In contemporary international relations, security is increasingly shifting from the realm of material capacities toward the domain of discursive constructions. The concept of “securitization,” theorized by the Copenhagen School, refers to the process of framing an issue as an existential threat, thereby elevating it above ordinary politics and legitimizing extraordinary measures. At the heart of this process lies not an objective reality, but rather a successfully constructed, circulated, and ultimately accepted threat narrative. Israel’s recent systematic discursive production regarding Türkiye is a concrete and strategic manifestation of this theory that must be addressed within this context. Indeed, this discourse points to a deep-seated operation of perception management and psycho-political framing that codes Türkiye as an “unpredictable,” “revisionist,” and “destabilizing” actor, rather than a narrative of direct military conflict. The fundamental operational logic of the strategy in question relies on constructing a speculative politics of fear based on Türkiye’s attributed potential intentions and hypothetical behaviors, rather than its actual capacity and concrete actions. Tangible examples of this framing are observable: for instance, Türkiye’s pursuit of its rights in the Eastern Mediterranean is presented not as legitimate moves within the framework of international law, but as deliberate “expansionism” and “provocation.” Similarly, advancements in the defense industry and successes in SIV (UCAV) technology are framed as a “destabilizing projection of power,” reflecting them as a declaration of intent rather than an increase in capacity.
Behind this discursive operation lie interconnected and layered strategic objectives. The primary goal is to transform the nature of the natural regional rivalry between Türkiye and Israel. In this context, the competition is attempted to be removed from being a legitimate struggle between two independent powers and instead placed within a framework of “self-defense” against a “law-defying threat.” In this way, Israel legitimizes its energy and security alliances established with Greece and the GRC (Greek Cypriot Administration) in the Eastern Mediterranean as a necessity of “preserving regional stability” and attempts to position these moves as a requirement of defensive policy in the eyes of the international public. A second and critical goal is diplomatic isolation. Türkiye’s position within NATO and its relations with the West are being constantly eroded through the narrative of an “unreliable ally” and a “troublemaking actor.” In this regard, Israel-affiliated think tanks and lobby networks systematically aim to influence decision-making mechanisms in Washington and Brussels by presenting issues such as Türkiye’s S-400 procurement or its Syria policy as evidence of a body of behavior incompatible with Western security interests. The ultimate aim of this discursive activity is to fuel sanction pressures against Türkiye and to gradually narrow Ankara’s strategic maneuverability within alliance systems.
Thirdly, this discourse functions as a tool for consolidation in domestic politics. During periods when political crises deepen or social divisions sharpen in Israel, the prominence of an “existential Türkiye threat” in the media and official discourse creates a focal point for calls for national unity by pushing internal political tensions into the background. A fourth objective is to maintain psychological balance. Türkiye’s success in military technology, particularly in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles, has shaken Israel’s traditional perception of qualitative superiority. The core message that “it is not Türkiye’s capacity, but its intention that is dangerous” attempts to eliminate the psychological shock created by this shift in the technological balance, reinforcing the impression that the real danger is Türkiye’s “destabilizing intent.”
Finally, Israel’s perception-based securitization discourse toward Türkiye also includes the aim of legitimizing its own violations of international law without drawing attention to them. In other words, Israel attempts to overshadow and relativize its practices, such as illegal settlement policies in the West Bank or the strict blockade on Gaza. In this context, framing Türkiye’s regional behavior as “expansionist” and “destabilizing” is a discursive comparative tool used to make Israel’s similar policies appear more “legitimate” or “reasonable.” This strategy is defined in international relations literature as classic “distraction” and “moral equivalence” tactics. Therefore, when Israel is criticized in international forums, bringing Türkiye’s operations to the agenda serves to divert criticism from the main subject and reduce the debate to a dilemma where both sides are “flawed.” Thus, while legitimizing its own policies, Israel seeks to gain a strategic discursive advantage by diverting attention and relativizing criticism.
The tools employed to achieve these objectives are so diverse and coordinated that they cannot be reduced to a single channel. In addition to official diplomatic statements and declarations from the security bureaucracy, think tank reports—often presented under an academic guise—play a crucial role in establishing this discursive framework. For instance, in a report titled “Türkiye Is Not Iran, but It Is a Threat” published by the Israel-based Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Türkiye is coded as an actor that is increasing its military presence in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, employing harsh rhetoric, and possessing the potential for friction in regional equations. Consequently, this situation is framed such that Ankara’s influence creates a significant security concern for Israel.[i] Similarly, in a report published by the Israel-based Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security on September 16, 2020, which defines Türkiye as the greatest obstacle for Israel (and its neighbors) in the 21st century, Ankara’s foreign policy orientations are presented as a factor undermining regional stability. Furthermore, the report associates Türkiye’s establishment of military bases and its activities particularly in geographies such as Iraq, Syria, and Libya with the image of a destabilizing actor.[ii] Additionally, influential English-language media outlets such as The Jerusalem Post and Times of Israel regularly publish critical discourses regarding Türkiye, carrying these analyses to an international audience. Powerful lobbying mechanisms in the US and partnership networks established with regional rivals (such as collaborations with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration) contribute to the reproduction of these discourses within diplomatic and security agendas. This multi-channel structure not only increases the consistency of a particular narrative but also strengthens its speed of dissemination by associating Türkiye with a perception of threat in the international public eye.
The shift in security and threat perceptions in the West plays a significant role in the emergence of this strategy. Indeed, Türkiye’s regional policies and global influence now present an appearance too complex to be explained solely within the framework of Islamophobia. The discourse of Islamophobia, which was functional in the West for a long time, has lost its explanatory power due to overexposure and the stagnation of Western values and norms. This situation also makes it impossible to understand Türkiye’s activities, such as its humanitarian diplomacy in Somalia or economic investments in the Balkans, through a purely religion-based framework. Consequently, the existing void creates a need for the construction of a new “other,” and attempts are made to fill this need with a narrative that can be termed “Turkophobia.” This new discourse is built upon the anachronistic transposition of the Ottoman past into contemporary politics (“Neo-Ottomanism”), the portrayal of Türkiye’s independent and autonomous decision-making capacity as synonymous with being “uncontrollable,” and the association of every military or diplomatic move with a historical “expansionist reflex.” For example, a routine cruise by the Turkish navy in international waters can be presented through symbolic frameworks like the “ghost of the Ottoman fleet” in the media, directly appealing to historical fears and subconscious perceptions. In this context, “Turkophobia” functions not only as a production of fear but also as a strategic discursive tool aimed at limiting Türkiye’s regional autonomy and capacity.
However, there are also significant structural factors that limit the long-term chance of success for this comprehensive perception operation. Israel’s discourse toward Türkiye is not merely a show of force or hostility, but a reflection of the anxiety regarding the loss of control and the uncertainty felt against Türkiye’s capacity to act with predictable rationality and strategic autonomy. For instance, Türkiye’s mediation role in the Russia-Ukraine War, its tendency to keep diplomatic channels constantly open, and its proven deterrence on the ground make it difficult to brand Ankara as an “irrational” or “out of control” actor. Similarly, Türkiye’s peace and humanitarian aid initiatives in the Middle East, development projects in Africa, and energy diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean demonstrate its capacity for pragmatic cooperation and crisis management with international actors, rather than just pursuing its own regional interests. Such concrete examples show that Türkiye’s actions are often rational and calculable, thereby weakening perception-based threat narratives. Furthermore, the increasingly multipolar nature of the international system makes it nearly impossible for any single actor to impose its own threat perception as a universal security paradigm. In such an environment where interest relations are highly fluid and pragmatic, the “Turkophobia” discourse turns into a limited propaganda tool that finds resonance only in certain strategic circles. For example, although Türkiye is accused of disrupting regional stability in some security analyses in Europe and Israel-based think-tank reports, Ankara’s diplomatic initiatives and crisis management capacity are also acknowledged in the same reports. Therefore, the discourse remains far from producing a hegemonic security narrative on a global scale. In this context, “Turkophobia” is nothing more than a perceptual tool that legitimizes a certain strategic concern and is reinforced within specific circles.
In conclusion, Israel’s perception-based securitization effort toward Türkiye is a sophisticated strategy that aims to transform Türkiye from a “power” into a “problem” and to limit its rising strategic influence on a discursive level. This strategy is not limited to diplomatic statements or media messages but is conducted simultaneously through academic reports, think-tank analyses, and international cooperation networks. Nevertheless, these narratives, which have a weak empirical basis and rely on selective historical analyses and speculative readings of intent, have a very limited potential to reach hegemonic acceptance in today’s international politics, where conflicts of interest, pragmatic calculations, and the multipolar system are decisive. In this framework, the discursive move in question is largely a reflection of Israel’s deep unease in the face of changing regional power balances and its search to protect its own position, maintain strategic advantages, and legitimize its policies within this new geopolitical reality. Consequently, Israel’s policies aimed at isolating Türkiye are intended not only to shape the perception in the diplomatic and security spheres but also to limit Türkiye’s regional influence and cooperation networks and to weaken Ankara’s strategic autonomy in the eyes of global actors.
[i] “Turkey Is Not Iran, but It Is a Threat”, İNSS, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/turkish-threat/, (Access Date: 18.12.2025).
[ii] “Turkey as a Major Challenge for Israel (and its Neighbors) in the 21st Century”, JİSS, https://jiss. org.il/en/inbar-lerman-yanarocak-turkey-as-a-major-challenge-for-israel-and-its-neighbors/, (Access Date: 18.12.2025).
