The meeting between President Erdoğan and U.S. President Trump at the White House on September 25, 2025, has already gone down in history as the second critical summit of the 2000s after 2007.
The first meeting, known as the “Erdoğan-Bush Summit,” took place at a time when Turkish-American relations were at their peak crisis. Following the “2003 Motion Crisis,” the tensions escalated with the “Hood Event,” during which the U.S. increased its pressure on Türkiye, particularly over the PKK terrorist organization and the so-called “Armenian genocide,” with Iraq as the primary focus. During this period, Ankara delivered three critical warning messages to Washington through the media. One of these came from then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who stated regarding Turkish-American relations: “It will break where it is thinnest.” The other two were conveyed by the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander of the Land Forces.
The second critical summit occurred during a period when the so-called “Model Partnership” era in Turkish-American relations (considered one of the main outcomes of the 2007 summit) was coming to an end, largely due to the “Israel Factor,” which began directly threatening Türkiye through Syria-centered developments. At this juncture, Ankara declared that as a “new world order” was emerging, Türkiye could also take part in it—thereby compelling the U.S. to make a clear choice. This declaration was framed as the “Türkiye-Russia-China Alliance” (TRC Alliance). (It is worth noting that a similar statement had been made in March 2002 in the context of “Türkiye-Russia-Iran.” However, this earlier declaration was relatively minor when compared with the TRC Alliance statement.)
The TRC Alliance discourse was further reinforced by decisive steps taken within the United States itself. Two notable examples were President Erdoğan’s address at the UN General Assembly and his remarks on Fox News.
Although U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio attempted to contain the situation with statements aimed at damage control, the message had already been delivered and resonated worldwide. Consequently, the Turkish delegation was received at the White House with a remarkable level of courtesy and attentiveness—an indication that Washington had taken these signals seriously.
The TRC Alliance Discourse Has Reached Its Target
Thus, the possibility of a rupture in bilateral relations—signaled by Erdoğan’s statement “It will break where it is thinnest” and by the TRC Alliance declaration—has once again been averted, or at least temporarily frozen. The warning signals sent from Ankara prior to the summit appear to have been duly registered.
Undoubtedly, Türkiye’s political and diplomatic resolve, the strong leadership factor, and its growing influence across a wide geography—backed by military and intelligence capacities—have played a critical role in this outcome. At the same time, global uncertainties and the fragility of the international system under reconstruction have rendered Türkiye’s position even more decisive, compelling Trump to adopt a more pragmatic stance. Otherwise, an image similar to that shown toward European leaders in the Oval Office would have been broadcast worldwide. Trump, in this sense, has demonstrated how the U.S. intends to treat different states, actors, and leaders.
As for images and narratives circulated on social media attempting to undermine this meeting, they carry little weight in the eyes of the Republic of Türkiye. Such moves suggest that the other side still fails to grasp the full scope of the “iceberg issue.” Spending time on such diversions is hardly advisable.
Persistent Problems, Ambiguous Answers
It must be noted that despite some confidence-building measures and agreements signaling continued cooperation, Turkish-American relations still suffer from an “identity and definition problem.” Although Trump has sought to portray a different picture, this alone is insufficient, as the American decision-making mechanisms—including his own team—continue to adopt a patronizing approach toward Türkiye. The remnants of the Biden-era stalemate have yet to be fully cleared. As long as inconsistencies between U.S. rhetoric and actions toward Türkiye persist, Ankara will remain cautious. The “trust deficit” has not yet been overcome.
To illustrate, Washington’s indecisiveness regarding Israel—and even more so, its outright support for Israel as seen in the cases of Qatar and Gaza—has elevated Ankara’s distrust to the highest levels, including in Syria. Consequently, Trump’s “goodwill” statements are losing resonance in Ankara, being replaced by a sense of concern and a strong perception of threat. The primary reason, as articulated in the TRC Alliance discourse, is Israel. Hence, the top agenda item for both countries remains Israel, with Syria being the immediate focal point.
The sale of F-16 Viper fighter jets and the prospect of Türkiye’s reintegration into the F-35 program are portrayed as key indicators of normalization in bilateral ties. However, as long as CAATSA sanctions remain in place, a genuine normalization process cannot occur. These sanctions are emblematic of the U.S. trust deficit toward Türkiye. While F-16 sales may be seen as a step toward lifting CAATSA restrictions, they cannot be considered a final solution. Trump may offer commitments regarding F-35s, but such promises are likely to face hurdles in Congress.
What Kind of Future?
Despite these uncertainties, the recent summit can be viewed as opening the door to a process in which Turkish-American relations may deepen and evolve strategically in the coming period.
The candid language and imagery displayed by both leaders were perceived as strong signals of a potential new strategic partnership between Türkiye and the U.S. The image of Presidents Trump and Erdoğan sitting side by side at the “Gaza Meeting” table is only one part of this emerging cooperation. This photograph, followed by the White House talks, suggests that in the months ahead—depending on developments in Syria, Iraq, and Gaza in the Middle East, as well as in the Caucasus (Azerbaijan-Armenia) and the wider region stretching from the Baltics to the Caspian amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict—Turkish-American relations will be defined within a cautious framework by late 2025.
Thus, Washington and Ankara appear to have, at least for now, averted an Israel-centered crisis and agreed to continue the process of regional reconstruction, even despite Israel’s opposition. The parties declared at the White House their intent to pursue a “wait-and-see, then act” strategy. This approach further consolidates Türkiye’s policy of balance and multidimensional engagement, now reinforced through its U.S. dimension.
Naturally, we should not be surprised if, in the near future, actors discontent with this new image of Turkish-American relations become more visible. We have seen such dynamics before.
The TRC Alliance Remains on the Agenda
In conclusion, while this summit marks an important step in leader-level diplomacy and lifted Biden’s “White House blockade,” the forthcoming period will serve as a short testing ground for the commitments and promises made.
The U.S. can no longer afford major missteps. It must take confidence-building measures, with the Syria-centered Middle East at the forefront. No actor understands better than the U.S. what “survival” and “security” mean for Türkiye. Yet as long as the “Israel factor” continues to hold U.S./Trump policy hostage, forging a truly robust strategic partnership will remain highly unlikely. Ankara expects not merely rhetorical calls for Israel to “act reasonably,” but concrete measures.
The Republic of Türkiye is fully aware of the game being played by the U.S.-Israel tandem. The TRC Alliance declaration was born out of this awareness—and remains firmly on the agenda today.
