In a period when the international system is evolving towards multipolarity and models of regional integration are being redefined, it is observed that economic unions are being tested not only at a technical level but also in geopolitical and institutional dimensions. In this context, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), established in 2015, was initially designed as a structure prioritizing economic integration, but over time, due to the diverging foreign policy orientations of member and surrounding countries, institutional incompatibilities, and regional power rivalries, it has entered into a multi-layered process of transformation.
At the end of 2024, the granting of observer status to Iran and the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that came into force in 2025 have brought the EAEU’s Middle East expansion onto the institutional agenda. This situation indicates that the union is evolving from an economic framework into a multi-dimensional platform that also carries geopolitical meanings. In this regard, the future of the EAEU will be shaped not merely by technical integration policies but by normative legitimacy, institutional depth, and the capacity for political cohesion.
Although the EAEU has been shaped by the goal of deepening regional economic integration since its establishment, today it faces geopolitical, institutional, and normative dilemmas that go beyond this goal. The official granting of observer status to Iran at the end of 2024 and the FTA that came into force on May 14, 2025, have marked a threshold for the EAEU’s Middle East expansion; through this agreement, it is aimed to increase commercial interactions, harmonize the regulatory framework, and facilitate market access between Iran and the five EAEU member countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia).[1] Under the roadmap, structures such as thematic seminars, digital platforms, and mutual alignment of legal processes have been envisaged. This process is not limited to the removal of customs barriers alone. This roadmap also aims to create an economic environment that will enable the parties to see each other as complementary partners.[2]
The gap between the institutional progress of the EAEU and the geopolitical orientations of its members is gradually widening. Uzbekistan’s formal renunciation of membership, Tajikistan’s avoidance even of observer status, and Moldova’s irreversible adoption of European integration show that the Union’s peripheral attractiveness capacity has remained limited. The strategic influence established by China through infrastructure projects in Tajikistan and the increasing security risks along the Afghan border make it imperative for the EAEU to enter a process of redefinition that is not only economic but also security-oriented. These dynamics also demonstrate that the EAEU’s expansionary will is an extension of Moscow’s strategy to restore regional leadership.
On the other hand, the EAEU’s efforts to maintain integration at the technical level are being reinforced through various collaborations. The seminar held on May 21, 2025, at the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) under the chairmanship of Trade Minister Andrey Slepnev aimed to eliminate trade barriers and increase sectoral cooperation between the EAEU and Serbia within the framework of the FTA.[3] Slepnev stated that the difficulties faced by EAEU exporters in the Serbian market would be brought to the agenda of the Joint Committee; he also emphasized that Serbia’s lifting of EAEU-related quantitative restrictions on the import of vegetable oils and margarine in March 2025 was a direct result of progress in negotiations.
Such technical-level gains are supported within the EAEU by efforts for inter-institutional coordination. At the meeting held at the EEC headquarters on May 23, 2025, Chairman of the EEC Board Bakytzhan Sagintayev and Deputy Prime Minister of Belarus and Chairman of the EEC Council Natalya Petkevich discussed the potential of the EAEU not only to stimulate economic growth within the Union but also to achieve tangible results in trade relations with third countries.[4]
This process has expanded the scope of the EAEU’s technical institutionalization efforts. At the Council meeting held under the chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister of Belarus Petkevich on May 21, 2025, it was decided to extend the pilot project of navigational seals for forest products between Russia and Belarus until July 1, 2026. In addition, a report was adopted on the harmonization of qualification levels for occupations in demand within the EAEU.[5] The plan for the digitalization of railway freight transport with China includes the transition to e-documents with legal validity in transport documentation; measures to reduce bureaucracy in technical regulations for natural gas have also been approved.
The coordination of standards within the EAEU points not only to a technical but also a normative depth. As emphasized by Deputy Head of the Technical Regulations Department of the EEC, Ani Obosyan, in her speech at the World Metrology Day event held on May 20, 2025, creating a system of measurements based on common metrological principles within the framework of the “Declaration of the Eurasian Economic Way” has become an integral part of the integration goal.[6]
The sustainability of integration is not limited to technical areas alone; the legitimacy of the normative and legal framework also becomes an important test. At the 13th St. Petersburg International Legal Forum, Judge of the Russian Constitutional Court Sergey Knyazev argued that individuals should be granted the right to directly appeal to the EAEU Court; otherwise, the democratic legitimacy of integration law could be questioned.[7] Knyazev stated that applying a model similar to the European Court of Human Rights at the EAEU level is decisive both for the rule of law and for the internal cohesion of the Union.
In this context, the internal structural imbalances of the EAEU are becoming even more visible. In 2024, Kyrgyzstan, with an average wage of 429 dollars, has the lowest-paid labor profile within the EAEU.[8] In Russia, this figure reaches 951 dollars, and in Armenia, 731 dollars; Kyrgyz workers, especially in the agricultural and industrial sectors, are unable to achieve sustainable growth due to low productivity and a lack of qualifications. The emigration of qualified labor abroad and the employment structure concentrated in low-productivity sectors weaken Kyrgyzstan’s position within the EAEU.
The Union’s economic harmonization capacity is at times tested by interventions aimed at alleviating regional imbalances. The decision to allow duty-free import of a total of 300,000 tons of potatoes into Kazakhstan and Russia before the summer of 2025,[9] is significant in terms of both maintaining market stability and ensuring flexibility in agricultural policies.
In addition to all this, one of the most notable developments in the EAEU’s international orientation is the ongoing FTA negotiations with India. Starting on April 21, 2025, India implemented a temporary 12% protective tariff on certain steel products, increased its exports to the EU by 33%, and raised its foreign trade volume with Russia to 39.8 billion dollars in the 2023 fiscal year.[10] This orientation, which aims to increase trade volume to 100 billion dollars by 2030, highlights the potential of the EAEU to evolve into an integration model not only for Eurasia but also on a global scale.
Another dimension of this global pursuit is the transformation within the financial system. According to data announced at the “Russia–Islamic World” forum held in Kazan on May 14–19, 2025, 93% of trade between EAEU countries was conducted in national currencies.[11] This is considered an important threshold in terms of reducing dependence on reserve currencies such as the dollar and the euro and increasing regional financial resilience.
The evolution of the EAEU into a sustainable model of regional integration in the medium term will depend on the simultaneous deepening of institutional reforms. In particular, the multilateral cooperation practices developed through FTAs with Iran and Serbia may create an economic alternative for countries on the Union’s external periphery. If the EAEU supports technical harmonization processes (such as digital customs documents and mutual recognition of professional qualifications) with a normative framework and institutionalizes common regulatory mechanisms in diverse areas from metrological standards to natural gas security, it may remain a functional bloc of economic solidarity even in the shadow of geopolitical vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the fact that trade based on national currencies has reached 93% constitutes an important example of financial adaptation, illustrating the gradual overcoming of dollarization. The continuation of this orientation could strengthen the foundations of monetary integration within the EAEU.
According to a more realistic scenario, as the EAEU’s expansion goals continue to be shaped under Moscow’s leadership, geopolitical misalignments between the institutional center and peripheral countries may deepen. Uzbekistan’s formal renunciation of membership and Tajikistan’s avoidance of even observer status are related not only to their foreign policy orientations but also to China’s infrastructure investments and strategic influence. Under these conditions, while the Union’s expansion capacity remains limited, internal imbalances that threaten political stability may also emerge among existing members. Indicators such as the low-wage labor structure, unemployment rate, and decline in formal employment in Kyrgyzstan weaken not only the EAEU’s economic integration but also its capacity for social cohesion. If the EAEU limits itself to merely technical and trade interventions in response to these structural problems and fails to take normative steps such as the reform of the EAEU Court to guarantee the rights of individuals, in the long run, it is highly likely to remain a regional structure with limited legitimacy, perceived solely as an instrument of Russia’s foreign policy.
At this stage, the EAEU is being considered not only as a tool for deepening economic cooperation but also as a multi-layered platform seeking to play a role in reshaping the regional geopolitical order. The free trade mechanisms established with actors such as Iran and Serbia, technical harmonization steps, and progress towards monetary integration provide important indicators of the Union’s capacity building. However, the evolution of these developments into institutional sustainability depends not only on technical and economic functionality but also on the provision of normative legitimacy, the guarantee of individual rights, and the establishment of political cohesion among member states. Otherwise, tendencies towards distancing rather than integration with external peripheral countries, and the deepening of structural inequalities among internal actors, will increasingly risk reducing the EAEU to a Moscow-centered geopolitical instrument. Therefore, the future of the Union will be shaped by its capacity to restructure its geoeconomic objectives on the basis of the rule of law, participatory decision-making structures, and mutual trust.
[1] “YEAES: Dorozhnaya Karta Dlya Soglasheniya o Svobodnoy Torgovle Gotova”, Iran.ru, https://www.iran.ru/news/politics/128120/EAES_Dorozhnaya_karta_dlya_soglasheniya_o_svobodnoy_torgovle_gotova, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[2] “Iran, Russia Advance Free Trade as Eurasian Union Finalizes Roadmap with Iran”, Tehran Times, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/513398/Tehran-Moscow-advance-free-trade-as-Eurasian-union-finalizes, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[3] “Komissiya Obsudila s Gosorganami Stran YEAES i Biznesom Aktivizatsiyu Torgovli s Serbiyey”, AEK, https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/komissiya-obsudila-s-gosorganami-stran-eaes-i-biznesom-aktivizatsiyu-torgovli-s-serbiey-/, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[4] “Vedetsya Aktivnaya Rabota po Razvitiyu YEAES – Glava Kollegii YEEK”, RASPI, https://rapsinews.ru/international_news/20250523/310897362.html, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[5] “Aleksey Overchuk Prinyal Uchastiye v Zasedanii Soveta Yevraziyskoy Ekonomicheskoy Komissii”, The Russian Government, http://government.ru/news/55120, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[6] “Strany YEAES Povyshayut Uroven İntegratsii v Sfere Obespecheniya Yedinstva İzmereniy”, Alta, https://www.alta.ru/ts_news/119286, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[7] “Fizicheskiye Litsa Dolzhny Poluchit Pravo Obrashchatsya v Sud YEAES – Sudya KS”, RASPI, https://rapsinews.ru/judicial_news/20250519/310868799.html, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[8] Mariya İndina, “Trud Kak Eksport: Skolko Stoit Rabochaya Sila v Yevraziyskom Ekonomicheskom Soyuze?”, Akchabar, https://www.akchabar.kg/article/ekonomika-fmluaeuoncqnjkhr/trud-kak-eksport-skolko-stoit-rabochaya-sila-v-eaes-waieenmuykjfobjq, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[9] “Sovet YEEK Predostavil Tarifnuyu Lgotu na Vvoz Kartofelya v Kazakhstan i Rossiyu do Novogo Urozhaya”, AEK, https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/sovet-eek-predostavil-tarifnuyu-lgotu-na-vvoz-kartofelya-v-kazakhstan-i-rossiyu-do-novogo-urozhaya/, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[10] Anatoliy Marmyshev, “Indiya i YEAES Zaklyuchat Krupnoye Soglasheniye”, URA, https://ura.news/news/1052935125, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[11] “Strany YEAES Pochti Polnostyu Pereshli na Natsvalyuty”, Arbat Media, https://arbatmedia.kz/evraziya/strany-eaes-pocti-polnostyu-peresli-na-nacvalyuty-9157, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
