Analysis

The “New Big Play” in the Arctic: Russia, China and India

India’s Arctic policy can also be interpreted as a balancing act, developed in response to China’s increasing activities in the region.
The climatological tele-connections between the glacial structure in the Himalayas, also reffered to as the “Third Pole”, and the Arctic are a vital matter of national security for India.
India’s Arctic strategy represents a proactive and long-term doctrine, designed to suit the multidimensional and competitive nature of 21st century geopolitics.

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While the Arctic region had an isolated focus of scientific exploration and nature research historically, today and with the irreversible environmental transformations triggered by climate change, it has turned into one of the most critical strategic centers of global politics. With the melting of glaciers, new trade routes opened and accesibility to the vast hydrocarbon and rare earth metal reserves has been eased, transforming the region into an arena for long-term competititon among major powers. In this complex geopolitical landscape, India, which has no direct Arctic coastline and is geographically thousands of kilometers away from the region, is taking a proactive stance by deepening its engagement in the region. New Delhi’s strategic orientation towards the Arctic region is seen as a comprehensive doctrine that goes beyond a mere search for resources and reflects the principle of strategic autonomy in a multipolar world order and the aspiration to be a global order-building actor. 

India’s Arctic vision has evolved from a traditional approach based on scientific research in the late 20th century, to a strategic imperative model adapted to the real political realities of the 21st century. Underlying this transformation, is the direct and indirect “butterfly effect” of changes in the Arctic ecosystem on India’s national interests. The climatological tele-connections between the glacial structure in the Himalayas, also reffered to as the “Third Pole”, and the Arctic are almost a vital matter of national security for India. The high correlation between the monson rainfall patterns, which are the keystone of India’s economy and food security, and the melting processes in the Arctic, have has made the flow of scientific data coming from the region seem as a matter of survival for New Delhi. On the other hand, the estimated 13 percent oil and 30 percent natural gas reserves in the Arctic are an indispensable part of the base energy security strategies of India, as it is one of the world’s largest energy consumers. In particular, the Northern Sea Route shortens the distance by approximately 40% compared to the traditional Suez Canal route, presenting a critical window of opportunity for India, in terms of optimizing global supply chains by cost and by time.[i]

The building block and the operational basis of this comprehensive strategy, seems to be the “special and privileged strategic partnership” between India and Russia. Russia’s break with Western actors and extensive sanctions following the Ukraine Crisis, have transformed New Delhi’s Arctic cooperation with Moscow from a preference into a whole mutual strategic “necessity”. Agreements signed between these two countries, such as the Reciprocal Logistics Support Agreement (RELOS), grant the Indian Navy a capability of refueling and maintenance around Russia’s Arctic and Far East ports, extending the operational range of Indian military presence to polar circles. This cooperation also encourages India’s direct participation in massive hydrocarbon projects such as Vostok Oil, allowing it to diversify its energy portfolio while also serving as a reliable non-Western financial and political channel for capital-intensive Arctic investments from Russia’s perspective. 

Nevertheless, India’s Arctic policy can also be interpreted as some sort of a balancing act, developped in response to the increasing activities of its regional rival, the People’s Republic of China, in the region. China’s self-description of being a “near-Arctic state” and its multi billion dollar intrastructure investments under the “Polar Silk Road” vision are perceived, by New Delhi, as a strategic encirclement threat.[ii] India is well aware that China’s potential (and absolute) logistical and military dominance in the northern routes would of course, in the long term, reduce its dependence on the Strait of Malacca, further giving strength for beijing’s hand.[iii] In this regard the strategic cooperation established within Russia seems to be a critical and balancing factor that prevents Moscow from falling completely into China’s economic and political orbit, by also creating an alternative power in northern Eurasia that favors India. 

New Delhi’s diplomacy during this process reflects an extremely delicate balancing art, requiring it to maintain its ties with Russia, without “jeopardizing” its various strategic partnerships with its Western allies, particularly the United States. Despite Washington’s pressure by sanctions, India’s orientation towards Russian energy resources and joint projects in the Arctic region are the most concrete applications of the country’s multi-vector foreign policy approach. While strengthening the security architecture with the West againts China in the Indo-Pacific region within the framework of QUAD, India is also cooperating alongside Russia in the Arctic, thereby maintaining the image of being an independent actor that “cannot be forced” to take sides in global crises. This strategic challenge elevates India to the position of an indispensable pole in the international system and a negotiator, who makes its presence felt in global affairs. 

Fundamental changes in Arctic governance also confirm that the region’s historically Westernized structure is eroding, while entering a process of “Orientalization”. The dysfunction of the Arctic Council after the Russia-Ukraine War and the institutional vaccum seen in regional governance have inevitably increased the influence and say of major powers outside the region, such as India and China. This situation demonstrates that the Arctic issue has shifted beyond being “solely” the domain of polar states, becoming a new front in the management of global common assets and a big power competition. However, this new dynamic also brings some serious global challenges with it, such as the risk of triggering regional arms races, environmental protection protocols being overshadowed by the economic priorities, and the relaxation of international maritime law norms. 

As a result, India’s Arctic strategy represents a proactive and long-term doctrine, designed to suit the multidimensional and competitive nature of 21st century geopolitics. By increasing its presence and institutional representation in the Arctic region, New Delhi is not only securing its short-term energy and material needs, but is also getting to its place at the “table” of rule makers in the reshaping of the world order. India’s move to shed its passive observer identity and become a game-changer and regulator is the clearest indication that global power balances are now being redefined far beyond traditional land and sea areas, even in the most remote and challenging geographies of the planet. 


[i] “India, Russia and the Northern Sea Route: Navigating a shifting strategic environment”, ThinkChina, https://www.thinkchina.sg/politics/india-russia-and-northern-sea-route-navigating-shifting-strategic-environment, (Access Date: 22.12.2025).

[ii] Sharma, A., & Shivani. (2025). India in the Arctic: Exploring strategic opportunities. International Journal of Political Science and Governance7(3), 48–52.

[iii] “India-Russia cooperation in the Arctic and the rising prospect of polarization in Arctic governance”, The Arctic Institute, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/india-russia-cooperation-arctic-rising-prospect-polarization-arctic-governance/, (Access Date: 22.12.2025).

Kürşat İsmayıl
Kürşat İsmayıl
Kürşat İsmayıl obtained his Bachelor's degree from Hacettepe University, Department of History between 2017 and 2021, and subsequently a Master's degree in Russian and Caucasian History. His Master's thesis was titled "Foundations of Azerbaijani Modernization: The Thought World of Mirze Kazımbey and Abbaskulu Ağa Bakıhanov." He is currently continuing his doctoral studies in International Relations at Hacı Bayram Veli University. He is proficient in Azerbaijani (Mother Tongue), Turkish, English, and Russian, and also has knowledge of Ottoman Turkish.

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