The Pax Americana order, which has played a decisive role in the stability of the European security architecture since the end of the Cold War, is showing signs of dissolution today. International politics has entered a period of transformation, drifting away from a relatively predictable structure guided by a single hegemonic power toward one shaped by multi-layered and profound global power shifts. In this new environment where great power competition has once again become decisive, European governments still strive to build their foreign policies upon normative principles such as the protection of international law, the sustenance of multilateral cooperation, and the promotion of democratic values. However, this approach is being shaped on increasingly fragile ground due to both the rising question marks regarding the reliability of the United States’ (US) security guarantees and the illiberal and nationalist trends gaining momentum within the European Union (EU).
Russia’s policies aimed at increasing its regional influence have not only left Europe facing a direct security threat but have also clearly exposed the continent’s structural dependence on the US. Europe’s responses to these developments have been shaped around increasing defense expenditures, providing comprehensive military support to Ukraine, implementing wide-ranging sanctions against Russia, and efforts to permanently integrate the US into the European security architecture. These steps mark a historical turning point in terms of European security policies.
The ‘Zeitenwende,’ announced in 2022 and representing a radical shift in Germany’s foreign and security policy, can be evaluated as the beginning of a transition period characterized by broader transformations in European foreign and security policy. Should the EU maintain its ambition to actively lead this process, it will inevitably face a fundamental strategic question: To what extent, and through which instruments, can Europe achieve its objectives with the United States, without the US, or—if necessary—in spite of the US?
Assessments of key policy areas and key actors in international politics point not to a uniform picture, but to a diverse and evolving landscape. Particularly when the time dimension is taken into account, it is seen that Europe’s room for maneuver varies within the framework of an approach that aims to increase preparations for risks in the long term and reduce dependence on the US. In this context, an important reference point is the United States National Security Strategy document dated November 2025. This document presents a contradictory picture of transatlantic relations.
Europe ranks third in the United States’ strategic priorities after the Western Hemisphere and Asia, while the EU is increasingly portrayed as a transnational actor that conflicts with American interests. European societies, on the other hand, are presented as weakened structures in political, economic, and cultural terms. In contrast, the US states that it maintains its interest in sustaining stability and peace in Europe and aims to contribute to the continent’s regaining of strength. However, this approach has become contradictory and somewhat threatening due to tendencies that go beyond the liberal framework and ethno-nationalist undertones.
The comprehensive political and institutional transformation observed in the United States in recent years has been described in some analyses as a shift toward competitive authoritarianism. This transformation is also clearly reflected in foreign policy. The systematic discrediting of international organizations, the use of force even against allies, the threat of economic pressure, and repeated violations of international law norms are among the increasingly visible elements of U.S. foreign policy. Current examples of this trend are evident in the open use of economic pressure tools to support military interventions and expansionist territorial claims.
However, European states neither see nor desire a complete break with the US in the short term. Cooperation with Washington, particularly on existential security issues, remains indispensable as long as it is politically feasible and normatively legitimate. Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine can be seen as a development that clearly highlights the importance of this necessity. In this context, the EU’s continued alliance within NATO stands out as a strategic necessity. However, the United States, as the leading country in the alliance, is gradually moving away from the normative basis that legitimizes military support for Ukraine.
In the short and medium term, the most prominent area of pressure facing Europe is security and defense policies. EU member states are in a fragile geopolitical position due to both their strategic dependence on the US and their perception of threats originating from Russia. While NATO continues to be the fundamental institutional pillar of European security, the alliance’s deterrence and defense capabilities rely heavily on US military power. However, Washington’s security commitments are increasingly tied to specific political and financial conditions. Chief among these conditions is the expectation that European allies will reach a level of defense spending and burden-sharing deemed sufficient by the US.
In this context, the most favorable scenario is the restructuring of NATO in close coordination with the US, with Europeans gradually assuming greater responsibility. Conversely, a sudden and sharp divergence in the transatlantic security architecture carries a high level of strategic risk and can only become sustainable after a long-term, comprehensive preparation process. Such a transformation requires not only filling the capacity gaps that would be created by a possible reduction in American military presence, but also overcoming the lack of collective political leadership capable of defining common interests within Europe and assuming effective responsibility in NATO’s military and political decision-making processes.
European states have developed various formal and informal cooperation formats to coordinate support for Ukraine and strengthen its defense capabilities. Recent ad hoc arrangements have served as flexible, situation-focused coordination mechanisms within the European security architecture, enabling the pooling of significant military and political capacity, primarily involving France and Germany, with the periodic participation of Poland and Italy. These countries effectively assume leadership roles within NATO, the EU, and the United Nations, forming a center of gravity for small and medium-sized states. However, there is no clear consensus among EU member states between maintaining security dependence on the US and strengthening European sovereignty. Current cooperation formats are largely geared towards preserving existing institutional structures, and therefore a more profound transformation is expected to be triggered primarily by political crises.
Beyond security and defense policies, it is evident that the EU’s capacity for action in foreign policy and strategic areas is limited. In the Middle East context, it is quite difficult for European-centered initiatives to produce effective results without US support. Although EU member states continue to maintain diplomatic channels and defend long-term goals such as a two-state solution, they largely lack the political and military weight to decisively steer the processes. A similar picture emerges with regard to policies on the Ukraine War, and Europe’s primary priority is to secure US support in order to ensure the continuity of its engagement in this area.
The structural dependencies the EU faces in the energy and technology sectors also significantly limit the continent’s strategic maneuvering space. Policies based on the US’s dominant position in energy markets and advanced technology sectors increase Europe’s external dependence in its short- and medium-term choices. For the EU, ensuring sustainability in the energy sector requires cooperation for supply security in the short term and the creation of a more autonomous common energy structure in line with decarbonization goals in the long term. Dependence in the technology sector not only has economic consequences but also facilitates political influence over European societies and institutions. Therefore, while developing independent alternatives remains a long-term goal, increasing resilience and strengthening protective regulatory mechanisms are priorities in the short term.
Throughout history, European states have been able to conduct their foreign policies relatively autonomously during certain periods and keep disagreements with the US at a manageable level. However, as long as shared values and mutual interests formed the structural basis of transatlantic relations, cooperation remained the dominant form of this relationship. Today, however, this common ground is increasingly weakening, and the US is observed to be moving away from its historically attributed role as a “stabilizing hegemon,” becoming a less predictable actor that more frequently clashes with Europe on fundamental issues such as democratic values and human rights. This transformation inevitably leads to Europe developing a more independent stance in certain policy areas and distancing itself from US policies when necessary.
This requirement is particularly evident in climate, development, and trade policies. The EU continues to pursue an ambitious and normative climate policy line and is striving to integrate this approach holistically into its foreign policy and trade instruments. In contrast, the US’s increasingly explicit embrace of a fossil fuel-based foreign policy approach and its greater emphasis on economic pressure tools are making the concepts of strategic autonomy and European sovereignty more central for Europe. While these concepts represent a long-term orientation towards overcoming structural dependence on the US, current uncertainties necessitate a balanced policy line between short-term cooperation requirements and long-term independence goals.
