As the international system evolves from a unipolar structure toward a multicentric and competitive order, the United States (US) stands as a power that is aware of this transformation but is increasingly losing its capacity to remain the decisive actor. In this context, the recent harsh rhetoric, military threats, and trade sanctions pursued by the US toward Iran should be evaluated not merely as policies targeting Iran, but essentially as part of a broader geopolitical strategy aimed at encircling China, Russia, and primarily Türkiye. Within this framework, Iran represents a threshold for Türkiye. Experts assess that if Iran were to collapse considering that Syria and Iraq have not yet achieved the desired stability it would naturally be Türkiye’s turn next.
The announcement by the US that it will impose an additional 25% customs duty on countries trading with Iran indicates that economic tools have been deployed because military options are not currently on the table. In other words, the US has realized that it cannot achieve victory in Iran through military means. It is assessed that Iran is not an actor that can be easily transformed through direct regime change from the US perspective. Indeed, unlike the examples of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, or Venezuela, Iran possesses a deep-rooted state tradition, a vast landmass, and a population of approximately 90 million. This situation demonstrates that Iran is not a “low-hanging fruit” for the US. Briefly, Iran is not just any Middle Eastern country created on a map with a ruler or pen according to someone’s whim after World War I.
The strategic importance of Iran for the US stems largely from its energy-based partnership with China. Under the China-Iran agreement signed in 2021 and valid for 25 years, China committed to investing approximately $400 billion in Iran. In return, China secured long-term oil supplies from Iran at reasonable prices. Today, the fact that approximately 80% of Iranian oil is exported to China and that China’s share in Iran’s foreign trade has reached 30% reinforces the strategic nature of the relationship between the two countries. Consequently, one of the primary goals of US pressure on Iran is to sever the energy bond China maintains through its imports from Iran. Expectations are high that China would provide all kinds of support, including military assistance, to Iran in the face of potential collapse scenarios. Otherwise, it is assessed as unlikely that an actor (China) that cannot protect its allies would rise to the status of a global power and/or challenge the US in the coming years.
The massive proven oil reserves possessed by Venezuela and Iran lie at the heart of the geopolitical energy competition conducted by the US. While Iran ranks third in the world in terms of oil reserves after Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, it holds the position of the second-largest country after Russia in terms of natural gas reserves. In this framework, US attempts to establish influence over Venezuela’s oil resources by targeting Nicolas Maduro are an extension of its hegemonic strategy aimed at maintaining the dollar’s status as the reserve currency in global energy markets. Similarly, within the context of this competition, the US seeks to remain a decisive actor over Iran’s oil resources.
While it does not seem possible for Trump to achieve his desired results in Iran in the short term, it is assessed that the reflection of Venezuelan oil revenues on the US economy will not be possible until the end of 2026. This is because Venezuelan oil is a heavy oil that is very difficult to process, and its global buyer is generally China. Venezuelan oil is generally used as fuel in heavy industrial production in China. In other words, unless China purchases Venezuelan oil at a reasonable price through US companies, Venezuelan oil is generally a dead investment for the US.
Although Donald Trump’s moves regarding Venezuela and Iran are consistent with US foreign policy, Trump is playing to the US domestic public with these maneuvers. In this context, Trump is trying to garner public support for the Congressional elections to be held in the US at the end of 2026. If Trump loses the Senate majority in the late 2026 Congressional elections, he will fall into the position of a “lame duck” in the US. Combined with the economic crisis in the US, the Epstein cases against Trump, and many other issues, the US which is no longer at its former global strength will lose more power by turning inward.
A large-scale military operation against Iran could bring the danger of closing the Strait of Hormuz. At this point, the Strait of Hormuz stands out as the key point of global energy security. As of 2024, an average of 20.3 million barrels of oil and petroleum products and 290 million cubic meters of LNG were transported daily through the Strait of Hormuz. Approximately 30% of global oil trade by sea and 20% of world LNG trade passed through this strait. Furthermore, in 2024, 80% of the LNG passing through Hormuz went to the Asian market, while 20% went to Europe. These data clearly demonstrate that in the event the strait is closed or its security is endangered, the heaviest economic and strategic cost would be paid by Asia-Pacific countries, primarily China, followed by India and Japan.[1] Therefore, it is predicted that China will provide unlimited support to Iran at any cost.
The military options of the US toward Iran face various structural problems. A ground military operation against Iran is nearly impossible. Potential intervention scenarios for the US are mostly limited to airstrikes and intelligence-based precision operations by Israel. However, the 12-day Iran-Israel conflict has demonstrated that the US and Israel lack the military capacity to completely bring Iran to its knees. The fact that US Patriot batteries and aircraft carriers have not yet been deployed near Iran indicates that US military preparations are not yet complete.
An analysis of the protests in Iran shows that they have failed to produce a revolutionary spirit capable of toppling the regime in the short term. The economically motivated protests that began on December 28, 2025; triggered by the sharp rise in exchange rates bear a different character than past ideological uprisings. The low participation rates in the first and second rounds of the 2024 Presidential elections, at 40% and 49% respectively, indicate increasing social distrust toward the regime. However, many experts suggest that street movements alone will not yield results for regime change in Iran. For instance, a radical and systematic transformation in Iran appears unlikely unless the pro-regime Clergy (Ulema), the merchant class defined as the Bazaari, and/or different groups within the regime switch sides by adopting an anti-regime stance.
Within this framework, the actual breaking point will be the post-Ali Khamenei era rather than the protests. A potential power vacuum could deepen competition among elites while making ethnic fault lines (Turks, Kurds, and Balochs) more visible. The scenario of Iran’s disintegration carries extremely high security risks not only for Iran but also for regional countries, primarily Türkiye. It has been realized by global actors (US-Israel) that such an environment of chaos would not serve their interests either; on the contrary, it would yield uncontrollable consequences.
In conclusion, the US has seen that it cannot transform Iran in its desired direction through military methods or by deepening internal chaos. Consequently, the US has announced that it will impose an additional 25% customs duty on countries trading with Iran. In other words, realizing that it cannot achieve its goals through military means or by instigating internal turmoil, the US has once again brought economic sanctions to the forefront. However, Iran has adapted to the embargo regime ongoing since 1979 and has developed the capacity to bypass these sanctions, particularly through China. Therefore, the latest US moves are expected to have a limited impact on Iran. In the context of the global power struggle, the China factor may become even more decisive. The current picture indicates that developments in Iran point toward a long-term, fragile, and multi-actor transformation process rather than a sudden regime change. While the emergence of a fragmented and unstable Iran may serve the regional interests of the United States and Israel, the fragmentation of Iran would pose serious risks to Türkiye’s security and economic interests.
[1] “Hürmüz Boğazı”, AA, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/info/infografik/46520, (Access Date: 19.01.2025).
