Recent developments on the European continent point to a critical period in which security policies are being restructured. Geopolitical tensions, particularly those that have accelerated since the Russo-Ukrainian War, are testing the European Union’s (EU) collective defense capacity, institutional cohesion, and strategic vision. Within this framework, increasing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) violations in border regions, Finland’s efforts to build a “drone wall” against Russia, intensifying debates on decision-making mechanisms within the EU, and Hungary’s oppositional stance during this process raise the question of whether Europe is entering a period of war preparation. The answer to this question depends not only on the EU’s military capacity or technological readiness, but also on its internal cohesion, its foreign policy deterrent capabilities, and its alliance relationships within the international system.
The most striking issue in Europe in recent weeks has been the increasing number of drone violations recorded along its eastern borders. These drones, detected in the airspace of countries such as Poland, Estonia, and Romania, have activated NATO’s rapid response capacity and significantly increased security concerns in the region. [i] While these violations do not pose as direct a threat as traditional military attacks, they stand out as a hybrid method that tests Europe’s defense reflexes. Experts emphasize that overreacting to such provocative actions could increase the risk of a direct conflict with Russia, and therefore, a calm but decisive approach is necessary.[ii]
In this context, the “drone wall” concept, which has emerged as a new line of defense designed to secure Europe’s eastern borders, is attracting attention. This idea, developed under the leadership of Finland, involves a comprehensive network of radars, electronic jamming, and deterrent systems to detect and neutralize suspicious UAVs. The Finnish Minister of Defense’s characterization of this project as “a race against time” is a clear indication of the urgency and vulnerability Europe feels in its defense capacity.[iii]
With this, the drone wall project presents significant technical and political challenges. First, there are significant differences in the technological infrastructures of member states. For example, while high-tech countries like Germany and France may be more likely to adapt to such a project, Eastern European countries may not be able to contribute at a similar level. Second, the risks associated with deploying defensive systems near densely populated areas in border areas are a matter of debate. Third, the need for joint financing and coordination is directly linked to the EU’s institutional decision-making mechanisms.
It should not be forgotten that Europe is still not at the level of Ukraine or Russia in terms of UAV technology and production capacity. Ukraine has engaged in rapid innovation under wartime conditions, successfully producing low-cost yet effective drone systems, while Russia, particularly through its cooperation with Iran, has developed extensive drone attack capabilities.[iv] In contrast, the EU lags behind in this area and is focusing on new investments to strengthen its deterrent. Therefore, the military-technological dimension can be interpreted as Europe’s belated strengthening of its defensive capacity rather than its direct “preparations for war.”
The second fundamental dimension shaping Europe’s security strategy is the EU’s internal institutional dynamics. One of the most debated issues recently has been the move to abolish unanimity in decision-making processes in favor of a qualified majority. The veto power of a single member state, particularly in sensitive areas such as foreign policy and defense, hinders the EU’s effective action. However, the most vocal opposition to this change came from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Orban harshly criticized the EU’s policies toward Ukraine, accusing Brussels of “dragging Europe into war,” and even attempted to mobilize his own public around this rhetoric through petitions.[v] Hungary’s veto highlights the fragility of strategic unity within the EU. The EU’s efforts to develop a common defense policy are frequently stymied by differing threat perceptions and foreign policy priorities among member states.
At this point, the problem facing the EU is not merely a matter of technical decision-making mechanisms, but also of the “will of unity.” While Eastern European countries like the Baltic states and Poland view Russia as an “existential threat,” actors like Hungary prefer a more cautious approach.[vi] This prevents the EU from developing a unified security policy. While Europe strives to take progressive steps in the defense field, the political will to support these steps is hampered by internal institutional differences.
The third, and perhaps most critical, factor shaping Europe’s security strategy is the emerging tensions in relations with Russia. Moscow’s hybrid warfare methods, energy policies, and attempted invasion of Ukraine pose a direct security threat to the EU. Increasing drone incursions in border regions are not merely a technical issue but also part of Russia’s attempts to test European security.[vii] At this point, Europe faces two options: either risk a direct conflict with Russia or attempt to manage tensions through defensive mechanisms that strengthen deterrence. Currently, the EU’s inclination is toward the latter option, namely, strengthening deterrence. Projects such as the drone wall, strengthening military capacity, and increasing coordination with NATO are all components of this deterrence strategy. However, it should not be forgotten that the EU is still largely dependent on the US and NATO for military capacity. While European armies are modernizing, developing an independent warfighting capability will require many years. In this context, the situation in question can be examined under the heading of defensive measures against the possibility of the war spreading to the continent.
In light of all these developments, it would be an exaggeration to say that Europe is preparing for war outright. However, it is clear that the continent is reshaping its security paradigm and working to strengthen its defense capacity. While drone violations and border security debates are prompting Europe to accelerate its technological investments, Hungary’s veto and political divisions within the EU are making it difficult to develop a common security will. The Russian factor, on the other hand, is compelling Europe to deepen its deterrence policies.
Therefore, rather than being an actor “preparing for war,” Europe is currently “trying to prepare for defense against a potential conflict.” However, wrong decisions made during this process, provocations at the border, or institutional alignment issues could inadvertently ignite a conflict. Europe’s greatest challenge lies in overcoming internal political divisions and developing a collective security strategy while building a deterrent defense against external threats.
[i] Sandor Zsiros, “Avrupa’daki İHA ihlalleri için uzman uyarısı: ‘Soğukkanlılıkla yanıt verilmeli’”, Euronews, https://tr.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/10/01/avrupadaki-iha-ihlalleri-icin-uzman-uyarisi-sogukkanlilikla-yanit-verilmeli, (Date Accessed: 03.10.2025).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Shona Murray, “Finlandiya Savunma Bakanı: Rusya’ya karşı drone duvarı inşa etmek için zamana karşı yarışıyoruz”, Euronews, https://tr.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/10/03/finlandiya-savunma-bakani-rusyaya-karsi-drone-duvari-insa-etmek-icin-zamana-karsi-yarisiyo, (Date Accessed: 03.10.2025).
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Sandor Zsiros, “Macaristan lideri Orban, ‘AB savaşa giriyor’ diyerek Brüksel’e karşı imza çağrısı yaptı”, Euronews,https://tr.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/10/02/macaristan-lideri-orban-ab-savasa-giriyor-diyerek-bruksele-karsi-imza-cagrisi-yapti, (Date Accessed: 03.10.2025).
[vi] Jorge Liboreiro, “AB’de ‘nitelikli çoğunluk’ önerisine Macaristan’dan veto”, Euronews, https://tr.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/10/03/abde-nitelikli-cogunluk-onerisine-macaristandan-veto, (Date Accessed: 03.10.2025).
[vii] Ibid.
