For many years, the concept of security in the Sahel region has been shaped primarily around the notion of “operations.” However, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) Summit held in Bamako, the capital of Mali, on 22–23 December 2025, has displaced this understanding and brought the issue of “institutionalization” to the forefront. The leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger reassessed the confederal step taken in Niamey in 2024 through the balance sheet of the past year and focused on the fundamental question that will determine the direction of the war on the ground: through which political architecture can the fight against terrorism acquire a sustainable structure?
The fact that the summit was spread over two days and the structure of its program carry symbolic significance. The preparation for the inauguration in Bamako on 22 December of two strategic showcases—a television channel and an investment bank—demonstrates that the AES is articulating a state-building discourse that goes beyond the identity of a mere “security alliance.” The deliberate decision to activate AES Television and the Confederal Investment and Development Bank (BCID-AES) before convening the session of heads of state reflects a conscious preference.[i] This sequencing mirrors the effort of the three governments, which are seeking military results on the ground, to engage the very core of the war through economic and communication capacities. In the Sahelian context, terrorism often begins as an armed phenomenon but rapidly evolves into an attempt at domination grounded in service deficits and justice vacuums. Accordingly, these inaugurations in Bamako signify the construction of civilian pillars that complement the armed struggle.
The core focal point of the summit is the final communiqué released on 23 December. The communiqué provides a comprehensive assessment of the confederation’s first-year roadmap and strengthens the legal framework required for the full functionality of its three pillars. The adoption of additional protocols concerning defense and security, diplomatic coordination, development coordination, and confederal parliamentary sessions concretizes the will toward institutionalization.[ii] In this way, the AES aims to transform military coordination from a temporary reflex into a system anchored in rules and institutions. The handover of the standard to the “Unified Force of the Alliance of Sahel States” (FU-AES) and the official declaration of the force’s activation demonstrate that joint action on the ground has evolved from the realm of “intent” to that of an operational “mechanism.”
The principal test confronting this mechanism lies in the hybrid warfare tactics employed by al-Qaeda in Africa (JNIM) and the Sahel branch of ISIS, ISGS. These terrorist organizations do not operate as actors seeking conventional battlefield confrontation with regular armies. Instead, they embed themselves within local disputes and sustain their operations through economic networks. At the village level, they establish zones of control through coercive taxation and so-called “protection” practices. For this reason, increasing military pressure by the AES is a necessity. However, even if a single-layer military strategy yields short-term successes on the ground, it is likely to generate new vulnerabilities in the medium term. The Bamako communiqué emphasizes that the threat is not limited to armed capacity alone by explicitly referring to “economic and media terrorism” as well as disinformation campaigns.[iii] This emphasis signifies the highest-level acknowledgment that the conflict on the ground also encompasses a dimension of “information warfare.”
In the short term, the most realistic outcome is likely to be an increase in joint operations aimed at generating simultaneous pressure along the borderlines of the three countries. The FU-AES can project its effectiveness on the ground through shared target lists and integrated reconnaissance-surveillance cycles. Cross-border hot-pursuit practices and logistical burden-sharing will narrow the operational space available to terrorist groups. This, however, requires not only the centralization of intelligence but also the ability to be in the right place at the right time on the ground. JNIM’s particularly strong local ties in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso undermine the feasibility of a “single large operation” approach. Similarly, ISGS’s mobility in western Niger and along the Liptako-Gourma corridor necessitates differentiated tactics. For this reason, the command-and-control architecture must be continuously informed by micro-level threat mapping.
At this stage, shared training doctrine and standardization are becoming as critical as command-and-control structures. Ensuring that units operate with the same maps, identical radio communication protocols, unified ammunition planning, and standardized evacuation procedures reduces casualties while making operational success more visible and measurable. When medical chains and logistical depots are planned at the confederal level, the operational tempo becomes less dependent on seasonal conditions. Likewise, joint maintenance workshops strengthen the continuity and availability of vehicles and drones in the field.
In the medium term, three complementary pillars that directly shape conditions on the ground come to the fore. The first pillar is a network-disruption strategy focused on dismantling the illicit economy and financial lifelines. The communiqué’s reference to policy convergence in areas such as customs, mining, industry, transportation, and investment highlights the link being forged between security and the economy.[iv] Unless the networks of gold, fuel, motorcycles, weapons, human trafficking, and narcotics are dismantled, the regenerative capacity of JNIM and ISGS will not be significantly reduced. The second pillar is the architecture of justice and local reconciliation.
The communiqué’s call for enhanced judicial cooperation indicates that, alongside armed struggle, there is a deliberate effort to strengthen legal capacity as well. Rapid mediation in local disputes and community-based conflict-resolution mechanisms will deprive terrorist organizations of their self-assigned “arbitrator” role. Swift judicial procedures and compensation programs that make grievances visible are critical in demonstrating the state’s protective and compassionate presence. The third pillar is service provision and governance capacity. Security gains become durable when village schools reopen and health clinics function. Ensuring safe roads and the establishment of local markets helps to restore public trust in the state.
The establishment of the Confederal Levy (PC-AES) and the BCID-AES, as stated in the communiqué, reflects a search for a domestic funding pool that can finance the delivery of services on the ground alongside security expenditures. This framework creates a financial basis through which “military success” can be transformed into “political legitimacy.” Sustaining a claim to sovereignty with a budget dependent on external assistance is inherently difficult. In the short term, supporting basic services and logistics in border regions can narrow the propaganda space exploited by JNIM and ISGS. In the medium term, accelerating projects that enable the local processing of raw materials and generate employment can undermine the pressure these organizations exert by exploiting youth unemployment.
Another critical dimension of the summit is the pursuit of “narrative sovereignty.” The Burkina Faso press reports that AES Television has been launched to produce a “sovereign voice” and that the leaders issued stark warnings for the region.[v] The success of this channel will depend on its ability to maintain the delicate balance between a propagandistic tone and the delivery of factual information. Countering disinformation cannot be limited to producing counter-narratives alone. Reliable data and consistent communication constitute the administration’s most powerful tools. In times of crisis, rapid information sharing and a governing language that assumes responsibility for mistakes on the ground enhance the legitimacy capital of the confederal project. The instruction in the communiqué to ensure regular and official information sharing against negative campaigns is therefore of strategic importance.
The Bamako meeting outlines a two-track approach in the diplomatic domain. While the communiqué emphasizes “sincere contributions” in a language that does not close the door to external partners, it also declares a common stance against pressures that may arise from within the region. The recording of the negotiation process with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the endorsement of the consultations held on 22 May 2025 indicate that, alongside confrontational rhetoric, a controlled channel of engagement will be maintained. This channel is critical to ensuring that regional ties in trade, migration, energy, and finance are not completely severed. The security objectives of the AES directly intersect with the permeability of everyday life with neighboring countries. Keeping the door to dialogue with neighbors ajar thus functions as a safety valve for regional stability.
At the conclusion of the summit, the transfer of the confederal presidency from Assimi Goïta to Ibrahim Traoré underscored an emphasis on continuity. It was reported that Traoré assumed the presidency with a one-year mandate and that the objectives of institutionalization would be sustained in the new period.[vi] This handover should be interpreted as a signal that limits the personalization of decisions around individual charisma and strengthens the institutional rhythm of the confederation. The rotating presidency system reinforces trust among the leaders. Nevertheless, the key benchmark will be how swiftly the operational coordination of the FU-AES is consolidated in the first months of 2026. The pace at which the BCID-AES mechanisms are able to channel resources to the field, and the extent to which local governance capacity becomes visibly stronger in specific regions, will ultimately determine the success of the process.
At Sahel’s current juncture, the distance between military success and political legitimacy is decisive. The Bamako Summit has produced institutional instruments aimed at closing this gap. Gains against JNIM and ISGS may begin with joint firepower, but they can only be consolidated through local justice, the disruption of economic lifelines, and the production of credible narratives. This equation places a heavy burden of implementation on the AES. Determination on the ground, discipline at the negotiating table, and sustained engagement with society have emerged as the three ключ factors that will shape the Sahel in 2026.
[i] “The AES Summit begins today in Bamako”, Maliweb, https://www.maliweb.net/economie/cooperation/sommet-aes-deux-inaugurations-prevues-ce-lundi-avant-la-conference-des-chefs-detat-mardi-3112424.html, (Accessed: 23.12.2025).
[ii] “2nd Ordinary Session of the College of Heads of State of the Confederation of Sahel States (AES): Final Communiqué,” Maliweb, https://www.maliweb.net/communique-391/2eme-session-ordinaire-du-college-des-chefs-detat-de-la-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel-aes-communique-final-3112477.html, (Accessed: 23.12.2025).
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] “Présidence de la Confédération AES : Assimi GOÏTA passe le témoin au Capitaine Ibrahim TRAORÉ pour un an”, Burkina24, https://burkina24.com/2025/12/23/bamako-laes-lance-sa-television-alerte-sur-un-hiver-noir-en-afrique-de-louest/, (Accessed: 23 December 2025).
[vi] “AES: Bamako affirms strategic continuity and opens a new cycle under the presidency of Captain Ibrahim Traoré”, ActuNiger, https://www.actuniger.com/politique/21624-aes-bamako-acte-la-continuite-strategique-et-ouvre-un-nouveau-cycle-sous-la-presidence-du-capitaine-ibrahim-traore.html, (Accessed: 23.12.2025).
