In the international arena, at a time when global polarization is increasing and regional spheres of influence are being redefined, Kazakhstan draws attention with the multi-dimensional strategy it demonstrates in its foreign policy. This approach, which proceeds neither through full engagement with the Western Bloc nor through a Russia-centered dependency, provides the country with room for maneuver and transforms Kazakhstan into an autonomous actor in both European and Eurasian contexts. In particular, the relations developed with the European Union (EU) constitute a significant reflection of this pursuit of strategic autonomy. Without disregarding its structural alliances with Russia, the Astana administration strives to develop grounds for cooperation with the West; in this regard, it is able to implement both crisis management and a politics of balance simultaneously.
One of the most prominent manifestations of this politics of balance occurred after the EU’s implementation of its 16th sanctions package against Russia in 2024. Restrictions imposed on Russian ports such as Ust-Luga indirectly disrupted Kazakhstan’s coal exports to Europe. However, through Kazakhstan’s diplomatic initiatives, a limited transit exception was included in the 18th sanctions package, which came into effect in 2025, for coal originating from Kazakhstan and belonging to institutions not subject to sanctions. This move revealed Astana’s ability to negotiate on a benefit-centered basis without engaging in direct confrontation, and reflected its capacity to maximize its strategic interests with Europe without excluding Russia.[1]
The aforementioned exception is not only symbolic but also economically critical. While in 2022, 45 percent of Kazakhstan’s coal exports, in 2023, 54 percent, and in 2024, 51.8 percent were directed to EU countries, in the first five months of 2025 this rate declined to 38.5 percent. With the new arrangement, the aim is to halt this decline and ensure stability in exports. However, the EU has developed strict monitoring mechanisms to prevent the misuse of this exemption; it has introduced stringent certification procedures regarding the origin and ownership of the coal; and it has announced that in the event of any detection of indirect Russian gain, the exemption would be immediately revoked.[2] This situation demonstrates that even while imposing sanctions, Europe adopts a more flexible and selective approach toward actors such as Kazakhstan, which succeed in remaining neutral.
In this process, significant steps have been taken not only in the economic sphere but also in diplomatic contacts. In the meeting between Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Arman Isetov and the EU Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Aleska Simkic, the implementation of the agreements reached particularly at the Samarkand Summit, sustainable economic development, the strengthening of transport corridors, and green energy projects came to the fore. These discussions indicate that Kazakhstan is being positioned in the eyes of the EU not merely as an energy supplier but also as a partner in regional stability. At the same time, the renewed interest of multinational corporations such as Glencore in mining investments in Kazakhstan supports the economic reflections of the multi-dimensional openings in foreign policy.
In this context, Kazakhstan’s efforts to expand its energy cooperation with the EU through multilateral structures are also manifested in the field of green diplomacy. The Green Corridor Union LLC, established through the joint initiative of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, aims to implement a vast green energy bridge stretching from Central Asia to Europe. In this project, Kazakhstan assumes the role of both producer and transit country, being connected to the EU’s energy grid through transmission lines that will pass beneath the Caspian Sea and reach Europe via Romania. This initiative, aligned with the European Green Deal and the Global Gateway Strategy, possesses transformative potential not only for energy supply security but also for the model of regional cooperation.[3]
Nevertheless, Kazakhstan does not pursue a sharp limitation of its relations with Russia within its multi-vector foreign policy; on the contrary, it continues strategic communication and cooperation. According to the statement made by Moscow on 8 August 2025, Vladimir Putin personally conveyed to President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev the details of his diplomatic meetings with the United States (US) Special Representative. This communication demonstrates that a high level of strategic coordination is still maintained in Kazakhstan-Russia relations, and that Kazakhstan, while not a mediator, retains the position of a connected observer in the EU-Russia confrontation.[4]
The reflection of these strategic contacts in the energy field materializes through Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant project. The site studies initiated in cooperation with Rosatom on 8 August 2025 in the Almaty region envisage the drilling of at least 50 deep wells and a construction process expected to last eleven years. The facility, to be completed at a cost of 14–15 billion dollars, is regarded not only as a step toward enhancing Kazakhstan’s energy independence but also as a significant move in advancing the country’s nuclear technology capacity.[5]
Integrating digital transformation and economic modernization into its foreign trade diplomacy, Kazakhstan has raised the share of e-commerce in retail to 14.1 percent as of 2025, with the target of reaching 20 percent by 2030. The national e-commerce strategy is based on legislative reform, digital literacy, modern logistics, and the principles of fair competition. Within this framework, the e-commerce memorandum signed with Pakistan has strengthened the country’s regional position in the field of digital diplomacy.[6]
The tourism sector has also become a prominent dimension of Kazakhstan’s economic diversification and public diplomacy. In 2024, the country was visited by 15.3 million foreign tourists, expanding its sphere of cultural interaction with EU countries, particularly Germany, and generating more than 2.6 billion dollars in tourism revenue. The opening of symbolic sites such as Baikonur to scientific-industrial tourism demonstrates that sustainable and inclusive tourism policies are being integrated with EU norms. The increase in Schengen visa applications, moreover, has created a dynamic that could pave the way for future negotiations on visa liberalization or facilitation with the EU.[7]
Commercial relations with Russia also continue to be preserved. Within the framework of the International Trade Forum held in Astana on 11 June 2025, a memorandum was signed between the Ministry of Trade and Integration of Kazakhstan and the Association of Russian Retail Companies (AKORT), institutionalizing the legal and technical dimensions of economic integration between the two countries. This agreement illustrates that Kazakhstan pursues the principle of multilateralism at the economic level not only with the EU but also within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union.[8]
In the field of security, institutional dialogues with the EU have acquired significant importance. At the 12th Annual High-Level EU–Central Asia Political and Security Dialogue meeting held in Dushanbe on 11 July 2025, multidimensional issues such as counterterrorism, border security, combating disinformation, cyber threats, and the sharing of water resources were discussed. Within the same framework, the EU–Central Asia Counterterrorism Dialogue also highlighted Kazakhstan’s ability to act jointly with the EU and its institutional integration in matters of regional security.[9]
In the short term (2025–2027), Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy is expected to evolve toward institutionalization, particularly in energy and digitalization-based cooperation with the EU. Within the framework of the “Green Corridor Union” initiative, the technical infrastructure of green energy lines connecting to Europe may rapidly develop, positioning Kazakhstan not only as an energy supplier but also as a guarantor of energy transit security. At the same time, within the sensitive balances of the sanctions imposed by Europe, arrangements such as transit exceptions are likely to continue as subjects of political bargaining. During this process, it can be foreseen that Kazakhstan will deepen its relations with the EU in line with its goals of economic growth and becoming a logistics hub, thereby increasing its institutionally oriented openings toward the West in its foreign policy.
In the medium and long term (2027–2030), Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia may face a new test. Russia’s policies aimed at further consolidating its influence across the Eurasian space may conflict with Kazakhstan’s independent foreign policy trajectory. Particularly, the growing Russian technological influence through nuclear energy cooperation carries the potential to overshadow Astana’s strategic balance with the West. In this regard, Kazakhstan’s orientation toward alternative energy investments supported by Western technologies in parallel with the Rosatom project may contribute to forming a more “balancing” profile in the eyes of both Moscow and Brussels. However, this also implies that Kazakhstan could face greater diplomatic pressure.
Kazakhstan, thanks to its multi-vector foreign policy, is among the few actors able to carve out room for maneuver in a geography where global rivalries intersect. The extension of its cooperation with the EU into numerous areas such as energy, the digital economy, security, and tourism enhances the country’s institutional capacity and international legitimacy. Yet the sustainability of these gains depends on Kazakhstan’s ability to preserve a delicate balance in its relations with both Russia and the West. The greatest challenge Astana will face in the coming period will be to make this balance not only preservable but also steerable. This will necessitate not only diplomatic flexibility but also the deepening of domestic structural reforms and institutional stability.
[1] Vusala Abbasova, “EU Grants Kazakhstan Transit Exemption for Coal Through Russian Ports”, Caspian News, https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/eu-grants-kazakhstan-transit-exemption-for-coal-through-russian-ports-2025-7-31-0, (Access Date: 08.08.2025).
[2] “Kazakhstan and EU Reach Agreement on Coal Transit Despite Sanctions on Russia”, Nova News, https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/kazakhstan-ue-intesa-con-lue-per-il-transito-del-carbone-nonostante-le-sanzioni-alla-russia-2, (Access Date: 08.08.2025).
[3] Rushana Aliakbarova, “A New Energy Bridge: Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan Unite for a Green Corridor to Europe”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/business/2025/07/15/a-new-energy-bridge-azerbaijan-uzbekistan-and-kazakhstan-unite-for-a-green-corridor-to-eur, (Access Date: 08.08.2025).
[4] Mikhail Mettsel, “Putin Obsudil s Tokayevym Khod Dialoga s SSHA po Uregulirovaniyu na Ukraine”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/24736791, (Access Date: 08.08.2025).
[5] “Stroitelstvo Pervoy AES Nachalos v Kazakhstane”, Interfaks, https://www.interfax.ru/world/1040235, (Access Date: 08.08.2025).
[6] “Kazakhstan Targets 20% E-Commerce Share by 2030”, The Times of Central Asia, https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-targets-20-e-commerce-share-by-2030/, (Access Date: 08.08.2025).
[7] Xhoi Zajmi, “Unlocking Kazakhstan, the Next Frontier for EU Tourism”, Euractiv, Ehttps://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/unlocking-kazakhstan-the-next-frontier-for-eu-tourism, (Access Date: 08.08.2025).
[8] “Assotsiatsiya Reteylerov iz RF Podpisala s Mintorgom Kazakhstana Memorandum o Sotrudnichestve”, TASS, https://tass.ru/ekonomika/24197251, (Access Date: 08.08.2025).
[9] “YES – Tsentralnaya Aziya: v Dushanbe Sostoyalos’ 12-ye Zasedaniye Dialoga Vysokogo Urovnya po Voprosam Politiki i Bezopasnosti”, Predstavitelstvo Yevropeyskogo Soyuza v Tadzhikistane, https://l24.im/tais, (Access Date: 08.08.2025).
