Begun in Yemen in 2011 with the Arab Spring and intensified with the fall of the capital Sana’a in February 2015, the civil war quickly turned into a proxy war involving regional actors, deepening the rivalry between particularly the Gulf States, Israel, and Iran. Among those supporting the Saudi-led coalition war against the Houthis in 2015 were actors such as Pakistan, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, the support these actors provided to the coalition forces tended to vary. For example, while Pakistan provided air support to the coalition, countries such as the UAE and Sudan supported the coalition against the Houthis with their own paramilitary forces or other military units.
In this regard, although the Saudi-led coalition has continued its support for the Aden-based Yemeni government, whose rule was overthrown in 2011 but is still widely recognized internationally, the UAE has stood out in this process by supporting the separatist Southern Transitional Council and has become a competitor to Saudi Arabia. In 2022, the “Presidential Leadership Council” was established as an executive body for the Yemeni government, and members of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces came to be represented in this structure. However, the Emirati-backed “National Resistance Forces” led by General Tareq Saleh, as well as the Southern Transitional Council forces, have progressively expanded their control over Yemen’s south and east. This has resulted in many areas previously controlled by Yemeni government forces ending up in the hands of Emirati-backed elements. One of the most concrete examples of this rivalry was the attack carried out by the Saudi-led coalition forces in the early days of 2026 to prevent a UAE-backed arms shipment at the Port of Mukalla.[1]
When looking at the bigger picture, it can be seen that Iran, Israel, and the UAE are competing to establish dominance over the Gulf of Aden, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Red Sea transit routes. Having military bases in countries such as Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia in the Horn of Africa signifies gaining a strategic advantage in the regional-global power struggle. Deepening power struggles in Yemen, located opposite the Horn of Africa, are also largely related to this strategic advantage. It has long been said that the UAE wants to gain a foothold on the island of Socotra and has therefore fallen into disagreement with the Yemeni government. Likewise, the UAE’s support for the separatist Southern Transitional Council or Israel’s recent recognition of Somaliland’s independence could also be considered as concrete examples of this competition.
Iran’s support for the Houthi forces since 2004, helping them seize power in Yemen, is also part of this competition. The Houthis’ anti-Israel and anti-American ideology has made it easier for them to receive support from Iran. The Houthis’ capture of strategic ports such as Hodeidah after the capital Sana’a and their attacks on Israeli and American-flagged ships passing through have led to Yemen slowly becoming a “global security threat”. Although some Western actors, notably the US and the UK, have tried to counter this “threat” by forming an “anti-Houthi” coalition in Yemen, they have not been successful. US attacks targeting Houthi forces around port areas such as Hodeidah aimed to fully eliminate “threats” directed at Israel in particular. Although these attacks were in line with the interests of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, they did not yield any tangible benefits due to the much deeper disagreements between these actors. Defeating the Houthis on the ground and regaining lost territories, including the capital Sana’a, appears to be an extremely unlikely possibility.
The greatest challenge faced in Yemen since 2014 has been to ensure the re-establishment of a fully sovereign government that preserves territorial integrity, both internally and externally. Acting in this direction, Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of the “Presidential Leadership Council”, which is recognized as the executive body of the Yemeni government, is trying to establish a sovereign Yemeni state that protects its territorial integrity. However, the UAE, which supports separatist groups in the south, has emerged as one of the biggest obstacles to the establishment of a Yemeni state that protects its territorial integrity. Although Saudi Arabia appears to have overcome this obstacle, the fragmented structure of the “anti-Houthi” forces on the ground is noteworthy. The UAE’s geopolitical vision, which seeks to defeat the Houthis in Yemen while also advancing their own interests, is causing a strain in their relationship with Saudi Arabia.
In the current situation, it can be argued that the war in Yemen has been deadlocked for a long time and will continue in this manner. The absence of expectations for a large-scale military operation that would lead to the decisive defeat of one of the parties indicates that the war will continue in the future. It can also be said that there are no expectations for a political settlement or peace in Yemen. This is because there has been no change in the positions of actors such as Saudi Arabia, the Houthis, and the UAE. During this process, US operations against the Houthis have not been large enough to change the existing balance. One of the biggest risks faced is Yemen’s progress towards a fragmented structure in the official sense. The UAE has played a major role in the fight against the Houthis. Looking at the balance of power on the ground, without the support of countries such as Sudan and the UAE, Saudi Arabia has almost no chance of defeating the Houthis and achieving success in Yemen. In such a situation, Yemen’s future appears to depend largely on how the competition between the UAE and Saudi Arabia will unfold.
[1] “Suudi Arabistan, Yemen’de bir limanı vurdu: BAE’yi açıkça uyardı”, Euronews, https://tr.euronews.com/2025/12/30/suudi-arabistan-yemende-bir-limani-vurdu-baeyi-acikca-uyardi, (Access Date: 06.01.2026).
