The power balance and strategic autonomy principles of the new realism are being rewritten in the vast steppes of Eurasia. Kazakhstan, traditionally seen as stranded between Russia’s security umbrella and China’s economic investments, initiated a pragmatic and proactive southern expansion aimed at breaking this pincer under the leadership of President Jomart Tokayev. With this move, alongside the search for a trade route, Astana’s vision is evolving from a landlocked geographical imprisonment into a geopolitical hub that connects continents.
Pakistan is positioned as this vision’s gateway to the oceans, in other words, Kazakhstan’s strategic breathing tube. The multi-vector approach that defines Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has, during the Tokayev era, transformed from a romantic balance into a hard, opportunistic mechanism of multi-alignment and balancing. In particular, the changing global conjuncture after 2022 and the logistical ruptures created by the Ukraine Crisis have pushed Astana to question its asymmetric dependence on the Northern Corridor. From a new realist perspective, Kazakhstan is balancing the hegemonic pressure created by its massive neighbors, Russia and China, through the new ties it has established with South Asia and the West.
Kazakhstan’s visit to Pakistan on 3–4 February 2026 marked a historic turning point in bilateral relations by officially elevating relations between Kazakhstan and Pakistan to the level of a Strategic Partnership. Within the scope of President Tokayev’s first state visit to Pakistan after 23 years, 37 new agreements were signed in critical fields such as trade, logistics, and defense, and the two sides set a target of increasing bilateral trade volume to 1 billion dollars in the short term.
Tokayev’s political vision is to design the country not only as a raw material exporter but as an intercontinental logistics hub. In this context, Kazakhstan’s move toward Pakistan is a strategy to transform the security vulnerabilities created by being landlocked into a connectivity power by creating multiple logistical alternatives. In this strategic transformation, Pakistan is the keystone of the Southern Corridor, completing Kazakhstan’s Middle Corridor vision and extending it to the Arabian Sea and beyond. Kazakhstan’s access to global markets through Pakistan is being shaped by technically and logistically revolutionary projects. The Trans-Afghan Railway project constitutes the most ambitious pillar of this vision. Covering the Termez, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul, and Peshawar line and projected at a cost of approximately 7 billion dollars, this line has the potential to radically reduce logistics costs and transit times by connecting Central Asia deep into South Asia.
Pakistan’s Karachi and especially Gwadar ports are not merely alternatives for Kazakhstan; they are strategic exit points that shorten the distance by about forty percent compared to routes passing through Russia. The railway connection between Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Pakistan is another technical alternative developed to distribute geopolitical risks. When Pakistan’s port data is examined, Gwadar’s integration with the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) also moves Kazakhstan’s relations with China to a new level. However, the main gain for Astana is the ability to integrate into the global supply chain via multiple port facilities without being locked into a single hub. This represents a classic maneuver to expand Kazakhstan’s bargaining space.
Afghanistan, the biggest obstacle in front of the Southern Corridor, is being transformed from a risk factor into a trade bridge through the pragmatic engagement pursued in recent years by Astana and Tashkent. Institutional working groups established by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with Afghanistan rationalize a regional trade target of 3 billion dollars. Kazakhstan’s removal of the Taliban from its list of banned organizations is not an ideological choice but rather the result of a strategy aimed at securing logistics lines and stabilizing the region through economic convergence. At this point, Kazakhstan sees Afghanistan not merely as territory to be crossed, but as an economic hinterland where it can market agricultural products, especially flour and wheat, and export construction materials.
Technical cooperation processes aim to minimize the risk of radicalism through economic interdependence by integrating the Taliban administration into regional economic projects. Regional data suggests that such an economic peace strategy promises far more sustainable stability than military interventions. Economic integration is not limited to Afghanistan but is also accelerating significantly in relations with Pakistan. Although Kazakhstan’s imports from Pakistan remained around 37 million dollars in 2022 — indicating performance far below potential — dozens of newly signed agreements and the 1 billion dollar trade target indicate that this picture will change rapidly.
In sectoral analysis, energy and agriculture stand out as the leading win-win opportunities. While Kazakhstan’s wheat and energy resources can help solve Pakistan’s chronic food and energy crises, Pakistan’s pharmaceutical industry and textile products can find a competitive place in the Kazakh market. The halal food sector, in particular, could serve as a lever for both countries to enter Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian markets together, supported by Islamic finance instruments developed within the Astana International Financial Centre. The joint investment platform established between Samruk-Kazyna and the Fauji Foundation represents the most serious institutional step taken to transform these opportunities into concrete production facilities.
However, serious bottlenecks stand in front of this optimistic picture. The Qosh-Tepa Canal project being built in northern Afghanistan has the potential to create tension with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan because it will draw significant amounts of water from the Amu Darya River. A water security crisis could damage the spirit of regional cooperation and undermine the political foundation of Trans-Afghan projects. In addition, financing for infrastructure projects remains uncertain. Support from international institutions continues to depend on terrorism risks in the region and the level of legitimacy of the Taliban. The competition among the United States, China, and Russia — key actors in the region — constitutes another layer of risk.
As the 2030 vision approaches, this connection Kazakhstan has built with Pakistan has the potential to reduce the country’s dependence on the Russia–China axis by 20 to 30 percent. Although this does not mean complete independence in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, it provides a vital Plan B that can be used during times of crisis. Pakistan, by gaining access to Central Asia, achieves geopolitical depth in its competition with India and positions itself as an indispensable logistics hub for the region.
In conclusion, the strategic partnership between Kazakhstan and Pakistan is a modern manifestation of a new realist survival strategy. This path is difficult and financially demanding; however, it is a critical exit route for Kazakhstan to reinforce its sovereignty and become a true connectivity power in Eurasia.
