The tension between Niamey and Cotonou has transcended the “temporary chill” mold in the first week of 2026, positioning itself at the very center of security and economic dossiers. Mutual “persona non grata” decisions, the suspension of embassy services, and heavy accusations circulating around intelligence and internal security institutions demonstrate that the rupture between the two neighbors has not remained within protocol limits. While it might seem possible to read this picture as a mere diplomatic standoff, indicators on the ground point to the fact that a broader fault line in West Africa has become visible.
Clarifying the flow of events allows the door of interpretation to be opened from the right place. The Beninese side has requested the departure of two personnel serving at the Nigerien mission in Cotonou. One of these individuals is identified as an intelligence officer linked to Niger’s security structures, and the other as a police commissioner.[i] Niamey, on the other hand, citing the principle of “reciprocity,” declared Seidou Imourana, who holds the position of first counselor at Benin’s Embassy in Niamey, “persona non grata” and requested that he leave the country within 48 hours.[ii] Benin’s response turned into the most visible move to narrow communication channels, and the mission in Niamey announced that it suspended its activities as of January 5, 2026.
At the center of this rapid multiplication of crisis headlines lies the oil pipeline. The approximately 2,000-kilometer pipeline extending from the Agadem field to Benin’s Sèmè-Kpodji terminal carries the export leg of Niger’s oil revenues. For Niamey, this line means revenue continuity. This is because it serves as the main artery that determines budget discipline, import capacity, and the pace of public spending. From Benin’s perspective, it signifies the port economy, logistics service revenues, and a regional transit role. Therefore, every disruption experienced on the line produces an “existential” sensitivity in both capitals for different reasons. While one experiences the fear of income loss, the other strives to protect its geoeconomic reputation.
The wave of sabotage targeting the pipeline in December 2025 made this vulnerability visible in all its nakedness. It is reported that the attacks claimed by the Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice (MPLJ), an armed terrorist group, aimed to cut the flow of the line, and in some cases, pumping stations and control systems were also destroyed.[iii] These sabotages, which have reached an increased technical level, transform a dossier described as a “diplomatic dispute” into a matter of physical security on the ground. For Niamey, the issue is not merely about protecting an infrastructure element; the regime’s economic lifeline is targeted. On the Benin side, the security of the commercial line leading to the terminal is read in the same sentence as the port’s regional role and investor perception.
Discussions regarding the coup attempt in Benin on December 7, 2025, also played a decisive role in the acceleration of the diplomatic escalation. Cotonou’s internal security reflex turned toward stricter monitoring of potential external influence channels. During the suppression of the coup attempt, the issue of external support came to the fore, with reports reflecting Nigeria’s military support and France’s intelligence-logistics contributions. Such a scenario feeds the perception in Niamey that “a coastal-based security order is being re-established,” while strengthening the conviction in Cotonou that “pressure originating from the Sahel is increasing.” The mutual growth of suspicion between the two sides turns even a small spark in diplomatic channels into a major crisis.
It is precisely at this point that the AES-ECOWAS fault line comes into play. Niger, along with Mali and Burkina Faso, is establishing a new language of security and political solidarity under the umbrella of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This language emphasizes sovereignty while redefining the relationship with regional institutions. Benin, on the other hand, is among the countries in the coastal belt that remain within the institutional framework of ECOWAS. Thus, the Niamey-Cotonou tension carries much more meaning than a simple file between two countries. The friction between the search for a new order established by military administrations in the Sahel belt and the status-quo-preserving reflex of coastal countries is becoming measurable on a concrete border line.
For the communities living on the border, this process cannot remain an abstract foreign policy debate. The Malanville-Gaya axis is one of the primary transition areas where the two economies touch. Restricting crossings slows the flow of trade and generates price volatility in local markets, thereby opening space for smuggling networks and increasing security pressure. When the functioning of diplomatic missions ceases, such problems move out of the realm of “solutions by phone,” and as the solution is delayed, security actors move forward while the economy recedes. At this point, the question to be asked is: Can the two capitals afford the political cost of daily life at the border?
Three basic scenarios stand out for the coming weeks. In the first scenario, a low-profile normalization line could be established through the mediation of third parties. Even if the return of diplomats is spread over time, technical contacts in the border and energy files could be reopened, coordination mechanisms for pipeline security could be formed, and communication mishaps could be reduced. This is the lowest-cost exit strategy for both sides. In the second scenario, accusations harden, the level of representation narrows further, restrictions on the border line are prolonged, and every new attack on the pipeline gives birth to a new retaliation in diplomacy. If this cycle is not broken, the crisis becomes established as a “national issue” in the internal politics of both countries, creating an atmosphere where the side that steps back would be accused of weakness. In the third scenario, pipeline security turns into an international project; technology, private security companies, new agreements, and different supply channels come to the agenda. This scenario could increase the capacity to protect infrastructure but would produce new dependencies by making regional politics more complex.
The common knot of these scenarios is the need for a “mechanism to calm the field.” The pipeline does not measure who is right; rather, it measures the states’ capability to protect infrastructure, their intelligence logic, border management, and crisis communication. If a window of dialogue is not opened between Niamey and Cotonou, every sabotage event on the ground turns into a diplomatic rehearsal, and every diplomatic countermove generates a new risk on the border line. This vicious cycle adds a new layer to the Sahel’s fragile security equation while making the coastal belt more open to the pressure of instability.
In conclusion, the Niger-Benin tension exposes the larger problem that West Africa carries as it enters 2026. As sovereignty claims rise, mutual dependence becomes more costly. The oil pipeline was designed as an economic project, but in the first days of the year, it functions like a security referendum. The management of the crisis depends not on the diplomatic courtesy of the two countries, but on whether they can establish institutional tools that will calm the field and not lock the economy. If these tools cannot be established, what will truly flow in the shadow of the crude oil running through the pipeline will be mistrust.
[i] “Crise diplomatique Bénin – Niger : expulsions croisées de personnels d’ambassades.” Africa24 TV, 5 Ocak 2026, https://africa24tv.com/crise-diplomatique-benin-niger-expulsions-croisees-de-personnels-dambassades, (Access Date:06.01.2025)
[ii] “Le Bénin et le Niger expulsent mutuellement des diplomates.” TRT Afrika, 4 Ocak 2026, https://www.trtafrika.com/francais/article/30cbdd1f77b5, (Access Date:06.01.2025).
[iii] Angèle Adanle, “Attaque du pipeline Niger–Bénin: une nouvelle menace sur le pétrole nigérien.” Bénin Web TV, 22 Aralık 2025, https://beninwebtv.bj/attaque-du-pipeline-niger-benin-une-nouvelle-menace-sur-le-petrole-nigerien/, (Access Date:06.01.2025).
