The visit of Syrian Interim President Ahmed al-Shara to Baku in July 2025 is not a mere symbolic diplomatic overture. The visit signifies the emergence of a new energy and infrastructure system in the southern part of the multipolar regional order. The memorandum of understanding signed between State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) and the Syrian Ministry of Energy revives the energy partnership that was initiated before the war in 2010 but frozen due to the conflict. This project, which aims to transport 1 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Syria via Türkiye, can be deemed a historic milestone considering Azerbaijan’s energy diplomacy that provides direct access to the Levant region.[i]
Future ramifications of this growth will extend beyond the energy supply and impact a wide range of industries, including digital infrastructure, transportation, agriculture, and regional reconstruction plans. A multi-layered foundation for a geopolitical reorganization between the Levant and the South Caucasus will result from this. In addition to ensuring energy security, Azerbaijan’s natural gas exports to Syria will also offer development investments and infrastructure transfers that will aid in Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction. This cooperation could initiate a process that can be deemed a novel model for post-conflict economic integration.
In particular, new trade pathways from Azerbaijan to the Persian Gulf and Syria to the Caspian Basin might be made possible by the addition of road and rail projects in the transportation sector, together with energy transmission lines. The establishment of such a line might stimulate Gulf investors to reinvest in Syria’s restoration projects while also energizing Turkish-Azerbaijani logistics firms in the sector. Azerbaijan’s expertise in food processing, seed modification, and irrigation technology may spur rapid development dynamics in Syria’s rural areas. This would have a multiplier impact, especially when it comes to the creation of new jobs and the return of refugees.
Transferring Baku’s expertise in “smart city” initiatives to the Damascus government might set the groundwork for a capital-centered digitalization and e-government push in terms of digital infrastructure and smart city applications. At the same time, the social pillar of this strategic alliance will be strengthened via “soft development” measures like youth exchanges, technical education programs, and inter-university cooperation. As a result, Azerbaijan will contribute to Syria’s reconstruction as a regional “development actor” in addition to being an energy supplier.
All these multi-layered structures could bring to the fore a larger east-south axis geopolitical integration perspective that would include not only the two countries in the region, but also Türkiye, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Gulf countries. This would contribute to Azerbaijan’s goal of diversifying its traditional natural gas routes, while also providing a new economic legitimacy for Syria’s political rehabilitation process.
In energy diplomacy, Azerbaijan has thus far mostly targeted the West, specifically Europe through Türkiye. However, Azerbaijan is for the first time creating a direct energy route from the south to the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula by exporting natural gas to Syria. SOCAR would theoretically be able to access these areas if Syria joins Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan in the “Arab Gas Pipeline.” This may pave the way for Azerbaijan to establish itself as a long-term energy provider to the Middle Eastern market for electricity production as well as to Europe.
The delivery of Azerbaijani natural gas to Syria requires the restoration of the functionality of the pipeline network connected to BOTAŞ International Limited (BIL) infrastructure via Türkiye. This situation could position Türkiye not only as an energy transit hub but also as a critical logistical route for the reconstruction of Syria. The repair of Syria’s infrastructure, which has been largely destroyed by the war, could be made possible through Türkiye-Azerbaijan cooperation in the areas of energy, roads, railways, and digital networks. Thus, Türkiye could become a strategic gateway for Azerbaijan not only to the West but also to the Arab world.
SOCAR’s provision of technical support to Syria is not only an economic gain but also a political prestige gain. Azerbaijan, perceived as an actor contributing to post-war development, could leverage this experience in infrastructure tenders in countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. SOCAR is expected to focus not only on oil and gas but also on areas such as reconstruction, facility rehabilitation, and technical consulting. This will increase Azerbaijan’s capacity to diversify its non-energy foreign investments.
While Syria still feels Turkish influence in the north and Iranian influence in the east, Azerbaijan’s economic entry into this area could open the door to Turkish-Azerbaijani coordination with the Damascus-based central government. Azerbaijan’s technology and workforce in the fields of agriculture and irrigation projects and the rehabilitation of smart city systems could offer attractive models for Syria’s economic recovery. This process could lead to international support funds being directed toward Türkiye-Azerbaijan joint projects in areas such as refugee return, local development, and social integration.
For Syria, which has been marginalized in the international system and subjected to heavy sanctions for many years following the civil war, the energy cooperation developed with Azerbaijan should be considered not only in the context of economic development but also as a means of reestablishing Damascus’ legitimacy in the international arena. Syria’s desire to re-enter the regional arena has been demonstrated by its recent diplomatic contacts with Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In addition, the strategic relations developed with Russia and China have opened up non-Western multilateral diplomatic windows for Damascus, while the new economic energy corridor established with Azerbaijan demonstrates that this process has gained institutional depth and that regional integration has entered a new phase.
The energy agreement signed with Azerbaijan will not only ensure that Damascus is supplied with oil and natural gas, but will also enable it to implement partnership models in areas such as multilateral infrastructure, agriculture, construction, and digitalization. This could lift Syria out of post-war isolation and transform it into an active component of regional development networks. Therefore, this cooperation goes beyond a technical gas agreement and signifies Syria’s repositioning in the Middle East’s reshaping economic map.
Considering the claims increasingly voiced in diplomatic circles that Azerbaijan has mediated indirect contacts between Israel and Syria, Baku’s role is not limited to that of an energy supplier. Rather, it is emerging as a silent but effective mediator or geopolitical facilitator. In the context of Israel’s attacks on Syrian airspace and the balancing of Iranian influence, the assumption of this role by Azerbaijan, one of the few countries capable of engaging with both actors, could create a new balancing factor in regional diplomacy.
In the long term, this soft power strategy developed by Azerbaijan through energy diplomacy may open the door for Damascus to play a more active role within the Arab League, as well as regain influence in platforms such as the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Non-Aligned Movement. This process will not only contribute to Damascus’ rehabilitation, but also help Azerbaijan position itself in the Middle East as a country that provides technical support, is neutral in terms of security, investor-friendly, and open to mediation. Thus, Baku can expand its multi-layered foreign policy vision by transferring the diplomatic gains it has achieved after Karabakh to the Middle East.
In conclusion, Azerbaijan’s delivery of natural gas to Syria will create a strategic energy window to the South Levant and elevate SOCAR to the same level as regional players. With this project, Türkiye can become not only an energy transit country but also a key logistical and diplomatic actor in Syria’s reconstruction. For Syria, this cooperation could be the first concrete sign of both economic recovery and an end to regional political isolation.
[i] “Expert: Connecting Azerbaijani gas to Syria pave the way for developing transportation projects between Baku and Damascus”, AZERTAC, https://azertag.az/en/xeber/expert_connecting_azerbaijani_gas_to_syria_will_pave_the_way_for_developing_transportation_projects_between_baku_and_damascus-3668399, (Date Accessed: 24.07.2025).
