The 44-day Second Karabakh War in 2020 and Azerbaijan’s subsequent victory radically transformed the geopolitical dynamics of the South Caucasus. In the post-war period, the Armenian administration began to question its trust in Russia and pursued Western-oriented initiatives; however, this approach gradually evolved into a more “regionalist” trajectory. The meeting held on 20 June 2025 in Istanbul between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was recorded as a concrete manifestation of this transformation.[1] The fact that the meeting took place immediately after Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s contacts in Türkiye the day before also reveals that Türkiye has positioned itself as a mediating actor in the regional peace process.
Pashinyan’s engagements indicate the beginning of a new phase not only at the state level but also in terms of intercommunal relations. At the meeting held in Istanbul with the Armenian community of Türkiye, Pashinyan emphasized the importance of direct dialogue in contrast to diplomacy conducted through third countries in the past, noting that a meaningful diplomatic opportunity had emerged between the parties.[2] This statement demonstrates that the normalization between Türkiye and Armenia has become not merely a matter of bilateral relations but a strategic objective within the framework of regional restructuring. Prime Minister Pashinyan’s invitation to President Erdoğan to attend the 2026 European Political Community Summit clearly indicates that this process is intended to be supported by multilateral institutional structures.
In particular, the Zangezur Corridor and the associated metaphor of the “Turan Route” have become significant areas of contention within Armenia’s new foreign policy discourse, both domestically and internationally. Although Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan avoids directly using this term, he has taken a critical stance toward diaspora and opposition groups that interpret the regional geopolitical goals of Türkiye and Azerbaijan through the “Turan” axis. Within this context, his proposed “Peace Crossroads Initiative” stands out as an attempt to establish a more rational basis for the process of geopolitical integration by offering a model of transportation infrastructure based on mutual sovereignty and equality instead of ideological conflicts. Symbolized by his statement “If there is a water source, we can drink from it together,” Pashinyan has advocated for a regional architecture focused on cooperation rather than conflict.[3] In this regard, the Peace Crossroads proposal should be interpreted as an indication of a new geopolitical era in which the South Caucasus has gained strategic significance not only in terms of land and energy but also in the contexts of air, transit, logistics, and digital infrastructure.
Indeed, the Peace Crossroads Initiative was officially announced by Pashinyan at the Tbilisi Silk Road Forum in 2023 and has taken shape as a multidimensional regional integration project aiming to reactivate transportation lines that have been closed in the South Caucasus for many years. In this framework, the reestablishment of road and rail connections is envisaged between Armenia and Türkiye (Iğdır), Azerbaijan (Nakhchivan and Karabakh), Iran (Julfa), and Georgia (Bavra and Sadakhlo); in particular, the construction of a new railway corridor along the Ağbaba–Julfa–Meghri–Horadiz line is planned. This line is conceived as a logistical backbone that will enable the interconnection of extensive trade routes extending from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean and from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf via Armenia.
Among the fundamental principles of the initiative are the preservation of each state’s sovereign rights within its own borders, the reciprocal and equal inspection of border checkpoints, and the subjection of all transits to customs control. Therefore, it constitutes a direct alternative to the “Zangezur Corridor” model proposed by Azerbaijan, which envisions a customs-free and unilaterally controlled route through southern Armenia to reach Nakhchivan. In this context, the Peace Crossroads is not merely a technical transportation project; it has been advanced as the outward expression of a broader strategic vision encompassing Armenia’s peaceful normalization with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, a multilateral balancing policy with Iran and Georgia, and integration along the East–West axis.[4]
The multilateral and cooperation-based foreign policy vision promoted by the Peace Crossroads Initiative has led to significant ruptures in Armenia’s internal political balances and its relations with the diaspora. The Armenian diaspora, particularly through strong lobbying organizations in France, the United States, and Canada, has interpreted the Pashinyan government’s position of withdrawing legal cases filed in international courts within the scope of peace talks with Azerbaijan as a threat to the so-called historical memory, alleged genocide claims, and national identity.[5] The imposition of an entry ban by Pashinyan on Mourad Papazyan, a diaspora leader based in France, and the subsequent lifting of this ban only through direct diplomatic intervention by French President Emmanuel Macron,[6] indicate that the Armenian government is now attempting to exclude diaspora politics from national decision-making processes and is moving towards redefining the traditional historical linkage between central authority and the diaspora.
Describing the domestic reactions to the Zangezur Corridor as “irrational,” Pashinyan expressed a favorable view toward the transit of Türkiye and Azerbaijan through Armenian territory with the remark, “Let them pass, what’s wrong with that?”[7] This rhetoric signifies not only a shift in transportation policy but also a profound paradigmatic change in Armenia’s foreign policy perception. The diaspora has deemed this approach inconsistent with the narrative of supposed “historical victimhood” and the concept of sovereignty, criticizing it for failing to adequately resist ideological codes such as the notion of a “Greater Turan.”[8]
In the same discussion, Pashinyan explicitly stated that they support not the Zangezur Corridor, but the “Peace Crossroads” project. It has been asserted that this project aims to create a strategic corridor connecting Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Armenia, stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean.[9] It has been particularly noted that the reconstruction of the Meghri Railway may elevate this integration from a technical to a political level, opening the door to mutual recognition and peaceful cooperation.
Simultaneously with Pashinyan’s engagements in Türkiye, radical opposition groups in Armenia attempted to organize mass protests, to which the government responded by launching extensive security operations.[10] This development indeed indicates that foreign policy orientations may also lead to societal fractures in domestic politics.
Pashinyan emphasized that the Peace Crossroads aligns with the Middle Corridor and expressed that Armenia could be not a passive but a constructive actor along this route, stating, “We don’t let anyone pass through our territory, and then we complain about being excluded.”[11]
It has been stated that Armenia has identified the signing of a permanent peace agreement with Azerbaijan as a primary objective. The normalization process intended to be initiated with Türkiye is also aimed at exerting indirect pressure on Baku and accelerating the peace process.[12] However, Azerbaijan’s legitimate insistence on the emphasis on Karabakh in Armenia’s Constitution and the role of the OSCE Minsk Group, along with the extension and postponement of Armenia’s constitutional referendum until 2027, complicates the achievement of regional peace due to Armenia’s slow pace in this process.
As a critical element, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced that they support the Peace Crossroads Initiative but linked this support exclusively to peace between Yerevan and Baku and normalization with Türkiye.[13] During his visit to Yerevan, Sergey Lavrov’s use of the Chinese-sourced metaphor “Let a thousand flowers bloom” demonstrates his support for multi-centered but controlled integration. These remarks reveal that Russia does not wish for the Zangezur Corridor to be implemented in a way that unilaterally increases Turkic influence and sees the route through Zangezur –referred to as the “Turan Road”– as a threat if directed by actors outside Moscow’s sphere.[14]
Ultimately, on 21 June 2025, Pashinyan confirmed this transformation with his statement, “There will be no Zangezur Corridor, there will be a Peace Crossroads.”[15] The construction of the Meghri Line represents not only a technical but also a concrete expression of a strategic foreign policy vision. Armenia is seeking to demonstrate to the international community its intention to realize this transformation –if necessary, by undertaking constitutional amendments and other political reforms– in order to counter the deepening economic crises and the risk of marginalization and regional ineffectiveness.
Looking ahead, it is highly likely that the Armenian diaspora –particularly by increasing its influence over public opinion, lawmakers, and the media in countries such as the United States, France, and Canada– will attempt to sabotage the peace process with Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Within this framework, the diaspora may persist in its anti-Turkic stance by transforming its victimhood narrative surrounding the so-called “genocide” into an ideological weapon and may argue that regional normalization entails Armenia’s abandonment of its “victim identity.” This could deepen polarization in Armenia’s domestic politics and potentially narrow the legitimacy space of the Pashinyan administration. It is anticipated that this process may bring forward the constitutional referendum planned for 2027, enabling Pashinyan to attempt to free his foreign policy from diaspora influence through changes that would further strengthen his position domestically. At the same time, efforts by the Armenian lobby to delegitimize this process in international institutions are expected to evolve into a strategy of diplomatic pressure, instrumentalizing the so-called “reckoning with history” narrative against Türkiye and Azerbaijan’s peace discourse.
Russia’s position regarding the regional peace process is also projected to constitute a decisive breaking point. Although Moscow does not explicitly obstruct the realization of peace, it may prefer that such peace be constructed not through projects proposed by Turkic states and shaped along the Türkiye-Azerbaijan axis, but rather via multi-centered platforms that it approves of and can supervise. Therefore, it is highly probable that Russia will exhibit a cautious or negative stance toward projects such as the Zangezur Corridor, which directly connect the Turkic World. Sergey Lavrov’s invocation of the metaphor “Let a thousand flowers bloom” as a call for multifaceted but controllable integration demonstrates that Russia does not wish to support any structure from which it is excluded. In this context, even the Peace Crossroads Initiative will only be approved by Moscow as long as Russia’s political weight is preserved; otherwise, political maneuvering aimed at Armenia will likely be employed to resist the shaping of this route into a Ankara–Baku-centered “Turan Road.”
In conclusion, the obstacles to building a sustainable peace in the South Caucasus are not limited to technical and legal issues but also include historical ideologies, geopolitical clashes of interest, and transnational mechanisms of influence. The influence strategy pursued by the Armenian diaspora through the narrative of supposed historical victimhood, combined with Russia’s desire to exert control over regional projects, will cause cooperation-focused initiatives such as the Peace Crossroads to face multidimensional pressures. Therefore, Armenia’s ability to realize its vision of regional integration will depend not only on its own political will but also on its capacity to correctly interpret and navigate the strategic balance established among Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Russia.
[1] “V Stambule Nachalas Vstrecha Pashinyana i Erdogana”, TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24303595, (Access Date: 22.06.2025)
[2] “Pashinyan Nameren Priglasit Erdogana v Armeniyu Vesnoy 2026 Goda”, Rambler Novosti, https://news.rambler.ru/world/54864767-pashinyan-nameren-priglasit-erdogana-v-armeniyu-vesnoy-2026-goda/, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[3] “‘Turtsiya dlya Armenii – ne Ugroza, kak i Armeniya dlya Turtsii: O Chem Pashinyan Govoril s Turetskimi Armyanami”, First News Media, https://1news.az/news/20250621013424632-Turtsiya-dlya-Armenii-ne-ugroza-kak-i-Armeniya-dlya-Turtsii-O-chem-Pashinyan-govoril-s-turetskimi-armyanami-VIDEO, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[4] Sheila Paylan, “How Armenia’s ‘Crossroads for Peace’ Plan could Transform the South Caucasus”, Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-armenias-crossroads-for-peace-plan-could-transform-the-south-caucasus/, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[5] “Open Letter to the Government of the Republic of Armenia”, Armenian Weekly, https://armenianweekly.com/2025/02/25/open-letter-to-the-government-of-the-republic-of-armenia/, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[6] Ruzanna Stepanian, “Diaspora Leader Credits France’s Macron With Lifting Of Armenia Entry Ban”, Azatutyun, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33330499.html, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[7] “Pashinyan v Turtsii Vysmeyal Strakhi Armyan Pered Turanom”, Minival, https://minval.az/news/124471535, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[8] Arshaluys Barseghyan, “Pashinyan Accused of ‘İgnorance’ after Controversial Statement on Armenian Genocide”, OC Media, https://oc-media.org/pashinyan-accused-of-ignorance-after-controversial-statement-on-armenian-genocide/, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[9] “Premyer Armenii Zayavil, chto Zangezurskogo Koridora ne budet”, TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24311167, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[10] “Holy Struggle Movement Reports Widespread Detentions of Its Supporters”, Panorama, https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2025/06/20/Holy-Struggle-movement/3134313, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[11] “Pashinyan: There will be no Zangezur Corridor”, News.Am, https://news.am/eng/news/889787.html, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[12] Semen Boykov, Anastasiya Kozlova ve Anastasiya Kostina, “Armyanskiy Zhest: Yerevan Khochet Poskoreye Podpisat Mirnyy Dogovor s Baku”, Izvestiya, https://iz.ru/1907761/semen-boikov-anastasiia-kozlova/armyanskij-zhest-erevan-hochet-poskoree-podpisat-mirnyj-dogovor-s-baku, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[13] “Dlya Realizatsii Proyekta ‘Perekrestok Mira’ Yerevan i Baku Dolzhny Podpisat Mirnoye Soglasheniye: Lavrov”, Armenpress, https://armenpress.am/ru/article/1220450, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[14] “Moskva Gotova Sodeystvovat Podpisaniyu Mirnogo Dogovora Mezhdu Baku i Yerevanom”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/24027861, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[15] “Pashinyan Predlozhil Zamenit Zangezurskiy Koridor na ‘Perekrestok Mira’”, Izvestiya, https://iz.ru/1908295/2025-06-21/pasinan-predlozil-zamenit-zangezurskii-koridor-na-perekrestok-mira, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
