Detections Regarding the Military Operation Carried Out by Russia in Ukraine

Paylaş

This post is also available in: Türkçe Русский

Russian President Vladimir Putin has been unable to acquire the requisite assurances from the United States (USA) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on essential issues related to the security guarantees he wanted (NATO). On February 22, 2022, Russia recognized the separatist Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics as independent from Ukraine, and on February 24, 2022, Russia initiated a military assault against Ukraine. However, the military operation in question has moved beyond the areas controlled by pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk provinces since 2014 and has turned into a military operation conducted from the north, south and east and targeting the whole of Ukraine. Russia’s operation has identified substantial security dangers at all levels and in all industries. Moscow’s action, on the other hand, caused a significant breach in the international security system and revealed information about Russia’s foreign and security policy.

The first is that, although abandoning ideological opposition during the Cold War, Russia was unable to overcome its predisposition to perceive the United States in particular, and the West in general, as the other. In this atmosphere, any development that favored the United States and the West was interpreted as a setback for Russia. Moscow reacted to colorful revolutions in former Soviet geography, as well as NATO and the European Union (EU) enlargement efforts, with political, military, economic, and cultural measures, and periodically pushed its nuclear deterrence to the fore. However, blaming Moscow alone for the current state of affairs is ridiculous. The expansion of NATO and the EU by the United States and the West without providing Moscow with a sense of security has also played a role in the current events. Due to the perceived danger from Russia, the Baltic and Eastern European nations have turned increasingly towards NATO, the EU, and the United States as a result of Moscow’s understanding of events in Europe within the context of military security and historical developments. As a result, these countries were fast to join NATO and the EU. Furthermore, these advancements have highlighted a security conundrum that feeds on itself.

Second, Russia’s engagement in Ukraine has shown inconsistencies in its previous use of armed force. Unlike prior military operations, the political goal of the Ukrainian operation is clear: NATO and the United States. Because, before starting the military operation against Ukraine, Moscow conducted the negotiations regarding its political and military demands with the USA, NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The draft agreement terms seeking security assurances from Moscow proclaimed the policy of opposing NATO’s growth in Ukraine to the whole world, and it was indicated that if these guarantees were not supplied, military-technical actions would be implemented. In other words, Ukraine has become a chessboard for Russia and the West’s power battle. In this scenario, Ukraine finds itself in the position of a country occupied by a state such as Russia, which possesses the world’s biggest arsenal of nuclear weapons and the largest conventional army on the European continent, in the context of national interests in a struggle between great powers.

Third, Russia has launched military operations in disputed areas in the past, claiming to be protecting its own residents or local people of Russian ancestry, being welcomed to the country under international law, or being sent as a peacekeeping force. The overall approach used by Moscow in these military forces is to secretly support the present Russian origin/pro-conflict conditions, to support and recognize the governments’ assertions of independence in conflict zones, and to ensure integration through increasing relations in all spheres. The Russian Army’s advance on Tbilisi in the 2008 Russia-Georgia War was brief and focused at getting the ceasefire terms adopted. Despite the fact that the Moscow administration is not recognized by several countries in Syria, it maintains a military presence at the Assad regime’s request. However, beyond the aforementioned concerns and contested territories, Russia sought to occupy the territory of another state for the first time. Furthermore, pursuant to the Budapest Memorandum signed in 1994 by Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine, no country will use or threaten to use force against Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine’s nuclear weapons being transferred to Russia, and the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity will be respected. In this approach, the Kyiv government was confident. Moscow, on the other hand, has blatantly violated the pact by annexing Crimea in 2014, offering assistance to separatist territories in eastern Ukraine, recognizing separatist regions’ independence in 2022, and conducting military operations against Ukraine.

On the other hand, the fourth paragraph of Article 2 of the United Nations (UN) Charter contains the following statement regarding the issue:

“All Members shall refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations, either against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.”

Without a doubt, the aforementioned article prohibits UN members from using or threatening to use force in international relations. Simultaneously, Russia is one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which is the primary authority for ensuring international peace and security, according to the UN Charter. Moscow is blatantly violating the UN Charter, which it is required by international law to uphold and safeguard.

Fourth, till now, all national power components, particularly political, military, economic, and cultural, have carried out Russia’s foreign military operations using hybrid war tactics in an unexpected and rapid impact. This position has resulted in impasses and hesitations, both in terms of the party targeted for use of force and the political and military strategies to be pursued in response to Moscow’s regional and global movements. This made it impossible to respond in a coordinated and integrated manner. However, Russia’s involvement in the attempted invasion of Ukraine prompted the Western world to respond unilaterally to Moscow. In the current circumstances, the Western World, which had previously diverged in its approach toward Russia, was able to adopt an integrated policy. The majority of these actions targeted Russia with economic and financial penalties.

Despite the fact that NATO and other nations did not send military forces to Ukraine, Ukraine received a considerable amount of essential weaponry, ammunition, and equipment, including anti-tank and air defense missiles. The war has already devolved into a proxy war. On the other hand, several new components have been included into the war’s evolving face. Citizens of third parties voluntarily took part in the war on the side of Ukraine against Russia. Ukraine was also in favor of this.

Fifth, Russia utilized military action against a state with relatively high national power elements for the first time. Ukraine, which has a greater degree of national power elements than Georgia, boosted its military preparations after the takeover of Crimea in 2014, and, contrary to predictions, it eventually shown strong opposition to Russia’s military operation. The President of Ukraine, Vladimir Zelensky, in particular, took a firm stand in defense of his country, which bolstered domestic resistance while gradually increasing international support for his country. In the Ukrainian terrain, which lacked difficult terrain for defense, Russian armed troops were unable to maneuver as swiftly as predicted. Conflicts and bombs in residential areas resulted in the consolidation and growth of anti-Russian public sentiment generated through the media across the world.

One of the most significant outcomes of the operation is Moscow’s position in international affairs. Power is the most important fact in world politics now, as it was yesterday. Hegemony or great power policies, which were formerly attempted solely on the basis of military force or ideology, are now developed within a framework based on consent and principles, with economic connections playing a major role. In this framework, the major powers seek to justify their policies by expanding their alliances and increasing the number of friendly nations. States aim to limit the number of unfriendly nations in this scenario. This is accomplished by the application of smart power, which combines hard and soft power.

With its military intervention against Ukraine, Moscow eschewed soft and thereby smart power aspects in favor of hard power. This position has the potential to have significant ramifications for Moscow’s ability to operate effectively in all sectors, both regionally and globally. Despite Putin’s claims that there is no ethnic divide between Ukrainians and Russians and that it was intentionally manufactured by the West, he began a military campaign in Ukraine, earning the moniker of occupier in the eyes of the Ukrainian people. Furthermore, despite the fact that Moscow has built regional coalitions under its own leadership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), it operates inside the post-World War II international order. The Western World imposes sanctions and pressure on some governments, international organizations, international credit and financial institutions, international enterprises, and international organizations to remind Moscow that it is a part of this system.

A major power’s influence in international affairs is primarily determined by its relationships with other great powers. It should be underlined that by maintaining a status quo attitude until 2008, Russia enhanced its political, economic, and military might. Its military might, which is based on nuclear weapons, which Moscow regards as a significant advantage, and its economy, which is dependent on the energy industry, are both flaws. Russia is attempting to accomplish objectives in international politics using its military force that it could not achieve with other national power elements, and the international community is reacting as a consequence. On the other hand, in the sphere of energy, which accounts for the majority of economic power capacity, EU nations, in particular, are currently attempting to lessen their reliance on Russia by diversifying their energy supply choices and utilizing renewable energy sources.

The Russian-led changes in world politics since 2008 are the late repercussions of the fall of a major superpower, such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), whose origins and implications are yet unknown. Russia, as the successor to the Soviet Union, is attempting to establish and cement its position in the international system in all areas. This is the biggest source of conflict in the international security system that stems from Russia. The Ukrainian operation, on the other hand, refers to a long-term process that will wear Moscow down. Moscow may suffer severe losses in its great power policy as a result of several military stalemates in Afghanistan and Chechnya during the USSR period.

On the other side, with the aforementioned operation, NATO’s post-Cold War legitimacy issue was resolved, and the political-military alliance reverted to its primary mission of protecting Europe from Russia, as it had been throughout the Cold War. The advances in Germany, particularly in order to boost Europe’s defense capabilities outside of NATO, indicate to the rise of new international security players. On the other hand, certain European countries with a reasonably independent foreign policy have a pro-Russian stance. China is Russia’s most important trading partner. Beijing is affected in two ways by the present process. The first is the United States’ return to a Pacific-European orientation as a result of Russia. The second is that in an environment where all international security-oriented attention is directed to Russia, room for maneuver has been opened for his cautious policy towards unification with Taiwan.

The military activity of Russia against Ukraine provides for key inferences regarding the nations’ security policy. The most essential responsibility of state leaders is to assure the state’s survival as well as the welfare of the country. Leaders must choose whether or not to pursue a certain policy in order to attain this aim. The most essential thing is to arrive to a conclusion without arguing. In this context, while Zelenskyy’s willingness to defend his country is lauded, it is thought that the military actions carried out by Russia in the past, as well as the broader tendency of Russian foreign and security policy, were not adequately evaluated by Zelenskyy, resulting in present events. International law, which is a political law, is not in Ukraine’s favor right now. NATO, which Zelenskyy believes would safeguard his nation from Russian aggression, does not give genuine military help to Ukraine, and the weapon systems it sends will worsen the damage in Ukraine. As a result, states attempt to achieve a balance between short, medium, and long-term objectives in order to preserve their existence.

Dr. Ahmet SAPMAZ
Dr. Ahmet SAPMAZ
Dr. Ahmet Sapmaz, 2000 yılında Kara Harp Okulu’ndan mezun olmuştur. 2006 senesinde de Harp Akademileri Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü Ulusal ve Uluslararası Güvenlik Stratejileri yüksek lisans programını “Rusya Federasyonu’nun Transkafkasya’ya Yönelik Dış Politikasının Türkiye’ye Etkileri” başlıklı teziyle tamamlamıştır. Sapmaz, 2016 yılında da Kara Harp Okulu Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Terörizm doktora programında “Rusya Federasyonu'nun Askeri Güvenlik Refleksindeki Dönüşüm” başlıklı tezini savunarak doktor unvanını kazanmıştır. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nde 21 yıl görev yapan Sapmaz, 2015 yılında Harp Akademileri Komutanlık ve Karargâh Subaylığı eğitimini ve 2020 yılında da Milli Savunma Üniversitesi Karargâh Subaylığı eğitimini tamamlamıştır. Mesleği gereği Afganistan ve Azerbaycan’da da geçici görevlerde bulunan Sapmaz’ın başlıca çalışma alanları Rus dış politikası ve Kafkasya’dır. Bu bölgelere ilişkin yayınlanmış çeşitli makaleleri, kitap bölümleri ve kitapları bulunan Sapmaz, ileri derecede İngilizce ve temel düzeyde Rusça bilmektedir.

Similar Posts