The border dispute between India and China has taken shape in the Himalayan region, where the two countries’ competing sovereignty claims intersect. Along most of the approximately 3,500–4,000-kilometre-long border, the parties have yet to agree on a definitive boundary line. The dispute, concentrated around Aksai Chin in the west and India’s state of Arunachal Pradesh in the east, concerns not only territorial sovereignty but also transportation routes, military mobility, and strategic control over border regions. While Aksai Chin is important for China because of its role in connecting Tibet and Xinjiang, India regards the security of its northeastern borders and territorial integrity as primary concerns. Consequently, even minor military movements along the border have the potential to develop into broader security concerns for both states.[i]
The historical course of the border dispute is closely associated with the security legacy of the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Although relations between the two parties improved at various points following the war, sovereignty issues remained unresolved. The 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, together with subsequent arrangements, aimed to manage military tensions without establishing a definitive border. This approach enabled the parties to keep the dispute under control through diplomatic negotiations. Nevertheless, differing interpretations of the border’s location have persisted, making encounters between military patrols and mutual accusations of attempts to alter the status quo enduring structural problems.[ii]
The deadly clash in the Galwan Valley in the Ladakh region in June 2020 significantly altered the course of bilateral relations. Twenty Indian soldiers lost their lives in the confrontation, while China confirmed the deaths of four of its soldiers. The incident was recorded as the first fatalities resulting from border clashes since 1975. While both parties accused each other of violating existing agreements, they reinforced their military presence along the border by deploying additional troops, military vehicles, and logistical capabilities. Consequently, the dispute, which had long been managed through diplomatic mechanisms, evolved into a crisis in which the risk of direct military confrontation between two nuclear-armed states became increasingly apparent.
Following Galwan, India’s policy towards China shifted towards a more cautious approach in the fields of security, economy, and technology. New Delhi banned certain Chinese-origin applications, tightened scrutiny of Chinese investments, and reassessed its approach to border security. These developments demonstrated that economic interdependence does not automatically generate political trust. Although trade between the two countries continued, the relationship between economic ties and border security became increasingly pronounced. For India, the fundamental challenge has been to limit the possibility of coming under military pressure while maintaining economic relations with China. For China, preventing the border dispute from defining the entirety of bilateral relations and maintaining ties with India within a broader diplomatic framework have remained important priorities.
Following the military confrontations that began in 2020, the two parties sought to reduce tensions through meetings at various military command levels and diplomatic contacts. The process advanced particularly through arrangements for the disengagement of troops from several disputed locations in eastern Ladakh. The agreement reached in October 2024 concerning patrolling activities in the Depsang and Demchok areas represented an important development in overcoming the deadlock along the border. Subsequently, steps were taken to expand diplomatic contacts and revive high-level relations. Nevertheless, these arrangements are not based on a comprehensive agreement determining the final status of the border. Normalization, therefore, rests not so much on resolving the dispute as on managing military risks and re-establishing political dialogue.[iii]
This aspect is particularly important in explaining why the normalization process remains fragile. The withdrawal of military units from specific locations may reduce the likelihood of confrontations along the border; however, it cannot eliminate the parties’ territorial claims, security priorities, or perceptions of each other’s intentions. Furthermore, communication between military command structures and political leadership must be maintained on a regular basis. A new clash along the border could intensify nationalist reactions among the public and narrow the scope for compromise available to both governments. Therefore, the easing of tensions that began in 2024 should not be interpreted as evidence of a strategic reconciliation between the two countries.[iv]
In a statement on 28 October 2026, Shatrujeet Singh Kapur, Director General of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), stated that Indian and Chinese troops had engaged in direct confrontations at various locations in Arunachal Pradesh and that the situation remained ongoing in certain areas. Reports have also alleged that Chinese troops returned in large groups to certain areas claimed by India earlier in the year and established camps there. These statements demonstrate that developments along the border are not merely a military matter. A public statement by a senior security official currently in office has brought the relationship between the government’s border policy, military assessments, and diplomatic messaging directly into focus.[v]
Following Kapur’s statements, India’s Ministry of External Affairs reported that friction occurs in border areas when Chinese forces deviate from established patrolling patterns. The statement, as reported by the Indian press, reveals that New Delhi evaluates these incidents within the framework of border management and existing patrolling practices. Nevertheless, the information made available to the public has not been sufficient to independently verify the precise locations of each encounter, the number of troops involved, or the operational details of the incidents. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to characterize these developments as the beginning of a new and comprehensive military offensive. The current situation indicates a renewed rise in security concerns at a time when normalization along the border is still underway.[vi]
The political dimension of the crisis can also be examined in terms of how statements made by security institutions affect the government’s diplomatic room for manoeuvre. Border issues carry considerable political sensitivity in India. Allegations concerning China’s military activities trigger debates over the government’s capacity to safeguard national security. In this environment, statements by official authorities may serve both to reassure domestic public opinion and to signal to Beijing that the existing situation will not be accepted. However, increasingly hard-line rhetoric may make it more difficult to keep diplomatic channels open. Accordingly, the impact of these statements also depends on the nature of the reported military incidents, how the two countries interpret them, and the messages they convey to each other.
Arunachal Pradesh is one of the regions where India’s and China’s sovereignty claims directly intersect in the eastern sector of the border. China’s designation of the region as “South Tibet” and India’s insistence on its sovereignty over the state increase the political significance of military activities in the area. The high-altitude and difficult-to-access geography of the Himalayas makes troop resupply, surveillance operations, and rapid response capabilities strategically important. Under these conditions, patrol routes, temporary deployments, and infrastructure activities are associated with maintaining effective control on the ground by both parties. The persistence of border competition means that military preparedness remains important not only during periods of crisis but also throughout periods of normalization.
India-China relations are connected to the distribution of power in Asia beyond the bilateral border dispute. Both states seek to expand their regional influence, broaden their economic and diplomatic partnerships, and secure more influential positions within international institutions. India’s cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia can be regarded as part of its pursuit of a regional balance in response to China’s growing power. Nevertheless, in line with its understanding of strategic autonomy, New Delhi does not wish to align its foreign policy entirely with Washington’s priorities. While competition with China encourages India to strengthen its security partnerships, its objective of maintaining independent decision-making also remains central to its foreign policy.
For China, the Indian border constitutes part of its security architecture along the country’s southwestern periphery. Beijing’s approach to maintaining stability in border regions and preserving its existing military position may conflict with India’s understanding of territorial integrity and deterrence. This situation leads the two parties to attach different meanings to the same military activities. An activity perceived by one side as a security measure may be interpreted by the other as an attempt to alter the status quo. Such a security dilemma reinforces mutual distrust and increases the likelihood that a limited incident could escalate into a broader crisis.[vii]
Despite the competition along the border, economic relations between India and China continue to be significant. Trade volumes, production networks, and technological connections make a complete severance of relations costly for both countries. Developments following Galwan demonstrated that security concerns can be reflected in investment, technology, and trade policies. Similarly, renewed border tensions may lead to a reassessment of economic relations in terms of their associated political risks.
The renewed tensions between India and China reveal the limitations of the crisis-management mechanisms established after 2020. The patrolling arrangement reached in October 2024 was important in reducing military encounters in certain areas and reviving diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, the fundamental sovereignty disputes between the two parties remain unresolved. Statements concerning encounters in Arunachal Pradesh in 2026 demonstrate that achieving a degree of agreement in certain border areas does not guarantee stability across all disputed regions. Therefore, rather than interpreting recent developments as evidence of the complete failure of previous normalization efforts, it is more appropriate to assess them by distinguishing between the scope of limited agreements and the structural problems that remain unresolved.
The key factor determining the future course of the crisis will be how the relationship between military activities on the ground and political decision-making mechanisms is managed. It is important for both parties to continue meetings at the level of military commanders, establish clear communication channels regarding patrolling activities, and prevent local encounters from rapidly escalating into high-level political crises. However, for these mechanisms to produce lasting results, mutual expectations must be defined more clearly. The withdrawal of military units, the regulation of patrolling activities, and the reduction of tensions are all of considerable importance.
From a broader perspective, the border dispute functions as both a cause and a consequence of power competition in Asia. India’s efforts to expand its regional influence and China’s security priorities in border regions shape the two states’ strategic assessments of one another. Managing this competition will not depend solely on reducing the number of troops deployed along the border, as required by a realist power paradigm. Economic relations, diplomatic contacts, regional partnerships, and national security policies will also determine the course of the process. India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy requires it to maintain relations with different centres of power while competing directly with China. For China, too, a prolonged crisis with India could entail additional costs for its diplomatic and economic priorities in Asia. Ultimately, the border encounters that came to the fore towards the end of 2026 demonstrate that normalization between India and China has yet to evolve into a lasting strategic reconciliation.
[i] “The China-India Relationship: Between Cooperation and Competition”, CFR, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/china-india-relationship-between-cooperation-and-competition, (Date Accessed: 28.10.2026).
[ii] Malik, J. M. (1995). China-India Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: The Continuing Rivalry. The China Quarterly, 142, 317–355. doi:10.1017/S0305741000034962
[iii] “Negotiating the India-China Standoff: 2020–2024”, Carnegie, https://voip.ceip.org/india/research/2024/12/negotiating-the-india-china-standoff-2020-2024, (Date Accessed: 28.10.2026).
[iv] Ibid
[v] “India and China were easing tensions-then a border official spoke out”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj3vq7nkzr0qo? (Date Accessed: 28.10.2026).
[vi] “China breaking patrol patterns leads to face-off: Centre on ITBP chief’s remark”, The Indian Express, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-china-border-lac-mea-peace-bilateral-ties-10934040/? (Date Accessed: 28.10.2026).
[vii] Fravel, M. T. (2020). Stability in a secondary strategic direction: China and the border dispute with India from 1962 to 2020. In Routledge handbook of China–India relations (pp. 129-140). Routledge.
