Central Asia, encompassing Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, occupies a significant position in both regional and global frameworks. The strategic importance of Central Asia is underscored by interconnected geopolitical, economic, and global security factors.
Geographically, Central Asia is located between major geopolitical actors such as Russia, China, and Iran, and is in close proximity to South Asia and the Middle East. Therefore, the region requires strategic attention from both global and regional powers. In the global context, due to economic interests, security concerns, and energy policies, the region is emerging as a rising power in dynamic international relations.
Considering its geographical proximity and relative geopolitical stability, Central Asia holds a strategic place under the umbrella of regional diplomacy conducted by Chinese authorities. A vivid example of this foreign policy is the recent visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Kazakhstan during the second China–Central Asia Summit, which took place in June this year amid rising tensions in the Middle East [i]. One of China’s goals is to strengthen strategic partnerships with Central Asia by establishing a solid foundation for uninterrupted economic and political cooperation.
It is noteworthy that China emphasizes stable cooperation with regional countries, particularly within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI constitutes part of China’s strategy to turn Central Asia into a critical area, owing to its shared borders and potential for integration into infrastructure projects. According to statistics, trade between the countries has increased by 35 percent over two years, while a broad spectrum of cooperation has emerged in industries such as investment, green energy development, and scientific-technological innovation [ii].
It is evident that China’s foreign policy efforts are aimed at preparing its economy for possible tensions with the United States and even with its partners. Therefore, China must demonstrate the importance of comprehensive strategic cooperation with Central Asian states and prove its commitment. In this regard, Central Asia can be considered an alternative route within the concept of diversifying geopolitical alliances in Eurasia. Consequently, in the face of anticipated challenges in relations with Washington, strengthening a coalition of loyal states in the Global South and Central Asia has become a primary objective. China’s interests are thus entirely pragmatic. Accordingly, Central Asia gains importance in the ongoing environment of competition between Beijing and Washington.
The potential instability of the political situation in the Middle East further enhances the importance of China’s strategic cooperation with Central Asia. Although China traditionally imports gas from Turkmenistan and oil primarily from Kazakhstan, potential problems in the Strait of Hormuz and reliance on Iranian oil are prompting Beijing to seek alternative routes.
Historically, China has maintained significant relations with Central Asia. Its ties with Kazakhstan are particularly strong due to their shared border and favorable logistics. Thus, it can be assumed that China is attempting to expand its influence in the region through Kazakhstan. During the summit held in Astana, 24 intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements were signed as a result of meetings between Kazakh and Chinese leaders [iii]. These documents cover a broad spectrum of cooperation, including energy, the space industry, digitalization, customs regulations, and agriculture [iv]. Furthermore, at the Astana summit, China’s unique technological capabilities in the nuclear field were identified as a priority area for cooperation. Kazakhstan has actively invited the Chinese side to invest in nuclear power plant construction projects [v]. Apparently, China aims to become Astana’s largest trading partner, which could push Russia into second place.
One of the key aspects of Central Asia’s contemporary relevance is its role as a logistical hub. Major infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, and pipelines are being planned to strengthen Eurasian trade. Initiatives like the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) serve as alternatives to traditional routes via Russia. In this context, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway project [vi] is a significant example that will deepen China’s transportation policy perspectives. With the aim of enhancing regional trade and connectivity, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have signed a trilateral framework agreement to establish a new railway corridor, linking Central Asia with South Asia [vii]. Due to its geographic location, the proposed Trans-Afghan railway will also offer connections with China and Russia.
However, considering past interruptions in oil supplies through Russia and the imposition of high American tariffs [viii], Kazakhstan has no choice but to pursue a balanced foreign policy. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Kazakhstan awarded the construction of its first nuclear power plant to Russia. The “Rosatom” corporation has been designated as the leader of the international consortium for the project [ix]. Having already initiated the construction process, Rosatom is expected to make a significant contribution to Kazakhstan’s energy efficiency. It is evident that Astana is clearly working to balance the interests of its regional partners.
Thus, it is necessary to highlight the first European Union–Central Asia Summit, held in Samarkand in April 2025 [x], followed by the first Central Asia–Italy Summit in Astana [xi]. Both events aimed to develop different dimensions of cooperation. Furthermore, on 14–15 August 2025, the Eighth Central Asia Expert Forum (CAEF), titled “Central Asia – A Common Space of Trust, Security, and Sustainable Development”, was held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, bringing together experts from the EU, ASEAN, the US, the UK, and other countries [xii]. It should be noted that the forum was organized by the Institute for Strategic and Interregional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan and supported by the OSCE Project Coordinator in Uzbekistan, along with other international organizations [xiii].
Accordingly, the forum was regarded as a suitable platform for exploring prospects for regional and international cooperation. At the same time, this reflects the formation of a regional identity in Central Asia within the broader context of global politics.
Overall, Central Asia has become a competitive arena for the struggle of influence among major power centers such as China, Russia, the United States, the European Union, and Iran, as well as Pakistan and India. This dynamic presents both opportunities and challenges for Central Asian countries as they seek to diversify their partnerships and safeguard their strategic autonomy.
[i] “China, Central Asian countries sign landmark treaty, vow to boost cooperation,” CGTN, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2025-06-18/China-Central-Asia-sign-landmark-treaty-vow-to-boost-cooperation-1Ei1tgKFlXa/p.html (Date of Access: 21.09.2025).
[ii] “China, Central Asia sign Treaty Outline New Paths for Cooperation,” CGTN, https://astanatimes.com/2025/06/china-central-asia-sign-treaty-outline-new-paths-for-cooperation/ (Date of Access: 21.09.2025).
[iii] “Kazakhstan, China Deepen Strategic Partnership, Sign 24 Agreements,” Astana Times, https://astanatimes.com/2025/06/kazakhstan-china-deepen-strategic-partnership-sign-24-agreements/ (Date of Access: 21.09.2025).
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Ibid.
[vi] “China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Corridor to Boost Regional Cooperation,” Astana Times, https://astanatimes.com/2022/09/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-corridor-to-boost-regional-cooperation/(Date of Access: 21.09.2025).
[vii] “Breakthrough Moment for Trans-Afghan Railway project hailed by Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Intelli News, https://www.intellinews.com/breakthrough-moment-for-trans-afghan-railway-project-hailed-by-uzbekistan-afghanistan-and-pakistan-392314/ (Date of Access: 21.09.2025).
[viii] “Kazakhstan Makes Trump ‘Reciprocal’ Tariff List,” The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/kazakhstan-makes-trump-reciprocal-tariff-list/ (Date of Access: 21.09.2025).
[ix] “Kazakhstan to Fully Own and Control Operations of First Nuclear Power Plant,” Astana Times, https://astanatimes.com/2025/06/kazakhstan-to-fully-own-and-control-operations-of-first-nuclear-power-plant/(Date of Access: 21.09.2025).
[x] “First EU-Central Asia summit, 4 April 2025,” Consilium, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2025/04/04/ (Date of Access: 21.09.2025).
[xi] “First Central Asia-Italy Summit Held in Astana,” News Central Asia, https://www.newscentralasia.net/2025/05/31/first-central-asia-italy-summit-held-in-astana/ (Date of Access: 21.09.2025).
[xii] “A Single Voice of Central Asia: Turkmen Expert on the Concept of Regional Identity,” Orient, https://orient.tm/en/post/89097/single-voice-central-asia-turkmen-expert-concept-regional-identity (Date of Access: 21.09.2025).
[xiii] “PCUz supported organisation of 8th Central Asian Expert Forum,” OSCE, https://www.osce.org/project-coordinator-in-uzbekistan/596381 (Date of Access: 21.09.2025).
