend the election law is in September 2022. The electoral law that Schmidt wants to put into effect stipulates that if an ethnic group in the cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is below 3% of the total entity population, according to the census conducted in 2013, a deputy from that canton will not be elected to the People's Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the current law, every constituent element in the country has the right to remove members in all cantons.[9]

As it is known, the Balkan geography has hosted global power struggles throughout history. Within the framework of the struggle, other countries in the region have tended to develop alliance relations with NATO and the US against the historical unity

of the Serbs and the Russian. However, the fact that the election law negotiations in Bosnia and Herzegovina led by the US and the EU did not yield any results shows that the Western alliance is insufficient to solve the problems in the region. Moreover, the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina carries the risk of turning into a security crisis that rapidly deepens the political crisis.

Essentially, the Dayton Regime is an issue, in which NATO directly becomes a side. If the problem cannot be resolved, NATO's regional influence and problem-solving capability will be questioned by the countries in the region, and the psychological superiority will pass to the Serbs and therefore to Russia.

How the Bosnia and Herzegovina crisis will evolve; it may have global effects such as the enlargement of the EU and questioning the existence of NATO. In addition, future developments will affect the Albanian-Serbian tension in the Balkans in particular, and even the Ukraine Crisis in general. If the political instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues, Western states, especially the US and England, using the Ukraine War as an excuse; it can take steps to increase its military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, just like in Albania and Kosovo.

It should be noted that; despite the long-running electoral law reform debate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country's electoral commission announced that general elections would be held on October 2, 2022. However, in a country like Bosnia and Herzegovina that harbors delicate balances, it seems unlikely that a radical electoral law reform would be realized with external impositions in such a short time. Especially because the Ukraine War has increased the polarization in the Balkans, it is difficult for the parties in the country to meet on a common ground. On the other hand, it is seen that the tension between Serbia and Kosovo escalates from time to time. In this environment, it can be argued that the regional conjuncture is not suitable for changing the status quo in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Finally, it should be emphasized that; there is a serious energy war in the background of the tension on the Belgrade-Pristina line on July 31, 2022. Shortly before the tension escalated, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic stated that natural gas reserves were at the highest level in the country's history; Kosovo, on the other hand, signed a \$236 million grant agreement with the US for the transition to renewable energy. This indicates that the energy preferences of countries will affect regional dynamics in the future. Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, is completely dependent on Russia in terms of natural gas. According to the picture that will emerge after the elections, the Serbian Entity may choose to make some agreements with Russia on energy.



## ANKASAM ANALYSIS

# Russia-Ukraine War and the Growing Nuclear Risks

The war that Russia has started in Ukraine has also brought the risk of nuclear conflict on the agenda. Russia has repeatedly signaled its readiness to use nuclear weapons. The discussions regarding the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant also reveal a different aspect of the nuclear threat. A nuclear conflict in Ukraine will cause irreparable damages. Fortunately, the

foundations of the global nuclear order, which aims to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict, are more solid than thought.

First, it should be underlined that Russia's nuclear threats are not a definite declaration of intention and contain vague messages that all options are on the table. The Moscow adminis-



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tration raises these threats to prevent the West from directly intervening militarily in support of Ukraine. However, this situation does not mean that the risk of nuclear conflict is insignificant either.

On the one hand, the Russia-Ukraine war adversely affects the global order regarding nuclear arms control; on the other hand, it leads to a review of assumptions about the use of nuclear weapons in conflicts. Therefore, the dissolution of the nuclear weapons taboo comes to the fore as one of the most important issues on the international agenda.

Whether or not there is a nuclear conflict in Ukraine, the current war will have significant psychological effects on the global nuclear order. First, nuclear weapons are ceasing to be a technocratic issue and the interest of the world public opinion in the nuclear issue is increasing. Although the risk of nuclear conflict has not become a part of daily life, as it was in the early years of the Cold War, the assumption that the global nuclear order is stable and institutional has been shaken.

The situation is not only about the Russia-Ukraine war. The arms control regime has already begun to lose its stability, with various steps taken by both the United States (US) and Russia over the past two decades. However, because of the psychological impact of Russia's intervention in Ukraine on world public opinion, unlike in the early years when the Cold War ended and the risk of nuclear conflict decreased, nuclear weapons have ceased to be an issue of interest to technocrats and political elites.

The practical consequences of the growing public interest in nuclear weapons cannot be foreseen at this stage. For example, Sweden and Finland by abandoning their long-standing neutrality status, preferred to take refuge under the nuclear umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The decision of the Berlin administration to allocate more budget to armament is also noteworthy. In fact, it is also understood that the negative point of view of the public about the American nuclear weapons located in Germany has begun to change. Looking at the current picture, it can be predicted that this tendency will continue, and more countries will want to come under the nuclear umbrella of the US. Likewise, it can be asserted that countries that have close relations with Moscow will try to take advantage of the security provided by Russia's nuclear weapons.

Certainly, not every country can act in the same way. Greater public interest in nuclear risks could also lead to an anti-nuclear weapons picture. After the heat of the war in Ukraine has passed, people can force their government to an anti-nuclear weapons policy. Which option will outweigh depends on how much tensions in the international system will escalate. However, in any case, governments, especially in democratic countries, will tend to pay more attention to preferences of the public opinion. Therefore, in the international debate regarding nuclear weapons, the influence of public opinion will be more decisive.

Undoubtedly, the attitude of the American public opinion is one of the most decisive factors. The fact that the US provides nuclear assurances to more countries will be one of the most important issues to be discussed in public. Essentially, this discussion has been going on for a long time, regardless of the situation in Ukraine and nuclear weapons. For example, the previous US President, Donald Trump, has repeatedly stated explicitly and sometimes in a rude manner that allied countries must assume more responsibility for ensuring their own security. There is also the possibility that Trump will be re-elected president in the upcoming elections. Therefore, it is not easy at all to claim that the American voters will look favorably on the expansion of the nuclear umbrella provided by their country.

In short, the NATO memberships of Sweden and Finland can be misleading in this respect. Because these two countries, although they have been neutral for many years, are Western actors in the political, economic, and cultural sense. Instead of creating a burden for NATO, it is thought that they will make positive contribution to the alliance. However, when it comes to granting nuclear guarantees to American allies in Asia, this issue will create much more controversy. This, in turn, will affect the American strategy of balancing China and relations with allies in Asia. Although it is difficult to foresee the consequences of increased public attention yet, it will not be surprising if the US acts more cautiously when providing security guarantees and demands that its allies assume more responsibility.



Eventually, the consequences that the Russia-Ukraine war and the growing public attention on nuclear issues will have on the global nuclear order will become clear over time. The global nuclear order is not on the verge of extinction, but it is far from being stable. The main discussion, on the other hand, is related to how to ensure security in the long term. The question of whether the great powers will pursue a strategy based on nuclear deterrence by acquiring more allies, or whether they will prefer to strengthen the arms control regime again, will determine the future of the global nuclear order. The answer to this question is not clear, but the opinions of the public opinion of the countries will play an important role in this discussion.



## ANKASAM ANALYSIS

# Changing Attitude of Bulgaria on Gas

After the start of the Russia-Ukraine War, there has been a serious concern in the European Union (EU) due to the dependence on Russian gas and oil. Unlike other member states, Bulgaria's high dependence on Russian energy has created some doubts about the country's abandonment of Russian gas and oil. Because Sofia supplies 77% of its gas from the Russian state company Gazprom, while the only oil refinery, the largest in the Balkans, belongs to the Russian Lukoil.

Bulgaria, once considered the Soviet Union's

"staunchest Warsaw Pact ally" but joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004 and the EU in 2007, began to paint a friendly image with Western countries and therefore attracted the reaction of the Moscow administration. After the Russia-Ukraine War, Sofia's support for Western sanctions accelerated the Bulgarian Government's orientation towards the West. In this context, in his first statements after the war, former Prime Minister of Bulgaria Kirill Petkov summarized Sofia's position as in the following:[1]



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"We are fully back the existing sanctions against Russia. We work with the EU to ensure that these sanctions have maximum power, but a thing that we cannot afford is to stop the import of oil and the import of gas."

As it will be recalled, on March 31, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree about the payment of Russian gas in rubles by "unfriendly" countries of Russia, including Bulgaria. After that, the Bulgarian and Polish state gas companies refused to pay in rubles. Consequently, Gazprom has stopped the distribution of gas to both countries.

For many years, the Kremlin's ability to influence decisions in Sofia has been based on its de-facto dominance of various parts of Bulgaria's energy sector, including oil, gas and nuclear energy. For many years, the United States (US) has supported Sofia in opening the Bulgaria-Greece liquefied gas (LNG) connector, which will facilitate access to different sources of supply from suppliers in Central Asia, primarily Azerbaijan. Sofia, however, has delayed the completion of this cross-border pipeline for a long time in favor of deeper relations with Gazprom.

Due to Bulgaria's support for Ukraine, Moscow has used the "gas" card to punish the country by cutting off flows. In response to this move, Petkov stated on May 20, 2022, that "one of Putin's goals was to bring down the government, which has steered a more EU-friendly course than previous Bulgarian governments." [2]

Following the gas cut, the Sofia administration said that they are ready to stop the supply of Russian gas and have plans for alternative sources. If the plans are successful, Bulgaria will become a country with greater energy independence at lower prices. In this context, the Petkov administration, which has taken a tough stance against Russia, expelled 70 Russian diplomats and spies and accelerated the search for alternative energy sources, including the operationalization of the gas pipeline on the Greek border, which was delayed for many years.[3] In fact, it has been announced that the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (ICGB) Pipeline, which connects Greece's Komotini to Stara Zagora in central Bulgaria, will start pumping gas in both directions in July 2022.

Although a short link, the new 180-kilometer pipeline, which promises to bring energy security to a wider area of Europe and will start commercial deliveries in September 2022, is planned to be powered by LNG supplies, which will include Qatar, Alge-

ria and the United States, from the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), an extension of the Southern Gas Corridor carrying gas from Azerbaijan.

In the light of recent global events, Azerbaijan has come to the fore as one of the most reliable energy suppliers in Europe. Especially after the war, the importance of the Southern Gas Corridor for the countries of Southeastern Europe has increased considerably. In this context, Bulgaria is taking a leading role in breaking the Russian energy monopoly in Europe by ensuring the supply of Azerbaijani gas to Europe via TAP within the framework of the agreement signed with Azerbaijan.

The fact that Bulgaria will start receiving gas from Azerbaijan as of July 1, 2022, is critical for the energy security of Southeast Europe. Once the ICGB is launched, 1 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas will be supplied annually from Azerbaijan and in the next stage, this volume will increase to 3 bcm which corresponds to the current capacity of the interconnector.[4] As a result of the search for alternative gas, Sofia has reached the level of "strategic partnership" with Baku in the field of energy and has therefore achieved great success in energy security.[5]

Bulgaria, which handled to manage the gas crisis despite being one of the first countries to experience gas cuts among EU countries after the war, attracted attention with its efficient and sustainable steps to get rid of its energy dependence on Russia. However, Petkov resigned, and the caretaker government took office due to the fact that he could not get a vote of confidence in the parliament without realizing all the gas diversification plans. In this setting, it has begun to be seen that there is a change of course in the search for solutions to the energy crisis.

The caretaker government, appointed by Bulgarian President Rumen Radev, has sought to create a more moderate atmosphere towards Russia, unlike Petkov. Caretaker Prime Minister Galab Donev, who is currently considered "pro-Russian" in the Bulgarian public opinion, has put the resumption of energy flow from Russia on the table as soon as he came to power and has given a message that gas imports from Russia could continue as a result.

Despite Petkov's efforts to make Sofia less dependent on Russian gas, the caretaker government described the supply situation as "serious, if not critical," saying that Bulgaria's gas supply could last only until September 2022 and laid the political-economic basis for starting gas trade with Russia.

Following negotiations by the Petkov Government to ensure the delivery of seven tankers of LNG from an American company, the caretaker government announced that it would accept only one of the LNG tankers, citing the high cost of making room for coming supplies at the terminals, and the gas agreement with Azerbaijan would be renegotiated. The caretaker government also criticized the decision to expel Russian spies and diplomats as putting "the energy sector, the economy and the people" at risk.[6]

Following the government change in Bulgaria, Energy Minister Rossen Christov's statement that Bulgaria has no choice but to restart negotiations with Gazprom is an indication of a change in Sofia's efforts to diversify energy sources, which it has been accelerating for months. Hristov also accused Petkov of worsening ties with Moscow and making future negotiations difficult.[7]

All these developments have led to the idea that the efforts of Bulgaria to diversify gas supply carried out during the Petkov era will be in vain. Because it is seen that the steps taken in the context of energy security as part of the support given to Ukraine are being re-evaluated. This brings with it some criticisms that Bulgaria will be shuttling in the East-West balance as it has been in the past. Because the Sofia administration's resumption of negotiations with Gazprom can be interpreted as a development that will increase Russia's influence in Bulgarian politics.

Ultimately, it is still unclear whether Bulgaria will remain a transit hub in Southeast Europe within the scope of energy security, or whether it will again fall under the Russian influence. However, it is obvious that this issue will be guided by the course that the country will adopt in its energy policies. Because it is brought forward that the steps taken by the caretaker government were not taken to ensure security of supply and were based on a geopolitical preference. However, on the contrary, Sofia may also have chosen to act pragmatically, considering that it cannot ignore the need for Russian gas due to the war in Ukraine.

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[3] "Bulgaria Expels 70 Russian Diplomats over Spying Allegations", Anadolu Agency, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/bulgaria-expels-70-russian-diplomats-over-spying-allegations/2624995>, (Date of Accession: 24.08.2022).

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[6] "Bulgaria Risks a Relapse into Its Addiction to Russia's Gazprom", Politico, <https://www.politico.eu/article/bulgaria-risks-a-relapse-into-its-addiction-to-russias-gazprom/>, (Date of Accession: 24.08.2022).

[7] "Bulgaria Minister Says New Negotiations with Gazprom 'Inevitable'", Balkan Insight, <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/08/22/bulgaria-minister-says-new-negotiations-with-gazprom-inevitable/>, (Date of Accession: 24.08.2022).



## ANKASAM ANALYSIS

# Explosions in Crimea and Russia's Security Vulnerability


On August 16, 2022, a large-scale explosion took place in the military warehouses in the village of Maiskoye in the Dzhankoi Region of Crimea. Following the explosion, the railway near Dzhankoi was out of service, in addition a substation and buildings were damaged. According to media reports, there is a large military garrison with an airport inherited from the Soviet Union in the region, which started to be restructured after 2014. Some sources point out that this airport may have been hit as well.[1] On the same day, another emergency case occurred in the vicinity of the village of Gvardeisky, near the military airport of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. It was stated that power lines, power plants, railway tracks and buildings were damaged after this incident.

Although the Russian Ministry of Defense first announced that the cause of the explosions in the Dzhankoi region was "a fire caused by the temporary ammunition in one of the military units", it was later stated that the incident was a sabotage.

[2] Declaring a state of emergency, the so-called Head of the Crimean Administration, Sergei Aksyonov, announced that two civilians were injured and approximately 2,000 people were evacuated from the region as a result of these explosions.[3]

A week before the events, there was an explosion at the military airport in Novofedorovka. Making a statement about this explosion that took place on August 9, 2022, Aksyonov stated that the northern regions of Crimea harbor a high terrorist risk and that the "terrorist threat" extends to the strategic facilities, especially the administrative institutions of the region.[4]

There are comments that the Ukrainian Army may be behind sabotage events such as the destruction of ammunition depots, weapons, logistics facilities, power lines and transportation facilities. However, Ukraine did not confirm or deny any involvement in these events. In addition, on August 16,



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2022, President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelensky issued a decree on the establishment of a structure called "Consultative Council on the Recovery of Crimea from Occupation and its Reintegration with Ukraine." Regarding the subject, Zelensky said that, "I held a meeting about the preparations for the Crimean Platform. Today, an advisory council has been established on the de-occupation of Crimea."<sup>[5]</sup>

The Crimean Platform Summit was held in Kiev for the first time on August 23, 2021, with the initiative of Ukraine. At the meeting, the issue of rescuing and reclaiming Crimea from occupation was discussed. More than 40 countries and international organizations participated in the event. Moscow, on the other hand, described this meeting as an "anti-Russian and unfriendly event."

Igor Strelkov, who took an active role in the process of Russia's intervention in the Donbas Region in 2014 and declared himself as the Minister of Defense of the region, has expressed that the explosion that took place in a large warehouse near Dzhankoi on August 16, 2022, may have been caused by "kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles" belonging to Ukraine.<sup>[6]</sup>

According to retired Russian Lieutenant General Yuri Netkachev, Kyiv is trying to destroy important logistics routes, power lines and other energy facilities in the Crimea and Kherson region to cause discontent among the population. Netkachev claimed that Kiev was trying to acquire high-precision missiles with a range of 300 km from the US and NATO, and if it procured these missiles, it could hit the Russian troops on the peninsula, including targets in the Crimea. In addition, according to Netkachev, Ukraine is preparing to produce its own drones especially.<sup>[7]</sup>

According to some sources, British military intelligence is behind the attacks in Crimea.<sup>[8]</sup> It was also stated that a plan to organize an attack on the Crimean bridge was discussed between London and Kyiv. However, the UK has officially declared that it does not have such information and has denied such accusation.<sup>[9]</sup>

On the other hand, there are also comments that the attacks on Crimea are part of Kiev's plan to reclaim the region. For example, on August 15, 2022, the Ukrainian Parliament decided to increase the defense and security budget by \$7.3 billion to \$32.55 billion.<sup>[10]</sup>

Crimea is a region where security is provided against threats from Russia. One of the aims of the intervention in the Donbas Region of Ukraine in 2014 was to keep the conflicts in Ukraine away from Crimea. Since that year, Moscow has acted in accordance with this plan and expectation. However, after Russia took the decision to seize other parts of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Kiev's interest in Crimea and thus in ensuring the territorial integrity recognized by international law came to the fore again.

Although Ukraine officially states that it is not behind the explosions, the fact that Moscow calls it "terrorism and sabotage" indicates that the attacks were carried out from the outside, or that is how Moscow wants to see the developments. On the other hand, although it is not clear who the perpetrator of the attacks is, the fact that the attacks can be carried out has revealed some important results.

First, the attacks indicate that Crimea is not as safe a place for Russia as it used to be. Moreover, it seems inevitable that the image of "Russia cannot ensure the security of the region" is formed. For this reason, it can be predicted that the confidence of the people in Crimea in Russia will decrease and therefore the reaction will increase. Therefore, those who are satisfied with the fact that Crimea is under Russian control may begin to question their thoughts. It is also possible that support for Russia's intervention in Ukraine will decrease due to concerns that conflicts in other parts of Ukraine will spread to Crimea.

The second conclusion concerns the military defense of Crimea. Russia has important military installations in Crimea, and they are protected by defense systems. The fact that the attacks could not be eliminated reveals the weakness of Russia in the field of defense. This reveals the idea that Crimea cannot be defended adequately. For example, shortly before the attacks, plans were being made to celebrate the Day of the Russian Navy in Sevastopol. However, a large explosion occurred in front of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters and this event was canceled after people were injured. If this explosion took place under the influence of Ukrainian missiles, it can be said that Russian air defense systems could not adequately protect the Black Sea Fleet. In addition, these attacks may not have been carried out by missiles, but by unmanned aerial vehicles flown from anywhere in Crimea. But this would also mean the weakness of intelligence.



## ANKASAM ANALYSIS

# Kosovo-Serbia Tension in the Framework of Internal and External Dynamics

The European Union (EU), which succeeded in its mediation process regarding the Kosovo-Serbia tension, which caused the footsteps of a new war to be felt in the Balkans, announced that an agreement was reached between Pristina and Belgrade on the "free travel" of all citizens, including Kosovo Serbs, on August 27, 2022.<sup>[1]</sup> This enabled the risk of hot conflict to disappear for a while at least.

That development prevented a new one from being added to the EU's unsuccessful exams in the face of crises. Because, during the events

in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s, the EU could not prevent the conflicts in its immediate surroundings and the competence of the union was brought into question during the period until the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Therefore, the EU has carried out a successful crisis management process, at least during the recent events in the Balkans. However, the developments that took place in August 2022 once again revealed the fragility of the ethnic and geopolitical fault lines in the region. This indicates that tensions may escalate again in



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the future. Therefore, evaluating the events that brought Kosovo and Serbia face to face, will also facilitate the prediction of future developments.

#### Why Did the Tension Rise on the Pristina-Belgrade Line?

As it is known, the decision of the Government of Kosovo to introduce a uniform identity and license plate application throughout the country and therefore including Serbs, drew the reaction of Kosovo Serbs. Thus, the fuse of social movements was ignited, and various protest demonstrations were organized. This caused war bells to ring in the Balkans.

After these protests, the Pristina administration's postponement of the decision for a month allowed the tension to decrease and the door to negotiations remained open. In other words, the crisis that broke out in the first days of August 2022 between the Government of Kosovo and Kosovo Serbs in particular, and between Kosovo and Serbia in general, ended without reaching a hot conflict with the announcement of the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, that he postponed the decision on the license plate and identity card for one month.

To reduce the rising tension between the two countries in this chaotic environment, the European Union (EU) brought together Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Serbian President Aleksandr Vucic on August 18, 2022 in Brussels. However, it was stated that no concrete results came out of this meeting. On the contrary, when he returned from Brussels, Vucic expressed his determination to protect Kosovo Serbs.[2] This has been interpreted as the war option is still at a size that cannot be ignored.

In this context, instead of reducing the tension, Serbian President Vucic's promises to protect Kosovo Serbs; it should be emphasized that it has an effect by raising tension and deepening the crisis. Because the Belgrade administration has clearly demonstrated through Vucic's words that it can act in line with the ideal of "Greater Serbia" when appropriate conditions arise.

In short, the process shaped by the internal dynamics of the country regarding Kosovo's own demographic structure, soon turned into a regional issue in line with Serbia's argument for the protection of Kosovo Serbs. Because the attitude of Belgrade caused the concern that ethnic violence could spread to the entire Balkans. At this point, it can be stated that Serbia's refusal to recognize Kosovo's independence has made the issue much more complicated.

Territorial War Risk

While there is tension between Kosovo and Serbia; the thought that a possible war might not be limited to these two countries also came to mind, and this further deepened the concerns. It is known that a similar ethnic and geopolitical vulnerability exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is obvious that the Bosnian Serbs, under the leadership of Milorad Dodik, are to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina and join Serbia. Therefore, the crisis in Belgrade-Sarajevo relations can be added to the tension in the Belgrade-Pristina line due to the approach of Serbia, which acts with the claim of protecting all Serbs.

In such a scenario, it may become inevitable for the Balkans to return to the circle of fire, just like in the 1990s. However, it should be emphasized that; the issue is not so limited that it can only be explained by regional dynamics and ethnic fault lines which is unique to the Balkans. Because the region stands out as one of the most important playgrounds of the Russia-West struggle.

#### The Playground of the Russia-Western Struggle: The Balkans

It should be noted that; after the start of the Russia-Ukraine War, the idea that the struggle for power and influence between Russia and the West could spread to various geographies has emerged. As a matter of fact, it would not be a surprising development that the crises and instability are carried by Russia to the immediate surroundings of Europe which is Balkan geography. In fact, the debates both in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina take place partly because of this situation. Russia is giving the message that the crises will not be limited to the Russian close circle as the pressure of sanctions against it increases.

Based on all this information, when the recent events are handled in the context of the Russia-West struggle, it seems possible that ethnic violence will rise again in the Balkans, where geopolitical fault lines are extremely fragile. In this sense, the Kosovo-Serbia tension indicates that the first geopolitical earthquake in the region may erupt here. It is possible that Bosnia and Herzegovina will follow this.

As it is known, Serbia, Kosovo Serbs and Bosnian Serbs are under the influence of the Russian-centered Pan-Slavism movement because of the Balkans is a fragile geography that stands out in the Russia-Western rivalry.

In fact, Russia's intervention in Ukraine has also shown a paradigm shift in Russian foreign policy, which can be defined as the transition from Eurasianism to Pan-Slavism. Therefore, the Mos-

cow administration may want to destabilize Europe through crises by using the actors under its influence in the Balkans.

On the other hand, Kosovo is a country that gained its independence with the support of the West. As a matter of fact, the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) is working in Kosovo. In this sense, it is a development that cannot be ignored that KFOR Commander Major General Ferenc Kajari stated that NATO forces are ready to intervene to maintain stability in the country if no agreement is reached between Kosovo and Serbia.[3] In this statement, Kajari made it clear that if the Serbs set up barricades, they would remove the barricades.[4]

The statement in question can be interpreted as a message given by NATO to Russia. Because NATO felt the need to demonstrate that it is determined to protect Kosovo's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and stability. In other words, there is a serious struggle between the Moscow administration, which tries to strengthen its hand in the Ukraine War by creating instability in the Balkans, and the West, which wants to maintain its influence and hegemony through the establishment of regional stability. This makes the region a geography where geopolitical earthquakes are expected.

#### Is It Possible to Talk About a Monolithic West?

However, when we look at the Balkans policy of the West, it is not possible to talk about a monolithic West. In this sense, considering that NATO is an international organization in which the US makes its weight felt, it can be argued that the Washington administration signaled that it would like to turn possible conflicts into opportunities and that it would intervene in the event of a crisis, aiming to break Russia's influence in the region. On the other hand, the EU has chosen to emphasize mediation diplomacy. In fact, the fact that Serbia is an EU "candidate country" despite its closeness to Russia has strengthened the hand of the European Union in this regard.

The basis of the EU's mediation efforts is that the Balkans are in the immediate vicinity of the EU. Therefore, if things get out of control in this geography, it is inevitable for EU countries to destabilize. For this reason, there is a visible separation within the West. On the one hand, there is a US that is trying to maintain its hegemony and thus its global leadership through crises and chaos[5], in other words, feeding on conflict; on the other hand, there is the EU, which is looking for ways to maintain peace, anticipating that regional instability will reflect negatively on itself. As a matter of fact, reaching an agreement between Kosovo

and Serbia can be interpreted as a victory of the EU against the US. However, there is an important point that unites the USA and the EU. It is also anti-Russian. The parties agree on limiting the influence of the Moscow administration.

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As a result, the discussions between the Government of Kosovo and the Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo brought Pristina and Belgrade face to face in a short time and war bells started to ring. Considering that there are separatist Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that Belgrade is trying to protect the Serbs in both countries within the framework of the ideal of "Greater Serbia", the importance of preventing the crisis before it turns into a hot conflict can be better understood. Because the Balkans is an extremely fragile geography in terms of ethnicity and geopolitics. Moreover, this region has the feature of being one of the playing fields of the struggle for influence between Russia and the West. For this reason, the EU's reconciliation of the parties is a very important development. However, it is not rational to claim that a new crisis will not break out on such a sensitive ground. Therefore, the sustainability of the peace environment is a question.

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[2] Eduart Halili, "Vucic Vows Protect to Serbs in Kosovo", Albanian Daily News, <https://albaniandailynews.com/news/vucic-vows-to-protect-serbs-in-kosovo>, (Date of Accession: 26.08.2022).

[3] "KFOR Ready to Unblock Any Barricades in Northern Kosovo", Euractiv, [https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short\\_news/kfor-ready-to-unblock-any-barricades-in-northern-kosovo/](https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/kfor-ready-to-unblock-any-barricades-in-northern-kosovo/), (Date of Accession: 26.08.2022).

[4] Ibid.

[5] Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, "Ukrayna'dan Tayvan'a: 'Kutup Savaşları' ya da 'Kaos Düzeni'", Anadolu Ajansı, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/ukraynadan-tayvana-kutup-savaslari-ya-da-kaos-duzeni/2658931>, (Date of Accession: 29.08.2022).



## ANKASAM ANALYSIS

# China-Serbia Relations in the Context of Kosovo and Taiwan Crises

After Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, a process began in which the world was shaped through the chaos. It is noteworthy that the Kosovo and Taiwan crises coincided with this period, and the relations between the countries leading the events.

The crisis between Kosovo and Serbia broke out after Pristina announced that as of August 1, 2022, Serbs living in the north of the country

must have plates issued by Kosovo. After the decision, the Serb minority living in the north of Kosovo organized protests and blocked some city roads, and the tension between Belgrade and Pristina increased. However, the Kosovo Government postponed its decision for one month after the meetings with the European Union (EU) and the Ambassadors of the United States of America (US).[1]



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The statement of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) that the situation in the north of the country is tense and that it is "ready to intervene if stability is threatened"[2] is very important in terms of showing the level of the crisis.

The Taiwan Crisis between the USA and China emerged due to the visit of the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan. Thus, the tension on the Beijing-Washington line has reached its highest point in recent years.

It is seen that both Serbia and China have been following consistent policies in the context of Taiwan and Kosovo issues for a long time. While Serbia supports China on the Taiwan issue, the Beijing administration also supports Belgrade on Kosovo. It is seen that the two countries implemented their policies in these crises as well.

Hua Chunying, Spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made a statement on the license plate issue between Kosovo and Serbia on August 3, 2022, stating that the best way for the parties to establish a dialogue and reach a mutually acceptable political solution within the framework of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. It was also stated that Serbia's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity should be fully respected.[3] China's emphasis on Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity about this crisis, which directly concerns the territory of Kosovo, reveals that Beijing sided with Belgrade in the dispute.

Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabic also commented on the issue during the escalation of Taiwan tension between the US and China and said that Belgrade supports the One China Principle. According to Brnabic, Taiwan is an integral part of China.[4]

China does not recognize Kosovo, which gained its independence from Serbia in 2008. The reason for this is the One China Principle advocated by Beijing. This principle adopted by China is a policy that benefits Serbia because the Belgrade administration sees Kosovo as its territory and does not recognize this country.

Beijing pays attention to the implementation of its stance, shaped by the "One China Principle" in foreign policy and domestic politics. Therefore, China's approach to Taiwan is similar to Serbia's approach to Kosovo. This situation encourages the two countries to develop cooperation between them.

In addition, both states use their power in the United Nations (UN) in the face of the problems they experience. Since China is a permanent member of the UNSC, it prevents decisions from being taken against it regarding Taiwan. Similarly, it is seen that Serbia has prevented decisions from being taken against it, thanks to Russia, another permanent member of the UNSC and its biggest ally. Therefore, both Kosovo and Taiwan cannot join the UN. This is another similar aspect of the two problems.

China is one of the largest trading partners of Serbia and its most significant economic partner in Asia. The relations between the parties are progressing in the military and the financial field. This adds a strategic nature to the relations.

In April 2022, China delivered the FK3 air defense missile system to Serbia. Allegedly, Serbia preferred to purchase an air defense system from China instead of the Russian S-300 air defense system.[5] Belgrade chose China over its traditional ally, Moscow, which demonstrates the importance Belgrade attaches to its relations with Beijing. In addition, it can be said that Serbia is trying to balance its relations with Russia, which is struggling with Western sanctions, by choosing China. Therefore, it is possible to say that the relations between China and Serbia have entered a new phase.

The strategic relations Serbia established with China may also enable Belgrade to increase its power in the UN in the future. Considering that the five permanent members of the UNSC, the USA, China, France, England, and Russia, have veto rights, the partnership with China is essential for Serbia.

In addition to all these, it can be said that China's influence in this country is ignored because Russia is a traditional ally of Serbia. Although Serbia is a candidate state for EU membership, prolonging the membership process is another issue that increases Beijing's influence over Belgrade. Because the delay in Serbia's EU membership also hinders the economic aid, it will receive from the bloc. In other words, Serbia cannot become an EU member to facilitate China's penetration into the country.

China's investments in Serbia also relieve Moscow, Belgrade's closest ally. Because Russia is stuck in the region after the operation launched against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, even Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov could not make his planned visit to Belgrade, his closest ally in the region, because European countries closed their airspaces to Russia.

In addition, Beijing sees Belgrade as an essential part of the Belt-Road Project. In this respect, the Hungary-Serbia Railway Project made by China is vital. Because the railway is considered the bridgehead of the Belt-Road Project in Europe.[6] Central and Eastern European regions and Greece are the gateways to Europe for China. In addition, it is thought that the Balkan geography will be an important center for the Maritime Silk Road. For this reason, the Balkans, in general, and Serbia are an extension of the Belt-Road Project in Europe. This makes Serbia a country that China is very interested in.[7]

As a result, due to the similarity of Kosovo and Taiwan problems, Beijing prefers to pursue a policy that sided with Belgrade. Therefore, this similarity encourages cooperation between the parties. Moreover, when the Kosovo and Taiwan crises are evaluated together with the process that started with Russia's intervention in Ukraine, it can be said that these three events symbolize the struggle for influence between the Transatlantic and Eurasian powers. In addition to all these, China considers Serbia an important component of the Belt-Road Project. For Serbia, China is a partner that has evolved from an economic partner to a strategic partner, especially in recent years due to its military cooperation.

[1]"Kosovo Government Postpones Number Plate Plan Following Serb Protests", Euronews, <https://www.euronews.com/2022/08/01/kosovo-government-postpones-number-plate-plan-following-serb-protests>, (Date of Accession: 21.08.2022).

[2] Ibid.

[3] "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on August 3, 2022", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/xwfw\\_665399/s2510\\_665401/202208/t20220804\\_10733756.html](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202208/t20220804_10733756.html), (Date of Accession: 22.08.2022).

[4] "Int'l Community Affirms Support for One-China Principle", Xinhuanet, <https://english.news.cn/20220807/15f93b66e6ae454ab9e3da4e5cd52a63/c.html>, (Date of Accession: 22.08.2022).

[5] "Serbia at the Crossroads between the Chinese Dragon and the Russian Bear: New Tensions in the Balkans?", Special Eurasia, <https://www.specialeurasia.com/2022/05/13/serbia-china-russia-balkans/>, (Date of Accession: 22.08.2022).

[6] Andreea Brînză, "China and the Budapest-Belgrade Railway Saga", The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/china-and-the-budapest-belgrade-railway-saga/>, (Date of Accession: 23.08.2022).

[7] Ljiljana Grubic, "Serbia's Increasing Importance for China's BRI", Emerging Europe, <https://emerging-europe.com/voices/serbias-increasing-importance-for-chinas-bri/>, (Date of Accession: 23.08.2022).



## ANKASAM ANALYSIS

# A Glance at India's Choice for Strategic Autonomy through Pelosi's Visit to Taiwan

Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the US House of Representatives, who has been an influential figure in the United States (US) politics since the late 1980s and has been elected as the Senate member from the state of California since 1987, visited Taiwan on August 2, 2022. Her visit, both before and afterwards, became one of the most focused topics in international politics. In fact, this visit brought the Russia-Ukraine War, which was considered as the most seri-

ous problem and threat in the context of the Atlantic Alliance, to secondary importance on the agenda, albeit for a short time.

As stated before, this visit made the entire system and especially the states of the region deal with a high-level crisis, albeit for a short time, in which the risk of global conflict was calculated and considered quite possible. In this instance, while some states made statements



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supporting the visit; some states have expressed their concerns and reservations regarding the visit. Despite this atmosphere of discussion regarding the visit, most of the actors of international politics, including the US, made statements confirming that they adopted the "One China Principle." At this point, India has drawn attention due to its regional and global strategic importance and its different position from other actors. What makes the attitude of the New Delhi administration remarkable in this regard is that it remained silent about the "One China Principle" in the context of the visit, and Beijing's openly called on New Delhi to abandon their silence and make a statement confirming its commitment to the "One China Principle".

In addition to the strategies of the US and regional developments to squeeze China with the developments in Asia-Pacific, which has become the center of military and political competition, especially the global economy, statements of the Beijing administration targeting New Delhi have made it necessary to evaluate India's Taiwan policy and its relations with China and its regional policy. In this context, first, it is necessary to look at the India-China relations with a historical methodology.

India, which gained its independence from Great Britain in 1947, recognized the People's Republic of China, which was established in 1949, in October of the same year. The most important aspect of this recognition in terms of the political structure and dynamics of the period is that India was the first non-communist state to recognize China. Although it recognized the communist regime in this period, New Delhi administration continued the "democratic" system inherited from Great Britain.

In this process, Pakistan by the disintegration of the Indian lands during the Great Britain period, and then Bangladesh states were established with the partition of Pakistan, due to the characteristics of its social and political structure, as well as colonial practices and inexperience in state administration.

As it is stated in the paragraph above, the main problems of India, which was under the colonial rule for a long time after independence, are the preservation of its territorial integrity, border problems and the need to build a state that preserves sovereignty and autonomy in the bipolar international system. The same is true for China. Although this common threat perception and reading of interests initially brought the two countries together within the framework of the "Non-Aligned Movement," problems began to arise between the parties, especially due to the border conflicts in the 1960s.

Looking at that specific period, in 1962, the Beijing administration declared that they did not recognize the McMahon Boundary Agreement signed with India, and then war began between the two states. In October 1962, the Chinese Army attacked the Chip Chap Valley in the Ladakh Region and captured the valley within 48 hours. Although a peace was reached between the parties on October 24, 1962, China landed troops in the eastern region of India on November 15, 1962. The relations, which were quite tense until 1976, resumed in the same year with the ambassadors of the two parties and normalized in the 1980s.

Although "a process of normalization with the 1980s" was the expression that is used for the relations between the two countries; there were issues related to their lands and borders, that have not been resolved and kept frozen. In fact, until the last period, the two states experienced military tensions due to these conflicts, such that there were even soldiers injured or killed from both sides.

In the context of bilateral relations, the New Delhi and Beijing administrations, who could not establish a stable constructive relationship due to the issues in the context of border problems and territorial integrity, also differ in their reading of international politics at the regional and global level. At this point, while the USA which has good relations with India and New Delhi was perceived as the biggest threat by China, Pakistan was also perceived as a threat by India due to its good relations with China. While the factor stated

in the previous sentence is the basis of the general positioning of the two states; in the context of Russia, for Beijing, both the need for Russian energy resources and the presence of the USA as their common enemy, are effective in the course of relations. New Delhi administration, on the other hand, tries not to antagonize Moscow in terms of its dependence on the Russian arms industry and balancing China in Asia.

India's past "Non-Aligned Movement" which on the one hand aims to be the dominant power in the region for the short term and a central power in the global system for the long term, and on the other hand aims to maintain its autonomous foreign policy and balance China by establishing a win-win relationship with the USA and Russia. With an understanding like the "Non-Aligned Movement" of India, it should be stated that the economic-based foreign policy initiative BRICS (the economic initiative formed by the states of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is an important and effective choice in today's context. Because it is obvious that the most important parameter for the change and transformation of the international system is the economy. In addition, on June 9, 2017, India became a member of the international organization called Shanghai Five in 1996 and named Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with the participation of Uzbekistan in 2001. Considering that Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran are among the members of the SCO, it can be easily stated that New Delhi seeks to strengthen its current position by not staying away from both political and economic initiatives that will affect the regional and global equation.

As a result, in today's conjuncture, where the unipolar structure of the international system is discussed and global competition is carried out in an Asia-Pacific center, the most important parameter in India's foreign policy is to strengthen its hand against China by conducting a balanced policy with the USA and Russia. On the other hand, in a period in which multipolarity is a topic that is being discussed, India's foreign policy is to become one of the global central powers through strategic and political autonomy. New Delhi, which partially implemented autonomous policies both in the first years of independence and during the Non-Aligned Movement, is trying to reconstruct a strategic autonomy in regional and global geopolitics, especially the "One China" policy that came to the agenda with Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. Whether it is possible for India to maintain this positioning continuously and what kind of foreign policy preference and strategy it will act on the US-Russia-China line while creating its own axis in global competition are the two prominent questions about this issue.





## ANKASAM ANALYSIS

# Russia's Military Showdown in the Shadow of the Ukraine War: Vostok-2022 Drill

On August 18, 2022, the Moscow administration announced that the fourth Vostok (East) drills will be held on August 30-September 5, 2022, under the name Vostok-2022.[1] It has been announced that China, Belarus, India, Tajikistan, and Mongolia will also participate in the drill. Vostok drills, which are held in four-year periods, were previously held in 2010, 2014 and

2018. The Chinese People's Liberation Army also participated in the drill in 2018, and Vostok-2018 took its place in the literature as the largest military drill after the Cold War, as 300,000 personnel were employed.[2] Russia, while the war in Ukraine continues; what messages is Vostok preparing to deliver by carrying out the 2022 drill?



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First, Russia is fighting Ukraine on the "Western Front." Vostok drills, on the other hand, are a preparation for the "Eastern Front." In this sense, Russia wanted to show strength despite the war it is currently waging and to show that its situation is not weak against the countries in its east. But more importantly, the Kremlin administration is trying to create the impression that things are going as planned in Ukraine by carrying out its routine military activities.

On the other hand, the information that Vostok-2018 was held in five different areas maintains its place in the memories.[3] According to media reports, more than ten areas have been identified for Vostok-2022.[4] This indicates that the Moscow administration wants to enter a possible war in the east in a much more prepared way.

On the other hand, Russia seems to have felt the need to give some messages about alliance relations on the drill. The first of these is to show that Russia is not alone. For this reason, it is necessary to mention the situation of the actors who will participate in the drill.

First, it should be emphasized once again that China also participated in the drill in 2018. Although this data indicates that there has been no significant change in the Chinese dimension of the issue, it is possible to argue that the Russia-Ukraine War deepened the "alliance of the Others". Because the two countries felt the need to show their rivals that they acted together militarily.

At the same time, the announcement that the Vostok-2022 drill will be held right after the Taiwan Crisis is quite remarkable in terms of its timing. This can be interpreted as the parties stand behind the joint declaration signed by President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of China Xi Jinping[5] during their meeting in Beijing on February 4, 2022, and are careful to act accordingly.

The situation of Belarus, one of the actors that will participate in Vostok-2022, can be described as stating the obvious. Because the Minsk administration carries out the integration process with Russia quickly, draws the reaction of the Western World due to its policy towards the war in Ukraine and even becomes the target of sanctions. Therefore, the participation of Belarus in the drill is not surprising.

On the other hand, there is an actor that can be considered as a surprise among the countries that will participate in Vostok-2022. Because the participation of India is a very interesting event. The most important point to be mentioned here is that India will take part in the same drill with China. It seems; Russia wanted to show that it could mediate in the resolution of conflicts between two regional rivals with border problems. In addition, the Moscow administration gives the message to the architects of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy", especially the United States of America (USA), that it is an actor with the power to disrupt the policy in question. In this regard, it can be argued that the Kremlin wants to use New Delhi's efforts to achieve strategic autonomy in foreign policy.

On the other hand, while war in Ukraine continues; India's agreement on to take part in the drill of the Russian Army may also bring about a serious trust problem in New Delhi's relations with the West. In fact, the military cooperation between Russia and India draws the reaction of the West. Vostok-2022 could cause problems to take on a much more complicated dimension.

Another participating state is Tajikistan. On this drill, the Moscow administration tries to demonstrate that its traditional influence on Dushanbe continues. As it is known, Tajikistan participates in the routine drills organized periodically by the Central Asian states with the USA. It even hosted the last military drill called "Regional Cooperation-2022". For this reason, Moscow sent an invitation to the Dushanbe administration to participate in Vostok-2022 and wanted to show the West that it could not act as it wanted in Central Asia and that some of its efforts were in vain.

Looking at the geopolitical reflection of this drill, it should be underlined that the Russia-China-India triangle may be formed. Of course, this situation means that the Turkish states in Central Asia are placed in a geopolitical grip; that means it is surrounded.

As a result, Russia, while the war in Ukraine continues the "Western Front", announced that the Vostok drill, which is one of its routine drills, will be held. Russia did that announcement to show that it is still strong, not to be caught unprepared for possible conflicts in the "Eastern Front", to show its determination regarding the alliance with China, to give the message that the integration process with Belarus continues, to create the impression that New Delhi is a "Trojan Horse" and to show that it maintains its influence on Tajikistan. The most important geopolitical reality revealed by the drill is that if New Delhi is included in the alliance on the Moscow-Beijing line, the Turkic republics in Central Asia will face a deep siege.


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[2] "Vostok 2018: Rusya ve Çin'den 'Soğuk Savaş' Sonrasının En Kapsamlı Tatbikatı", BBC Türkçe, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-45335072>, (Date of Accession: 19.08.2022).

[3] "VOSTOK 2018: Rusya'nın On Yıllık Stratejik Tatbikatları Ve Savaş Hazırlıkları", NATO Review, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/tr/articles/2018/12/20/vostok-2018-rusya-nin-on-yillik-mstratejik-tatbikatları-ve-savas-hazırlıkları/index.html>, (Date of Accession: 19.08.2022).

[4] "Batıda Ukrayna ile Savaşan Rusya, Doğuda '2022 Vostok' Askeri Tatbikatını Düzenleyecek", Euronews, <https://tr.euronews.com/2022/07/26/batıda-ukrayna-ile-savaşan-rusya-doguda-2022-vostok-askeri-tatbikatını-duzenleyecek>, (Date of Accession: 19.08.2022).

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## ANKASAM ANALYSIS

# What Could China's Red Lines in Taiwan Be?

China, in its White Paper on Taiwan published on August 10, 2022, mentions that "reunification" with the island will take place peacefully. Nevertheless, the Beijing administration also stated in the document in question that it can resort to the use of force if necessary and that it reserves the option to take all measures. So how far do "foreign powers" have to go before China resorts to the use of force in Taiwan? So what are the red lines that will lead China to use military force?

China's Ambassador to London, Zheng Zeguang said that Britain would face serious consequences if it were to "follow in the footsteps of the United States of America (USA)" and crosses the "red lines" on Taiwan, it will face "serious consequences".<sup>2</sup> "Taiwan independence means war and will lead to a dead end," Zeguang also said.<sup>3</sup> Based on these words, it can be thought that China's red line is Taiwan's independence. However, the Beijing administration made similar warnings before the US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pel-



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si's visit to Taiwan. At that time, China's red line was thought to be a visit to Taiwan. Despite this, Pelosi's plane landed in Taiwan and Beijing could not do anything against it. Therefore, it has been understood that these visits are not China's red line.

For the last few months, British Foreign Minister Liz Truss has been emphasizing the importance of taking lessons from Ukraine and providing military support to Taiwan. For example, a delegation from the British Parliament is expected to visit Taiwan in the coming months. China, on the other hand, warns that if the UK takes a step in this direction, it will face serious consequences. So China's red line could also be political, economic, and military support for Taiwan. However, London is determined to cross these red lines of Beijing. Because Washington has done this before and has not faced any serious response. In addition, England under the protection of the USA and relying on it will make these visits.

In addition to the UK, Parliamentary delegations from Germany and France will also visit the island in the coming months. In this case, China may have to impose separate sanctions on each European country. To learn how China reacted when the "so-called" red lines were crossed, it is necessary to look at Pelosi's reaction after her visit to Taiwan. In response to this, China introduced 8 "countermeasures" to the USA. Therefore, the Beijing administration may take some additional precautions against Europe instead of sanctions.

Economic dependency is not only for Europe; It also applies to China. Beijing will not want to lose its market in Europe so easily. In short, even if European delegations start to visit Taiwan more frequently, China will not react strongly to this and will only be content with threatening them. In addition, it will take some measures to reduce bilateral dialogue, as it did with the USA.

Another development that drew Beijing's anger; It is the statement of the US Army's intention to conduct exercises in order to ensure the safety of navigation in the Taiwan Strait. In response to this, China stated that it will resist "US aggression" and said, "We will respond to any action that will harm the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our country."<sup>4</sup> Based on these words, it can be thought that China's red line is for the US and its allies to pass through the Taiwan Strait or to be in security circles there. However, Beijing has previously issued similar warnings to the United States and its allies regarding transit through the Taiwan Strait.

In recent years, some European states, such as Germany, have given up on passing through the strait, taking these warnings into account. But the Washington administration's purpose to lead European states by crossing Beijing's red lines. In this direction, the USA aims to disrupt the "de facto" situation created by China by passing through the Taiwan Strait once again, as it has done in previous years. Beijing, on the other hand, states that it will react harshly if its sovereignty is violated during this transition.

It is seen that China will have to resort to hard power in order to make these warnings of China into consideration. In the past, during Pelosi's visit China has made much bigger threats than this; but in the end, he did nothing. Thus, it lost its credibility and deterrence. At this point, it is not only the USA; All European powers are giving the message that they can take provocative actions on China's near seas. Because they know that China will leave these moves unanswered. For example, when the Beijing administration did not object to Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, the USA went further and sent a delegation of senators to the island. China, on the other hand, held exercises around Taiwan in response to this visit. Moreover, by strengthen its hand once again, the USA is preparing to conduct a navigational safety exercise in the Taiwan Strait.

As can be understood, the USA strengthened its hand as it seems that China cannot respond. This is part of the US effort to suppress China and consolidate its hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. In other words, the USA should not be expected to give up on these steps.

In other words, Washington does not understand soft power. Here, "What is China's red line in Taiwan?" the question arises. China's red lines to lead to the use of force in Taiwan could be:

First, visiting Taiwan is not China's red line. This is understood. In other words, although China sees such an act as a violation of sovereignty, it does not use hard power.

Secondly, China says that it sees "Taiwan's independence" as a red line.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, if Western states, especially the USA, announced that they officially recognize Taiwan, Beijing may use force.

Third, if Taiwan becomes represented in international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations in general, China can respond with hard force.

Fourth, if the United States and its allies maintain de facto relations with Taiwan and develop economic and military cooperation, China may use military force to prevent this. China's red line here is to sign trade agreements with Taiwan and provide military aid to the island.

Fifth, if the Western powers declare that they will protect Taiwan and form a coalition for this, China may take action to unite with the island. In this sense, Beijing's red line is Taiwan's participation in defense alliances and coalitions.

Sixth, if the US violates China's territorial waters in the Taiwan Strait, Beijing may respond with retaliation. So, China can use force. In fact, the last warning of the Chinese Ambassador to Washington is in this direction.

As a result, China's red lines regarding Taiwan are being tested by the United States. It is not known in which field, when and how Beijing will react. If it is necessary to reach a conclusion based on the above possibilities; China's red line in Taiwan could be the start of the United States and its allies recognizing Taiwan's independence. But while the Western powers are developing their relations with Taiwan; it also emphasizes their commitment to the "One China Policy". Taiwan's further integration into the international system could pose a major threat to China's national interests. In other words, the United States and its allies want to provoke China, push its borders, and thus force Beijing to make mistakes, by reaffirming their commitment to the "One China Policy" and at the same time improving relations with Taiwan.

[1] "Full Text: The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era", Xinhua, <https://english.news.cn/20220810/df9d3b8702154b34b-bf1d451b99bf64a/c.html>, (Date of Accession: 24.08.2022).

2 "Chinese Ambassador Warns UK Not to Cross 'Red Lines' over Taiwan", The Guardian, , (Date of Accession: 24.08.2022).

3 Same link.

4 "China Doubles Down On Its Warnings; Vows To Respond To US Army Drills In Taiwan Strait", Republic World, <https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/china/china-doubles-down-on-its-warnings-vows-to-respond-to-us-army-drills-in-taiwan-strait-articleshow.html>, (Date of Accession: 24.08.2022).

5 "Chinese Ambassador Warns UK Not to Cross 'Red Lines' over Taiwan", a.g.e.,(Date of Accession: 24.08.2022).



## ANKASAM ANALYSIS

# The Rising Star of Energy Markets: Africa

The sharp curve of energy market, beginning with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has led European countries to seek to reduce their dependence on Russian gas and oil. According to International Energy Agency (IEA) data, European Union (EU) purchased 155 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Russian gas in 2021. 45% of the EU's gas imports and approximately 40% of the total gas consumption are provided by Russia. [1]

After the eruption of war in the east of Europe, EU members have decided to place sanctions on Russian energy export which means the main source of its income, by aiming to lessen to affordability of war by Moscow. Thus, EU authorities have announced that they will reduce natural gas imports from Russia by two-thirds within the next year. To achieve this goal, member states have agreed to decrease gas usage by 15% by the end of 2022.



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Despite setting such a target by the EU, current conditions in the energy markets that gas prices are soaring, allowing Moscow to be less affected by sanctions contrary to expectations. Since the beginning of the war, Russia has exported 46 billion euros worth of energy to the EU, and also, its revenues from energy sources have continued to increase. Energy income of Russia is roughly double the amount of sales in the same period of 2021. [2]

EU countries have gravitated towards alternative energy sources due to their failure of attaining the objectives of sanctions, escalating energy prices and also to reduce dependency on Russia. However, there are certain concerns about where these alternative sources will come from. Because the fastest solution to the energy crisis is supplying liquefied natural gas (LNG) from other states, especially Qatar and the USA but this situation creates some issues due to the lack of LNG facilities in Europe, notably in Germany.

Based on their reserves and investment-friendly production capacity, African countries has occurred as the first choice for energy diversification. The withdrawal of Russian energy from the European market is supposed to mean a greater share for African energy producers. Additively, Europe is on a quest for fulfilling the "energy gap" in a short span of time. This gap has the meaning for a bigger room for African gas than ever before, which is particularly liquefied natural gas that is easy to stock and transport.

On the African continent, Nigeria has the largest proven gas reserves, followed by Algeria, Senegal, Mozambique, and Egypt. [3] Therefore, although it has been on the agenda with energy projects for a long time, Africa, which could not achieve any concrete output, become the winning side of the Russia-Ukraine War and begin to take part in the energy picture in European. About 3 months after the breakout of the war, Germany's Chancellor Olaf Sholz made a visit to Senegal on May 22, 2022, to ensure a stable natural gas supply from the countries' offshore projects. [4]

Italy is a leading European country with its eyes on African resources. Roma has negotiated with Algeria for additional natural gas supply in 2022 and announced that it expects the country to continue to provide extra capacity after 2022. Moreover, more comprehensive agreements are being negotiated with Angola, Egypt, and the Republic of Congo. [5] In this context, it

can be said that Europe considers Africa not just as a quick solution to the current gas gap, but also as an actor with a significant role in the future energy game.

In an exclusive interview, Deputy Director-General for Energy of the European Commission Matthew Baldwin who is the newly appointed Deputy Director-General of the EU Energy Platform Task Force (EPTF), which is constituted for reducing Europe's dependence on Russian oil and gas, has expressed Nigeria's enthusiasm for its contribution to the EU's gas supply. Baldwin made the following statements:[6]

"We can no longer count on the gas coming from the Russian Federation and we want to build a new partnership with African countries like Nigeria with whom we have an already well-established partnership to obtain more gas and LNG from you on good commercial terms"

In light of Europe's enthusiasm for energy imports and Africa's geographical proximity to Europe, this continent stands out as an ideal candidate for European supplier diversification. In addition, African countries, which are traditionally gas suppliers to Europe, have favourable conditions to increase their exports. Pipelines connect African countries to the wider European gas grid across the Mediterranean. Existing pipeline exports from the continent to Europe extend via the Medgaz Pipeline to Spain via Algeria, from Libya to Italy via the Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline (TRANSMED) and from Libya to Sicily via the Greenstream Pipeline.

One of the most reasonable options for Europe is the increase energy supply from Africa to EU by improving the existing pipelines. In this regard, forward-looking new Technologies and changing geopolitical conditions make it easier for African countries to the preservation of their market share in Europe. Despite the existing potential, there are also several obstacles for Africa to become a rising star in the European market. These obstacles can be explained as follows:

First and foremost, regional countries have serious requirements for the new initiative to discontinued energy projects due to a lack of financing and infrastructure. Within this framework, in order to diversify its energy supply, the EU will need to increase its investments in Africa. Therefore, the cost is likely to be higher than expected.

A second problem is the security situation arising from terrorist activities and instability in countries with high energy production, particularly Libya, Algeria, and Nigeria. Thus, to ensure the continuity of the EU's gas flow, it may be necessary to pressure to create stability in these countries. In turn, this may further weaken the current environment of insecurity.

Last but not least, both Africa and Europe may be unable to reach their green energy transition targets. In order to facilitate economic development, the leaders of both continents advocate the use of natural gas as a "transition fuel" and support investment in renewable energy sources, such as solar, wind, and hydroelectricity. Although the common effort to halt dependence on Russian energy could slow the transition to green energy for both continents.

In spite of all these potential problems, African countries still have the most potential to reduce their energy dependence on Russia. Surely, it is not easy to reduce the dependence on Russian natural gas. However, if the necessary conditions for increasing Africa's gas production are provided and the security of energy supply is guaranteed, the continent has the potential to reduce Europe's dependence on Russia.

Furthermore, as investments in the continent grow and diversify, projects for the EU's electricity needs can accelerate, not just in natural gas, but also in solar and wind energy. Africa will benefit from the EU's decision to evaluate its potential by gaining access to other forms of energy and fostering its economic, political, and social prosperity. This will result in a renaissance of Africa as a result of its increasing importance on the European market.

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[2] "Financing Putin's war: Fossil fuel imports from Russia during the invasion of Ukraine", CREA, <https://energyandcleanair.org/financing-putins-war/>, (Date of Accession: 20.08.2022)

[3] "Top 10 African Countries Sitting on the Most Natural Gas", Energy Capital Power, <https://energycapitalpower.com/top-ten-african-countries-sitting-on-the-most-natural-gas/>, (Date of Accession: 20.08.2022)

[4] "Germany is Keen to Pursue Gas Projects with Senegal, Says Scholz on First African Tour" Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-looms-large-scholz-first-africa-tour-chancellor-2022-05-22/> (Date of Accession: 20.08.2022)

[5] "Algeria Becomes Italy's Biggest Gas Supplier in New €4bn Deal to Reduce Russian Dependency", Euronews, <https://www.euronews.com/2022/07/18/italys-draghi-visits-algeria-for-gas-talks-while-political-crisis-continues-at-home> (Date of Accession: 20.08.2022)

[6] "EU Makes Offers to Nigeria to Drive LNG Supply to Replace Russian Gas", Premium Times, <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/546596-interview-eu-makes-offers-to-nigeria-to-drive-lng-supply-to-replace-russian-gas.html>, (Date of Accession: 20.08.2022)



## ANKASAM ANALYSIS

# Montenegro and the Serbian Orthodox Church: A Question of Identity and Sovereignty

Many factors make a people or community a nation. Foremost among these is a common narrative of history, culture, and language. Yet there is another important factor, and that is "religion". Religion plays a significant role in the self-definition of a society or people and in forming a narrative. Examining the studies in this context, one may see that Christian Orthodox societies and countries utilise the religious factor very much in the process of self-definition. While this definition often brings societies together, it can also be observed that it divides and disintegrates.

Montenegro is one of the places where the aforementioned fragmentation has been observed recently. At this stage, the presence of two different Orthodox churches in the country causes ethnic debates; it also wreaks havoc on the balance of domestic politics. In particular, the "Basic Agreement" signed between the Montenegrin government and the Serbian Orthodox Church recently was met with criticism by the Montenegrin Orthodox Church and many Montenegrins. As a result, the incumbent Dritan Abazovic government fell, with continued demonstrations and the opposition demanding a vote of no confidence in the government.



**Mustafa  
ÇUHADAR**

While all these experiences show that religion is still an important factor in the Balkans, one should not perceive these developments as tension between a government and a church. Because this rapprochement between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the government has brought along sovereignty and identity disputes.

### **Serbian Orthodox Church and Montenegro from Past to Today**

To fathom the current events, the historical background should be mentioned briefly. Because all these developments are the result of a common history. It is well-known that Montenegro and Serbia have had close relations throughout history. Montenegro was a principality between the 12th and 13th centuries, and then it became a part of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century. Nevertheless, Montenegro, which rebelled against the Ottoman Empire many times, became a principality again in 1878. In 1918, it became a part of Yugoslavia. At this point, it is worth mentioning that Montenegro and Serbia had very close relations within Yugoslavia.

In fact, Montenegro, acting in cooperation with Serbia during the disintegration process of Yugoslavia, sided with Serbia during the Bosnian War and the attacks against the Croats. In fact, in this period, Serbs and Montenegrins saw themselves as members of the same ethnic group. One may observe that ultra-nationalist Serbian politicians are also Montenegrins. Montenegro, which established a confederation with Serbia after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, quickly estranged itself from Serbia and started to turn its face to the West. Since declaring independence in 2006, Montenegro has been trying to reduce the influence of the Serbs in domestic politics.

Although it moved away from Serbia, tensions escalated now and then due to the existence of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) in the country as an extension of Serbia. In fact, recent tensions stem from this. Gaining autocephaly in 1219, that is, a self-governing status, the Serbian Orthodox Church has worked for centuries for the identification of Serbian identity and Orthodoxy in the region. It is known that in this period, the founder of the church, St. Sava, formed nine dioceses, and one of them was located in Zeta, Montenegro.

The Montenegrin Orthodox Church, which had a somewhat separate structure from the SPC during the rule of the Ottoman Empire, merged with the SPC in 1920. Nevertheless, in 1993, with

the developments generated from the disintegration process of Yugoslavia, the Montenegrin Orthodox Church was established in Cetinje.[1] It is stated that in this period, the Montenegrin government and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church acted jointly towards the separation of Montenegro from Serbia and its independence again.

By the time it was 1997, one could observe that the leader of The Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS), Milo Djukanovic, who was in power, was growing away from Serbia's leader, Slobodan Milosevic, and his policies at that time. Following its independence in 2006, the Montenegrin Orthodox Church attempted to expand its activities. This was met with a reaction by the SPC and Serbia.

### **Tensions in the Shadow of the Two Churches**

From this point on, SPC and Montenegro would be associated with tensions. In only September 2021, protests arose during the coronation of the new Metropolitan of the SPC. In fact, the starting point of the events is the death of Metropolitan Amfilohije in October 2020, who had been on duty in Montenegro for a long time. In the following year, a new Metropolitan was appointed after the meeting held in SPC Belgrade to fill the seat of Amfilohije. Following this, tensions escalated. Because, according to tradition, the coronation ceremony of the new Metropolitan would be held in Cetinje, Montenegro. This was met with a reaction by many Montenegrin nationalists[2], for this step was an attempt at Montenegro's sovereignty. In addition, President Milo Djukanovic's calls to join the protests also escalated the tension.

Despite this, the new Metropolitan was escorted to Cetinje under tight security, and the coronation ceremony was held. Meanwhile, President Djukanovic strongly opposed the holding of the ceremony, arguing that it should be cancelled, whereas the then government of Prime Minister Zdravko Krivokapic supported the church in going through with the ceremony.[3]

The Krivokapic government, which came to power in 2020 in a tense election setting, is a pro-Serbian administration. After forming the government, he acted together with the Montenegrin Serbs and the church to show strength to the Montenegrins and Montenegrin Muslims. Even Chetnik anthems were sung in the streets during this period, as journalist Bayram Pomač has stated.[4]

On the other hand, it is known that anti-Islamic street writings were written on the street walls in Montenegro during the aforementioned process. The reason behind these tensions during the 2020 elections was the "Freedom of Religion Law" enacted by Djukanovic in 2019. Because the said law cleared the way for the religious buildings built in Montenegro until 1918 to become the property of the state. Serbs, especially SPC, reacted to this, and the country was trapped in a tense setting, hosting various protests until the elections.[5] In the aforementioned period, Djukanovic aimed to reduce the influence of the SPC, and therefore of Serbia, in the country and consolidate the status of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church.

These developments have allowed the SPC to take over these properties by pressing the government. On the other hand, the authority of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church was denied and its sphere of influence tried to be narrowed. On that note, a development occurred on August 3, 2022, which would shake the country deeply. On August 3, 2022, Prime Minister Dritan Abazovic, who has been in power since April 2022, together with the SPC Patriarch Porfirije, hastily signed an agreement known as the "Basic Agreement" (Temeljni ugovor).[6] This agreement would give the SPC the opportunity to take over many religious properties and structures that the SPC claims. On the other hand, it is stated that the agreement in question would acknowledge the "official status" of the SPC in Montenegro while regulating the relations between the SPC and the government and its relations with other churches in Montenegro.

As a result of this agreement signed between Abazovic and the SPC, reactions have arisen from the opposition, especially from the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS), and from the Montenegrin public. Thus, the country hosted protests and tensions escalated. Meanwhile, Abazovic posted a video and expressed that he is proud that he ended a long-standing problem" and asserted that this agreement would bring peace and tolerance to the country.

On the other side, not only the opposition reacted to the developments, but also Abazovic's own cabinet showed reactions. In his statement, the Foreign Minister stated that Abazovic did not have such authority.[7] DPS, on the other hand, launched a vote of no confidence initiative for the government, leading the discussions posed by the agreement to shift to a different dimension.

All in all, the vote of no confidence resulted in Abazovic and his government falling on August 19, 2022.[8] Behind this vote of no confidence against the government, apart from the agreement with the SPC, allegations of corruption and criticism that the government abandoned the European Union (EU) agenda were also influential. Moreover, the reason behind Abazovic's move is also an attempt to get closer to Serbia in order to take part in the "Open Balkan Initiative". However, while this step is expected to produce positive results in the short term, it deepens Montenegro's ethnic and religious divisions and exacerbates disputes over national identity and sovereignty in the long term.

As one may observe, the presence of two different churches in Montenegro has cleared the way for many conflicts. Moreover, these conflicts will not stop here. Because the long-standing tensions between the SPC and the Montenegrin government (s) are not just for religious reasons. Beyond that, it also has historical, political, and geostrategic dimensions.

Within this framework, one may argue that the authority that is given to the SPC in Montenegro is at the same time given to Serbia. As a matter of fact, with the authority given, it can be said that Serbia consolidated its influence on Montenegro through the SPC. In addition to that, the steps of the SPC raise an issue regarding the national identity of Montenegrins. In this context, the statement made by the Metropolitan of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, Mihailo, after the developments is noteworthy. Mihailo claims that, with the signing of this agreement, the Montenegrin state and national identity will no longer exist. He stated that Montenegro has now become a part of Serbia.[9] While these words are striking, they are alarming. For Mihailo's words have a grain of truth.

Eventually, religion in the Balkans maintains its influence in the political arena. In other words, policies and decisions shaped by theo-strategic dimensions are extremely common in this geography. The bond between the public, the church, and decision-makers is extremely strong.[10] For this reason, Serbia, which utilises the SPC very well, maintains its presence in Montenegro through the SPC. Although the parties broke up in 2006, Serbia maintains its place and influence in Montenegro. One should not look past that; today, although Serbia under the leadership of Aleksander Vucic is observed reiterating the discourse of cooperation, Vucic's ultra-nationalist years remain in the memory. Because the "Great Serbia Project" is still the first item on the secret agenda of Serbian nationalists.

In particular, Serbs do not see the Montenegrins as a separate nation, but acknowledging them as Serbian is an indication of this. This poses a problem for Montenegro, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country. Since Montenegro joined NATO, Russia's influence in this country has decreased considerably and its elbowroom has narrowed.

On that note, in the shadow of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, Russia can utilise Serbia and Montenegrin Serbs to cause instability by consolidating its elbowroom here, for Pan-Slavism still maintains its place among the Serbs. With this dimension of the developments, it does not only affect domestic politics, but also it is understood that it is a tension with international repercussions. Because, considering the influence of religious institutions and Serbia in Montenegro, it is always possible for the tension over both churches to turn into conflict. Within this context, one may argue that the recent developments in Montenegro may disrupt the balances in the Balkans by activating the frozen ethnic and national tensions in the region, thus creating a domino effect for the region that is already drifting towards instability.

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[3] "Serbia-Montenegro/The Growing Religious Divide", Youtube, Prof James Ker-Lindsay, 10 Eylül 2021, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7klWIA\\_pt9s&list=PLUzSOLzcfKuNFHucLafDd7w-UVIn6ovq&index=7](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7klWIA_pt9s&list=PLUzSOLzcfKuNFHucLafDd7w-UVIn6ovq&index=7), (Date of Accession: 26.08.2022).

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[5] "Montenegro's Not-So-Merry Legal Challenge To The Serbian Orthodox Church Riles Society", Radio Free Europe, <https://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-s-not-so-merry-legal-challenge-to-the-serbian-orthodox-church-divides-society/30347966.html>, (Date of Accession: 26.08.2022).

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[9] "Crnogorski mitropolit Mihailo: "Crna Gora više ne postoji"", Balkan News, <https://www.balkannews.ba/region/crnogorski-mitropolit-mihailo-crna-gora-vie-ne-postoji-h5344.html>, (Date of Accession: 27.08.2022).

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# BASINDA ANKASAM

## 30 August 2022

ANKASAM Central Asia Expert Emrah Kaya's analysis titled "The Construction Process of New Kazakhstan", which won the first prize in the competition organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan was published in Astana Times, one of the leading newspapers of Kazakhstan.

## 31 August 2022

ANKASAM Security Advisor Assoc. Dr. Şafak Oğuz evaluated the provocation of Greece in the TVNET.

## 31 August 2022

ANKASAM International Relations Consultant Dr. Kadir Ertaç Çelik evaluated the latest developments in foreign policy in the Bengütürk TV Breaking Point program.

## 1 September 2022

ANKASAM President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol evaluated the current developments in foreign policy in TRT Ankara Radio Agenda program.

## 1 September 2022

Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol's article titled "Peace Maker of Regional and Global Stability: The New Uzbekistan" was published in Hürriyet Newspaper.

## 1 September 2022

Retired Ambassador Aydın Nurhan, Senior Advisor to the President of Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM), made evaluations to TVNET about the radar lockdown step of Greece against Turkish planes.

## 1 September 2022

Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol's analysis titled "Another Name for Power Struggle: 'Corridors' and 'Edge Belt'" was published in Anadolu Agency.

## 1 September 2022

Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol's evaluations on Mikhail Gorbachev's death and Turkish-Russian relations during the Soviet Union were published in News Global.

## 2 September 2022

Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol's analysis titled "The other name of the power struggle: 'Corridors' and 'Edge Belt'" was shared in Güneş Newspaper.

# BASINDA ANKASAM

## 2 September 2022

ANKASAM President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol evaluated the current developments in foreign policy in A Haber.

## 2 September 2022

ANKASAM International Relations Consultant Dr. Kadir Ertaç Çelik evaluated the steps of Greece that increased the tension in the Aegean on Bengütürk TV.

## 2 September 2022

Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol's analysis titled "The other name of the power struggle: 'Corridors' and 'Edge Belt'" was shared on the Latest News news portal.

## 2 September 2022

Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) Chief Energy Advisor Dr. Cenk Pala evaluated the fuel prices in Turkey for Yeni Şafak Newspaper.

## 2 September 2022

Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol's analysis titled "The other name of the power struggle: 'Corridors' and 'Edge Belt'" was shared on the News EU news portal.

## 2 September 2022

Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol's analysis titled "The other name of the power struggle: 'Corridors' and 'Edge Belt'" was shared on the Ulak News news portal.

## 2 September 2022

Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol's analysis titled "The other name of the power struggle: 'Corridors' and 'Edge Belt'" was shared in Star Newspaper.

## 2 September 2022

Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol's analysis titled "Another name for the power struggle: 'Corridors' and 'Edge Belt'" was shared on the Bursa Press news portal.

## 2 September 2022

ANKASAM President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol evaluated the latest developments in foreign policy in the TVNET News Center program.

# BASINDA ANKASAM

## 3 September 2022

Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol evaluated the latest developments in Iraq to TVNet.

## 3 September 2022

Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) Asia-Pacific Expert Dr. Cenk Tamer evaluated the ongoing Prime Ministerial race in the UK to the UK-based National Security News news portal.

## 3 September 2022

Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol's article titled "Peace Maker of Regional and Global Stability: The New Uzbekistan" published in Hürriyet Newspaper was featured in Uzbekistan-based Dunyo News Agency.





*The latest issue of the International Journal of Crisis and Politics Studies, an international peer-reviewed journal operating within the Ankara Center for Crisis and Politics Studies (ANKASAM), has been published. Academic Keys, ASOS Index, CEEOL, Cite Factor, DRJI, Index Copernicus, Ideal Online, Research Bible, Sindex and TUBITAK DERGIPARK databases are scanned by our journal can be accessed via the link below.*

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CRISIS AND POLITICAL STUDIES VOLUME VI, ISSUE I

# JOURNAL OF REGIONAL STUDIES

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ANKASAM JOURNAL OF REGIONAL STUDIES VOLUME VI, ISSUE I

