Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are undergoing a radical transformation at a time when regional geopolitical shifts are accelerating. In particular, the downing of an AZAL passenger aircraft belonging to Azerbaijan by Russian air defense systems in December 2024 marked an irreversible turning point in these relations. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s statement at the Shusha Global Media Forum, in which he emphasized that the incident constituted a violation requiring accountability within the framework of international law, clearly demonstrated that Azerbaijan is seeking a legitimate position not only in bilateral relations but also at the global level.[i] President Aliyev’s appeal to Ukraine, urging it “not to submit to occupation” while referencing experiences from the Karabakh War, further highlighted Azerbaijan’s new position in the South Caucasus.[ii]
This political resolve has not remained at the level of rhetoric but has manifested as a new dimension in Azerbaijan’s multidimensional foreign policy strategy. Through its initiatives in the energy sector, Baku has implemented a foreign policy based not only on independence but also on economic sustainability. The new roadmap signed with Ukraine in the fields of natural gas production, storage, and transportation has reinforced Azerbaijan’s constructive and critical role in Europe’s energy security.[iii] This new energy diplomacy, particularly shaped through the Middle Corridor, has expanded Baku’s geo-economic maneuvering space and significantly undermined Moscow’s regional energy monopoly.
The most visible reflection of the shifting power dynamics in the region has been observed in the negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia conducted without Russia’s mediation. The direct meeting between Azerbaijani President Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan in Abu Dhabi stands as strong evidence of the diminishing influence of Moscow’s traditional mediating role in the South Caucasus.[iv] This diplomatic momentum was clearly embodied in Aliyev’s statement in Khankendi, where Azerbaijan was observed to pursue stable diplomacy based on two fundamental conditions for peace: the amendment of Armenia’s Constitution and the dissolution of the Minsk Group.[v]
During this process, Azerbaijan has demonstrated resistance to Moscow’s policies not only on a diplomatic level but also through internal security measures. The confirmation that the rights of Russian citizens arrested in Baku were safeguarded under the oversight of the ombudsman institution revealed that Azerbaijan operates within the framework of international law and human rights. The prosecution of eight Russian nationals on charges of cybercrime and drug trafficking strongly underscored the independence of Azerbaijan’s domestic legal system.
Azerbaijan’s tendency toward independent action has also been clearly reflected in its relations with former Soviet mechanisms. The Azerbaijani government’s decision not to send a representative to the Economic Council meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) held in Moscow on July 18, 2025, was not merely a temporary diplomatic gesture; it was also a concrete indication that Azerbaijan is strategically distancing itself from Russia-centered structures.[vi]
At this point, a particularly noteworthy dynamic is the discursive aggressiveness that Moscow has developed in response to Azerbaijan’s recent steps toward greater independence. Moscow has described the potential rapprochement between Aliyev and Zelensky as provocative and has accused Azerbaijan of being incited by Ukraine.[vii] However, Azerbaijan responded to these accusations with reflexes characteristic of Western-style independent diplomacy, taking deterrent measures against Moscow such as closing press offices, implementing legal actions against information operations, and initiating judicial procedures against Russian citizens.
It is evident that Azerbaijan’s foreign policy vision is shaped not solely by energy and security concerns but also notably by humanitarian diplomacy. As a country that has endured the heavy humanitarian toll of the Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has received international recognition for comprehensive programs aimed at rehabilitating Ukrainian children affected by war, thereby concretizing its soft power capacity.[viii]
This new understanding of humanitarian diplomacy has further exacerbated Moscow’s approach to the South Caucasus. Russia’s portrayal of Azerbaijan as a forward base of the West within the framework of its “Near Abroad Doctrine” is interpreted as a panic-driven reflex in response to its waning influence in traditional spheres of dominance.[ix] In this context, Azerbaijan’s rational and controlled foreign policy reflects its preference for a multipolar approach rather than full integration with the West.
The most tangible mechanism of pressure exerted by Russia has been its repressive policies targeting ethnic Azerbaijan Turks. A wave of arrests against the Azerbaijani diaspora in the Sverdlovsk region, particularly in Yekaterinburg, along with incidents of violence against the family members of diaspora leaders, exceeded Baku’s tolerance threshold and accelerated its retaliatory measures.[x]
In this context, Azerbaijan’s law-based approach stands out. President Aliyev, as in the case of the downed AZAL aircraft, has demanded international accountability and compensation from Moscow. Despite receiving only official refusals, he emphasized that the pursuit of justice would continue for years if necessary.[xi] This approach demonstrates that Azerbaijan is focused not merely on short-term diplomatic maneuvers but on the long-term construction of a legal position.
In the coming period, the Azerbaijan–Russia crisis appears likely to deepen further. In particular, Azerbaijan’s strategic inclination to diversify its energy exports and accelerate integration with the West through a regionalist framework will further weaken Moscow’s influence over the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan’s strengthening integration with the Middle Corridor and its direct access to the European energy market via Ukraine will yield outcomes that neutralize Russia’s economic and geopolitical instruments of pressure. Accordingly, it is likely that Moscow will seek to intensify its pressure mechanisms on Baku; notably through increased securitization policies targeting the Azerbaijani diaspora, further marginalization of Azerbaijan in multilateral platforms such as the CIS, and more frequent perception operations via information warfare. However, Azerbaijan’s current rational and multidimensional diplomatic reflexes possess the capacity to build strong resilience against such pressures.
Secondly, the current trajectory increases Azerbaijan’s potential to become a direct center of power in the South Caucasus. The erosion of Russia’s traditional mediation capacity – particularly its exclusion from Azerbaijan–Armenia negotiations – will position Baku as the leading peace actor in the region. Another key consequence of this development will be Azerbaijan’s ability to obtain a more advantageous position in its relations with the West. Especially with the further institutionalization of strategic partnership with Türkiye within the context of the Middle Corridor, Azerbaijan is moving toward constructing a multipolar balance without compromising its core principles of independence while integrating with the West. In this context, Azerbaijan’s effectiveness in both energy security and regional mediation will increase; particularly, the humanitarian diplomacy models developed with Kyiv are likely to provide foreign policy flexibility that can be adapted to other regional crises.
In conclusion, Azerbaijan has opened the doors to a new era in South Caucasus geopolitics through the rational and multidimensional foreign policy it has pursued in recent years. Its consistent stance based on legal principles against Russia’s provocative and coercive policies, the diversification of its energy diplomacy, and the consolidation of its soft power through humanitarian diplomacy have made Baku more visible not only on a regional but also on a global scale. In the period ahead, Azerbaijan is expected to protect and strengthen its national interests across a wider geography without compromising its commitment to international law and the principles of multipolar foreign policy. In this context, Azerbaijan is not merely a party to the crisis with Russia but is emerging as one of the shaping actors of the regional order.
[i] “Aliyev Posovetoval Ukraine ‘Ne Smiryatsya’ s Okkupatsiyey Territoriy”, Radio Svoboda, https://www.svoboda.org/a/aliev-posovetoval-ukraine-ne-smiryatjsya-s-okkupatsiey-territoriy/33478629.html, (Access Date: 20.07.2025).
[ii] Lala Hajiyeva, “Ukrainian Media Widely Covered President Ilham Aliyev’s Speech at the 3rd Shusha Global Media Forum”, ANewz, https://anewz.tv/region/south-caucasus/10910/ukrainian-media-has-given-coverage-to-azerbaijan/news, (Access Date: 20.07.2025).
[iii] “Ukraine to Store Gas from Azerbaijan, Ease Transit to Europe in New Energy Deal”, The Cradle, https://thecradle.co/articles/ukraine-to-store-gas-from-azerbaijan-ease-transit-to-europe-in-new-energy-deal, (Access Date: 20.07.2025).
[iv] Ulviyya Asadzade, “Russia’s Grip Weakens in the South Caucasus, Opening Doors to New Players”, Radio Liberty, https://www.rferl.org/a/south-caucasus-russia-losing-influence-armenia-azerbaijan/33475018.html, (Access Date: 20.07.2025).
[v] “Aliyev: Baku i Yerevan Ochen Blizki k Podpisaniyu Mirnogo Dogovora”, TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24558165, (Access Date: 20.07.2025).
[vi] “Lebedev Nazval Vremennym Epizodom Otsutstviye Delegatsii Baku na Ekonomsovete SNG”, Rambler, https://news.rambler.ru/world/55005613-lebedev-nazval-vremennym-epizodom-otsutstvie-delegatsii-baku-na-ekonomsovete-sng, (Access Date: 20.07.2025).
[vii] Ivan Khomenko, “Kremlin Blames Ukraine-Again-This Time for Russia’s Fallout With Azerbaijan”, United24 Media, https://united24media.com/latest-news/kremlin-blames-ukraine-again-this-time-for-russias-fallout-with-azerbaijan-9574, (Access Date: 20.07.2025).
[viii] Timucin Turksoy, “Azerbaijan Welcomes War-Affected Ukrainian Children for Cultural and Psychological Support”, Caspian News, https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijan-welcomes-war-affected-ukrainian-children-for-cultural-and-psychological-support-2025-7-12-0, (Access Date: 20.07.2025).
[ix] “Vodolatskiy: Zapad Pytayetsya Rasshatat SNG, Chtoby Sozdat Problemy na Granitsakh RF”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/24534969, (Access Date: 20.07.2025).
[x] “Na Urale Arestovali Syna Glavy Azerbaydzhanskoy Diaspory”, TASS, https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/24531723, (Access Date: 20.07.2025).
[xi] Kateryna Serohina, “Azerbaijan’s President Warns Russia of Legal Action Over AZAL Plane Shot Down Over Donbas”, RBC-Ukraine, https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/azerbaijan-s-president-warns-russia-of-legal-1752973761.html, (Access Date: 20.07.2025).
