The relations between Russia, striving to preserve its traditional spheres of influence in the geopolitics of the South Caucasus, and Azerbaijan, solidifying its strategic autonomy, are evolving in the recent period from a phase of “conflictual competition” into a process of rational-based détente and mutual cooperation. In particular, Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev, who met in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, on October 9, 2025, took a critical step to alleviate the tension that had been persisting for months; specifically, Putin’s indirect apology regarding the incident of an Azerbaijani aircraft being shot down by a Russian missile in December 2024 has initiated a period of pragmatic consensus in relations.
Russia’s need for trade routes opening to the south (INSTC) due to the Ukraine War and Azerbaijan’s policy of regional balance have brought the two countries back to the table from an “acrimonious” process filled with mutual detentions and media bans. However, this rapprochement is a strategic necessity stemming from Azerbaijan’s apprehension regarding Russia’s economic and military pressure capacity and Russia’s dependence on Baku’s logistical support amidst the grip of sanctions, rather than sincere trust.[i]
This warming in diplomatic channels reached a high level of representation with the telephone conversation that took place on December 24, 2025. Russian President Vladimir Putin both congratulated Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on the occasion of his birthday and sent a congratulatory telegram. In the contacts, which passed in a friendly atmosphere with the participation of Azerbaijan’s First Vice President Mehriban Aliyeva as well, the two leaders conveyed mutual New Year wishes. In the statement made by the Moscow Press Service, it was stated that both sides confirmed their determination to strengthen the Russia-Azerbaijan alliance relations in every aspect and agreed on maintaining personal contacts.[ii] This dialogue at the leadership level was characterized as “warm and necessary” by Moscow Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov; within the scope of this contact, the leaders addressed the current regional situation and confirmed the determination to strengthen the alliance relations between the two countries.[iii]
The softening process in question is constructed not merely as a conjunctural necessity but also as the reconstruction of a deep-rooted diplomatic tradition. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in the congratulatory message he sent to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, congratulated Aliyev on his birthday and emphasized Azerbaijan’s achievements in social and economic fields as well as its strengthening position in the international arena. Stating that the relations between the two countries are based on traditions of friendship, good neighborliness, and mutual respect, Putin expressed his confidence that these ties would continue to develop with the spirit of strategic partnership and alliance. In the message, it was stated that this cooperation serves the interests of both peoples, and wishes for health and success were extended to Aliyev.[iv]These expressions of Putin should be read as a reflection of Russia’s desire to recognize Azerbaijan’s rising regional status and to consolidate bilateral relations within the parenthesis of “alliance.”
Conversely, while Azerbaijan pursues a more autonomous foreign policy compared to the past thanks to the strong alliances it has established with Türkiye and Israel, it categorically rejects the status of being Moscow’s “backyard.” Utilizing the maneuvering space expanded by Russia’s weakening in Ukraine, Baku is, on one hand, diversifying its relations with China, the EU, and the USA, and on the other hand, trying to keep the tension with this giant neighbor at a manageable level through the lobby of Azerbaijani-origin businesspeople in Russia and the increasing trade volume. Consequently, the meeting in Dushanbe has served as the registration of a new balance of power where Russia has downshifted by accepting its regression in the region, and Azerbaijan has proven that it will not be a “satellite state.”
One of the most important elements strengthening the realpolitik ground of the relations is the new trade architecture of Eurasia. The high-level contacts that took place between Azerbaijani and CIS railway officials on November 26, 2025, mark a strategic turning point in infrastructure modernization and digitalization processes on the INSTC and the Middle Corridor. In this process, where Azerbaijani Minister of Transport Reşat Nebiyev set a target of 5 million tons of cargo volume annually by 2028 and 15 million tons in the long term; the railway leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran agreed on competitive tariffs and regular block train services with the trilateral memorandum they signed. In particular, the increase of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars line’s capacity to 5 million tons, the commencement of the Rasht-Astara railway construction in Iran in 2026, and Uzbekistan’s strategic interest in the Trump Route demonstrate that Azerbaijan has consolidated its position as an indispensable transit bridge at the center of the Eurasian logistics network.[v] This corridor politics creates a leverage effect in bilateral relations in favor of Baku by making Russia dependent on Azerbaijan’s infrastructure capacity.
The transformation in global energy markets strengthens Baku’s hand before both Moscow and Brussels. While the European Union’s (EU) strategy to completely substitute Russian gas by 2028 moves Azerbaijan to the position of an “indispensable alternative” in the continent’s energy security equation, colossal investments such as Shah Deniz and ACG Deep Gas led by BP have become the technical carriers of this geopolitical transformation. The EU’s reduction of supply from Russia from 45 percent to 13 percent and the capacity increase target of 20 billion cubic meters signed with Baku have transformed the energy fields in the Caspian Sea into a center of global attraction; however, Brussels’ cautious stance regarding long-term contracts and infrastructure financing has pushed Azerbaijan to expand its own market network through bilateral and direct agreements, as in the example of Germany’s Uniper.[vi] In this energy equation, Baku pursues a sophisticated balancing strategy by taking over Moscow’s market share without entering into a direct conflict with it.
When viewed with a medium and long-term observation within the framework of the current situation, it is evaluated that the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan will be converted into a pragmatic balance regime shaped around the axis of “asymmetric interdependence” rather than an ideological rapprochement; and that Russia’s structural need for the INSTC, which acts as a lifeline opening to the south amidst the grip of Western sanctions, and Azerbaijan’s strategy of keeping Moscow at the level of a “manageable partner” in order to preserve its gains in the region will push the parties toward economic integration. While Baku’s 2028 logistics goals and its critical role in the EU’s energy security provide a historical diplomatic leverage against Moscow, Moscow’s emphasis on “alliance” will remain permanently as an effort to stabilize its loss of influence in the region through commercial collaborations; in light of these dynamics, the isolation deepening with the Ukraine War and the energy geopolitics in the Caspian will unite the parties on a ground of sophisticated “strategic neighborhood” and “non-conflict” where crises are managed with a controlled language without compromising their spheres of sovereignty.
[i] Emil Avdaliani, “Putin Seeks to Solve His Azerbaijan Problem”, CEPA, https://cepa.org/article/putin-seeks-to-solve-his-azerbaijan-problem/, (Access Date: 24.12.2025).
[ii] “Putin i Aliyev podtverdili nastroy na ukrepleniye otnosheniy RF i Azerbaydzhana”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/26005539, (Access Date: 24.12.2025).
[iii] “Peskov nazval razgovor Putina i Aliyeva ochen’ teplym i nuzhnym”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/26006283, (Access Date: 24.12.2025).
[iv] “Putin calls relations with Azerbaijan ‘allied’”, Aze.Media, https://aze.media/putin-calls-relations-with-azerbaijan-allied/, (Access Date: 24.12.2025).
[v] “Azerbaijan, Russia, And Iran Sign Trilateral Railway Memorandum”, Caucasus Watch, https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/azerbaijan-russia-and-iran-sign-trilateral-railway-memorandum.html, (Access Date: 24.12.2025).
[vi] “EU’s Russia gas exit seen boosting BP-led projects in Azerbaijan”, OC Media, https://oc-media.org/eus-russia-gas-exit-seen-boosting-bp-led-projects-in-azerbaijan/, (Access Date: 24.12.2025).
