Analysis

China’s Relations with Russia and the United States and Problems of Global Governance

The long-term impact of elite scandals may further weaken the normative foundations of global governance.
The meetings reflect China’s effort to manage its relations with major powers in both the Western and Eurasian axes simultaneously.
China will continue to position its own governance model as a “more stable and moral” alternative.

Paylaş

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The high-level meetings held by Chinese President Xi Jinping with Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of the United States (U.S.) Donald Trump constitute a critical turning point for understanding the current dynamics of the international system. These dialogues, which took place on 4 February 2026, reveal China’s balancing role among major powers within a multipolar world order. These engagements foreground themes such as global strategic stability, the protection of sovereignty, and cooperation based on mutual benefit.

The meetings reflect China’s effort to manage its relations simultaneously with major powers along both the Western and Eurasian axes. While the emphasis on global strategic stability and coordination within multilateral platforms in Xi’s meeting with Putin reveals the deepening nature of China–Russia relations, the focus on mutual respect, the management of differences, and warnings regarding regional issues in the meeting with Trump points to the fragile balances characterizing China–U.S. relations.[i]

On 4 February 2026, Xi stated that he was ready to work with Trump to jointly steer the “giant ship” of China–U.S. relations steadily forward against winds and storms. He emphasized that effective communication had been maintained between the two leaders throughout 2025, and that the successful meeting in Busan had set the direction and course for China–U.S. relations; he noted that these developments had been welcomed by the peoples of both countries and by the international community. He further stressed that China remains faithful to its words and actions, demonstrating consistency between rhetoric and practice.[ii]

On the same date, on the occasion of the Lunar New Year, Xi conveyed his congratulations to Putin and the Russian people, and expressed his willingness, through the joint efforts of the two leaders, to chart a new roadmap for bilateral relations. He stated that the two meetings held in 2025 had elevated China–Russia relations to a new stage of development; that the 80th anniversary of the victory over fascism in the Second World War was being commemorated; that economic and trade relations were proceeding robustly; that people-to-people exchanges and cooperation were expanding; and that joint efforts were being made to build a more just system of global governance. Putin, for his part, stated that Russia would actively support China’s hosting of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting.[iii]

These developments point to significant challenges in the context of global governance. Today, the international system is undergoing a transition from the post–Cold War unipolar American hegemony to a multipolar structure. However, this transition is characterized by a crisis of legitimacy of institutions, the intensification of great power competition, and normative conflicts. While China claims to be a defender of a United Nations (UN)–centered order, it is simultaneously constructing a robust governance vision through alternative platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). This situation represents the rise of a relative sovereignty perspective in response to the universalist claims of the liberal international order, and the pressure exerted by “elite wealth” on global governance increases the risk of fragmentation.

Donald Trump’s first presidency (2017–2021) created a profound rupture in China–U.S. relations. It was characterized by a trade war, high tariff barriers, and technology restrictions, transforming the relationship into a debate over the dismantling of mutual interdependence. Sanctions imposed on Huawei and bans targeting TikTok were interpreted as the onset of a technological new Cold War. During the same period, China–Russia relations approached the level of a “limitless partnership,” and in 2019 a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era” was declared. The Covid-19 period and the sanctions imposed by the West on Russia over Ukraine further reinforced this rapprochement.

The Joe Biden administration (2021–2025) largely maintained Trump’s policies, but pursued a multilateral balancing strategy through coordination with allies (QUAD, AUKUS). The CHIPS Act and export controls aimed to constrain China’s advancement in high-technology sectors. Relations with Russia, meanwhile, deepened as China adopted a formally neutral yet Russia-supportive stance in response to Western sanctions following the Ukraine War. The “limitless friendship” declaration by Xi and Putin at the 2022 Beijing Summit represents the apex of this period.

With Trump’s re-election in 2025, a new period of uncertainty has begun in the international system. The meetings held at the beginning of 2026 are of critical importance in this context. Xi’s virtual meeting with Putin on 4 February 2026 included the celebration of the 30th anniversary of relations and the decision to launch themed “years of education.” Noting that the international situation is turbulent, Xi called for the preservation of global strategic stability and emphasized the defense of a United Nations (UN)-centered order. Putin, in turn, committed to strengthening coordination on multilateral platforms (the UN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and BRICS). This meeting demonstrates the resilience of the China–Russia axis in the face of Western sanctions and geopolitical pressures.

On the same day, Xi’s telephone conversation with Trump points to an effort to “set the direction” of relations. Referring to the previous Busan meeting, Xi called for keeping communication channels open, managing differences, and expanding practical cooperation. He characterized regional issues as “important and sensitive matters” and warned against U.S. arms sales. In the face of expectations regarding possible tariffs and technology restrictions under the Trump administration, it is observed that China is pursuing a strategy that combines both dialogue and deterrence.

The defining feature of Chinese foreign policy—“pragmatic balancing”—remains active. China opts for neither full alliance nor full confrontation; instead, it manages its relations with major powers simultaneously, thereby expanding its room for maneuver.

Current Problems in the Context of Global Governance

Current developments concretize the fundamental problems of global governance. First, normative conflict comes to the fore. China and Russia, as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, claim to be defenders of the post–Second World War order, yet they criticize the West’s “rules-based order” as hegemonic. This situation leads to divergence in the interpretation of international law.

Second, the legitimacy crisis of institutions is deepening. The expansion of BRICS in 2024 and the growth of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are creating alternative platforms to Western-centric institutions. While China’s hosting of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting strengthens its leadership claim in the Asia-Pacific region, this is counterbalanced by the United States’ hosting of the G20.

In this regard, the pressure exerted by elite wealth on global governance increases the risk of fragmentation. In particular, allegations emerging in Western countries involving organized crime networks and abuses of power allegedly implicating high-level political, financial, and intellectual elites seriously undermine the moral and normative superiority claims of the liberal international order. Such scandals not only lead to an erosion of trust within domestic publics but also, on a global scale, call into question the universalist legitimacy of the Western-centric governance model. Chinese state media have previously interpreted such incidents (for example, the abuse case that resulted in the suicide of a high-profile financier in 2019) as indicators of structural flaws and elite privileges within the U.S. political system, emphasizing the hypocrisy of the West’s human rights discourse. In the recent process of the gradual public release of the Epstein files, Chinese official news agencies have reported developments in a neutral tone; however, by highlighting the connections of such incidents to Western elite circles, they have adopted an indirect critical stance.[iv]

Chinese official discourse systematically uses such incidents to criticize Western democracy. In the white paper “China: Democracy That Works” published in 2021, the weaknesses of Western-style political party systems are explicitly emphasized; it is stated that parties act in decision-making and governance processes in line with their own interests or the interests of the classes, regions, and groups they represent, thereby creating divisions within society. The White Paper criticizes Western models for being procedure-based, for failing to fulfill electoral promises, and for being forcibly imposed on other countries through hegemonic pressure. This situation deepens elite domination and social polarization. Chinese state media interpret Epstein-like scandals within this framework, highlighting the hypocrisy of the West’s human rights and democracy discourse, while positioning China’s own model of “whole-process people’s democracy” as a more just and stable alternative.[v]

The long-term impact of elite scandals may further weaken the normative foundations of global governance. China will continue to position its own governance approach as a “more stable and moral” model. As this narrative resonates particularly in developing countries, the appeal of Western-centered institutions may diminish, and a fragmented version of a multipolar order may gain strength. In the future, new revelations concerning elite networks may further shift great power competition onto an ideological plane, increasing the risk of a transition from managed competition toward bloc formation.

In conclusion, the meetings held at the beginning of 2026 demonstrate China’s mastery of great power diplomacy. Global governance will evolve toward either a more inclusive or a more fragmented structure, depending on the success of this balancing strategy. The international community must strengthen dialogue mechanisms that can prevent conflict.


[i] “Xi calls on China, Russia to grow ties, work for global strategic stability”, Xinhua, https://english.news.cn/20260204/ac95c216d7d349a3961b589c13d6e8d6/c.html, (Accessed: 04.02.2026); “Xi says ready to work with Trump to steer giant ship of China-U.S. ties steadily forward”, Xinhua, https://english.news.cn/20260205/08d54e12dab24793880e7fccd6fa584c/c.html, (Accessed: 04.02.2026).

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] “Xi calls on China, Russia to grow ties, work for global strategic stability”, Xinhua, https://english.news.cn/20260204/ac95c216d7d349a3961b589c13d6e8d6/c.html, (Accessed: 04.02.2026).

[iv] “Jeffrey Epstein death reveals flaws in US political system”, Global Times, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1161089.shtml, (Access Date: 04.02.2026); “Certain Epstein documents withdrawn after victims complain”, Xinhua, https://english.news.cn/northamerica/20260203/5349455ed9ef4f8d88060ed1a6a48ae7/c.html, (Access Date: 04.02.2026).

[v] “Full text: China: Democracy That Works”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, https://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202112/t20211204_10462468.htm, (Access Date: 04.02.2026).

Zeynep Çağla ERİN
Zeynep Çağla ERİN
Zeynep Çağla Erin graduated from Yalova University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations in 2020 with her graduation thesis titled “Feminist Perspective of Turkish Modernization” and from Istanbul University AUZEF, Department of Sociology in 2020. In 2023, she graduated from Yalova University Institute of Social Sciences, Department of International Relations with a thesis titled “South Korea’s Foreign Policy Identity: Critical Approaches on Globalization, Nationalism and Cultural Public Diplomacy” at Yalova University Graduate School of International Relations. She is currently pursuing her PhD at Kocaeli University, Department of International Relations. Erin, who serves as an Asia & Pacific Specialist at ANKASAM, has primary interests in the Asia-Pacific region, Critical Theories in International Relations, and Public Diplomacy. Erin speaks fluent English and beginner level of Korean.

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