The event titled ‘The Grand China-Venezuela Expo: A Magnificent Future’, held in Caracas from July 4 to 6, 2025, not only consolidated economic and technological cooperation between the two nations but also represented a significant milestone for the future of artificial intelligence in Venezuela.[1] The memorandum of understanding on AI development signed between Venezuela and China has revealed the two countries’ intention to deepen their strategic cooperation in science and technology. However, this development should be assessed from a technological standpoint and through its geopolitical and economic dimensions.
The most interesting point of the memorandum is that China’s one of the most important technology companies, iFlytek, will lead in cooperation with Venezuela. iFlytek holds a significant global position, particularly in voice recognition and natural language processing technologies. Its leadership in projects implemented in Venezuela carries the potential for an important technological leap for the Latin American country. According to the agreement, iFlytek is expected to develop AI solutions in strategic sectors such as tourism, agriculture, healthcare, education, hydrocarbons, and telecommunications.
As Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro put it, the country is seizing the opportunity to “enter through the front door to the forefront of artificial intelligence development.”[2] This ambitious rhetoric is significant regarding technological progress, political legitimacy, and foreign policy discourse. Amid a severe domestic economic crisis and growing international isolation, the Maduro administration appears to be pursuing a new form of legitimacy on the global stage, centered on technology, through this high-profile partnership with China.
While this cooperation offers Venezuela opportunities for scientific and economic development, it raises a critical concern: increased dependency on external actors. In particular, countries with underdeveloped infrastructure in high-tech sectors are vulnerable to becoming heavily reliant on foreign partners, an issue often criticized in the context of national capacity building. As Venezuela delegates much of its AI development to Chinese companies, questions remain about how it will cultivate its own human capital and academic infrastructure. AI is not only about algorithms or software; it also involves complex dimensions such as data access, security, ethical standards, and cyber sovereignty. In this regard, Venezuela’s digital sovereignty may be undermined by the dominant role of Chinese firms.
China’s engagement in such partnerships is driven not only by economic interests but also by geopolitical objectives. Since the early 2000s, China has steadily expanded its diplomatic and commercial influence in Latin America. Countries like Venezuela, whose relations with the West remain strained, are increasingly seen as “natural partners” for Beijing. These partnerships are not limited to investments or loan mechanisms; they are also being deepened through technology transfers, scientific cooperation, and large-scale infrastructure projects.
China’s outreach to Venezuela is part of Beijing’s broader strategy to expand its footprint in Latin America. In its rivalry with the United States, China is consolidating its regional presence through raw materials, energy, and advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence. The presence of companies like iFlytek in Latin America can also be interpreted as an element of China’s soft power strategy.
In addition to the AI memorandum, the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement signed between China and Venezuela highlights the multidimensional nature of their strategic partnership.[3] This agreement brings forward issues such as enhanced knowledge and technology sharing, investment promotion, and environmental sustainability. Notably, China’s donation of materials to help Venezuela protect its water resources reflects the humanitarian and ecological dimensions of the bilateral cooperation.
Another noteworthy aspect is the involvement of the China Development Bank in this process. China’s development banks are key in global infrastructure financing and technology exports. Through these financial instruments, China’s engagement with countries like Venezuela reveals the implementation of “development diplomacy” complementing traditional diplomatic efforts.
One of the most notable aspects of the agreement is that technology transfer should not be limited to importing equipment and software but should also encompass the development of local capacities through knowledge exchange and human resource training. Venezuela’s long-standing challenges—such as brain drain and a lack of academic infrastructure—may worsen if such agreements remain confined to acquiring “ready-made” technologies from abroad. In contrast, the establishment of joint research centers, the promotion of inter-university exchange programs, and the launch of vocational training partnerships could yield more sustainable outcomes in terms of long-term development. As in other countries, China’s approach in this domain will be decisive in shaping the results in Venezuela.
Another critical component accompanying the agreement is China’s donation to protect Venezuela’s water resources. This indicates that the technical cooperation between the two countries extends beyond economic interests to include environmental sustainability. Venezuela faces serious challenges, particularly in rural areas, with access to clean water, waste management, and environmental protection. If China’s contributions are channeled into transparent and sustainable projects that address the needs of local communities, they could support Venezuela in moving closer to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.
Such partnerships could give rise to a new regional paradigm in Latin America. Venezuela’s cooperation with China in artificial intelligence may lead to either competition or interaction with other regional powers such as Brazil, Argentina, or Mexico. If this collaboration lays the groundwork for Venezuela to build its domestic tech ecosystem, it could be considered a genuine case of “co-development.” However, if the process remains heavily dependent on foreign technology and capital, it may instead be remembered as an example of an “asymmetric technology relationship.”
[1] Fernández, Sleither. “China‑Venezuela Grand Expo Seals Alliance for Joint Development of Artificial Intelligence”, Guacamaya, guacamayave.com/en/china‑venezuela‑grand‑expo‑seals‑alliance‑for‑joint‑development‑of‑artificial‑intelligence, (Date Accessed: 20.07.2025).
[2]Ibid
[3]Ibid.
