Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit held in Tianjin, China, from August 31 to September 1, 2025, and his participation in multilateral talks with Chinese and Russian leaders, has led comments in the Western press such as “India is turning away from the West and turning to Asia”.[1] The main reasons for these comments can be attributed to Modi’s previous absence from some SCO summits, and when he did attend, his distant stance towards Chinese President Xi Jinping and his tendency to avoid appearing in the same frame with him. Furthermore, according to Western claims, US President Donald Trump’s imposition of an additional 25% tariff against India on August 27, 2025, influenced Modi’s participation in the Tianjin Summit. Western-based analyses mostly argue that India has begun to turn away from the US and is moving towards closer cooperation with Russia and China.[2] While there is some truth in this idea, it is worth looking into the importance of the Western World-India partnership, New Delhi’s perspective on cooperation in Asia, and especially the nature of its relations with Russia and China.
First of all, regarding the claims that India is turning away from the US, it can be argued that while this approach is likely in the short and medium term, a major break in the nature of relations is not expected in the long term. This is because there has been no structural change in the nature of India’s relations with Pakistan and China in particular. In other words, there are no major variables in regional-global geopolitical balances in this regard. Within this context, it can be said that India must maintain and develop its military-security partnerships with its European partners, primarily the US, for the security of the Asian continent and the Pacific. Accordingly, India will continue to need cooperation with its Western partners in the framework of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)”. It should also be noted that military cooperation and exercises routinely carried out under security agreements concluded with the US in previous years in the areas of border security and counterterrorism continue. At this point, India’s biggest criticism of the US is that it has not received sufficient support, especially in terms of fighter jets for over 50 years and air defense systems in recent years, and therefore, it has turned to Russia as an alternative to fill this need. Moreover, ongoing US support for Pakistan regarding F-16 fighter jets remains one of India’s greatest concerns for many years.
Former US NATO Ambassador Ivo Daalder wrote in his analysis for Politico that[3] He has claimed that “the US has lost its strategic partner in an important part of the world.” Modi’s visit to China after a seven-year break has been cited as the most important indicator of this “shift in axis.” It is now a well-known fact that the Modi administration is uncomfortable with Trump’s policies. The main reasons for this discomfort include Trump’s claim that he was a mediator in the May 2025 tensions between India and Pakistan, India’s policies encouraging domestic production, and the US’s attempt to pressure India by implementing new customs policies in response to India’s ongoing energy trade with Russia. India’s most fundamental concern might be Trump’s attempt to take advantage of the problems with Pakistan. The Modi administration argues that the problems with Pakistan should be seen as “a matter between two states” and strongly opposes the involvement of “third actors” in this issue. In May, some actors, including China and the US, made efforts to defuse the latest conflict with Pakistan, but Trump’s attempt to turn this into a “diplomatic gain” was not welcomed by New Delhi.
Based on the above, it can be argued that New Delhi participated in the SCO Summit to send symbolic messages to the US due to its dissatisfaction with the Trump administration. However, this message-bearing participation may reopen the door to new cooperation with Russia and China. Indeed, in 2022, shortly before Russia’s attacks on Ukraine began, a series of intensive diplomatic contacts had been established between Russia, China, and India, particularly on the basis of resolving border issues and developing cooperation in Eurasia. Prior to 2022, Putin was acting with the desire to establish an important partnership-alliance in Eurasia by mediating between India and China. Significant progress had been made in this regard. However, Putin’s move in Ukraine has led to certain changes in both the approach of India and China towards Russia. As a result of Russia taking a back seat, border disputes between India and China revived and tensions continued to rise. From this point on, the nature of relations between India, China, and Russia began to change, and the focus of discussions shifted to ending the war in Ukraine. These geopolitical balances and circumstances remain unchanged. Therefore, as long as the war in Ukraine and tensions in Kashmir continue, taking concrete steps toward cooperation in Eurasia between Russia, India, and China remains a challenging endeavor.
Except for the change in power in the US in 2025, there is no structural break or variability in the relations between Russia, India, and China yet. For instance, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not attend the SCO Summit held in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, in 2024; instead, the Indian Foreign Minister attended. The SCO Summit held in New Delhi in 2023 was conducted as a virtual conference. The absence of Chinese President Xi Jinping from the G20 Leaders’ Summit held in New Delhi that same year was also noteworthy. Modi’s decision to skip the 2024 SCO Summit in Kazakhstan, after attending the G7 Summits for the past two years, highlighted the fragility of the cooperation and coordination process in Eurasia.
Due to the political changes in the US and the incompatibility with the Trump administration, Modi sent an important message that he could turn away from the West in foreign policy by attending the SCO Summit in China. However, it would be incorrect to assess this participation as a “major shift in axis” or a “move towards alliance building.” However, if India-US relations continue to be stuck in economic and trade disputes, this could have much greater negative effects on regional and global geopolitics. It can be argued that these developments will contribute to India’s strategic autonomy rather than leading to a change in its foreign policy direction.
[1] “India turns away from Trump’s America”, Politico, https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-america-india-china-europe-liberation-day-tariffs/, (Date of Access: 03.09.2025); “India is defying Trump’s tariffs and bankrolling Putin. There’s a word for that”, Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/09/02/india-trump-tariffs-modi-putin-ukraine-war/, (Date of Access: 03.09.2025);
[2] “The Guardian view on Donald Trump and India: the tariff war that boosted China”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/sep/01/the-guardian-view-on-donald-trump-and-india-the-tariff-war-that-boosted-china, (Date of Access: 03.09.2025).
[3] “India turns away from Trump’s America”, a.g.e., (Date of Access: 03.09.2025).
