Recent geopolitical dynamics between the United States (U.S.), Russia, and China, particularly in regard to nuclear arms rhetoric and increased strategic competition among major powers, reveal that the global security architecture is at a critical crossroad. This period, in which the Trump administration’s operational foreign policy approach has signaled cooperation in the Ukraine War on the one hand, while on the other hand pursuing a multidimensional balancing strategy that provides fragile ceasefires far from resolving permanent structural problems, requires in-depth analysis within the framework of the concepts of great power competition and strategic communication in the discipline of international relations.
Following the announcement of tests of the Poseidon and new cruise missile systems by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea, the U.S. immediately announced that it would resume nuclear weapons testing immediately after a 30-year hiatus, marking a critical escalation point for global nuclear stability. Indeed, this decision can be analyzed as an effort to redefine the balance of deterrence based on the principle of reciprocity, relying on the necessity to act on an “equal level” with Russia and China in response to their programs and referring to the “immense destructive power” in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
In this context, Trump’s statement on the social media platform Truth Social announcing that he had ordered the immediate commencement of nuclear weapons testing[i] served to justify his political motivation based on the perception that other countries were closing the gap despite US leadership, while the Russian Presidential Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s comments that Russia’s “Burevestnik” nuclear-powered missile tests do not fall under the scope of nuclear weapons testing because they do not involve the detonation of a nuclear warhead,[ii] stand out as an information-centered strategic communication action aimed at alleviating international legal and political pressure. Ultimately, and while immediately following this nuclear escalation rhetoric, Trump’s announcement of an order to the Department of Defense to immediately commence nuclear weapons testing, just before his summit with Xi Jinping in South Korea,[iii] not only served as a deterrent message to Russia, but also functioned as a multi-purpose coercive diplomatic tool aimed at strengthening the negotiating position of U.S.
Following the summit held in this strategic atmosphere in Busan, U.S. President Donald Trump’s announcement that the two countries would work to cooperate to end the war in Ukraine is a striking and unexpected development in terms of geopolitical realignment and great power diplomacy. Trump’s emphasis that Xi would assist the US in this matter reflects expectations that China may partially depart from its traditional image of neutrality on the Ukraine issue (or its indirect support for Russia) and take on a more active role in the process of resolving the global conflict.
Trump’s endorsement of this signal of cooperation, while noting that the Taiwan issue was not discussed, demonstrates that the U.S. has temporarily set aside its most sensitive area of disagreement with China and established a pragmatic foreign policy priority focused on the humanitarian and economic costs in Ukraine. As a reflection of this reality-based approach, Trump’s statement that the U.S. is “making money” through arms sales via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), despite his discomfort with the human losses caused by the war, is a transparent but controversial statement based on a known fact that openly discloses the military-industrial and economic dimensions of foreign policy decisions.[iv]
However, this trade framework agreement is actually a fragile truce that falls short of resolving the fundamental issues.[v]The agreement essentially returns relations between the two countries to the status quo before the escalation preceding Trump’s “Independence Day” offensive, with steps such as China resuming soybean purchases, suspending rare earth export restrictions for one year, and the U.S. reducing tariffs on China by 10%. This shallow compromise clearly reveals the fundamental incompatibility between Washington’s core demands regarding China’s industrial policies, excess production capacity, and export-oriented growth model, and the issues Beijing is willing to compromise on. The Chinese side viewed this meeting as a stepping stone to stabilizing the relationship without expecting bilateral ties to be completely reset, and was pleased with Trump’s framing of the meeting as a “G2” and his warm tone.
This tactical softening may give needed breathing room to international companies caught in the middle, but the scope and depth of the agreement reveal how much worse relations have become compared to the comprehensive deal efforts during Trump’s first term. For instance, merely postponing restrictions on rare earth elements perpetuates ongoing uncertainty for U.S. supply chains. While Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s praise of the two leaders as “world-class leaders” and his emphasis on their personal relationship highlights the critical importance of personal ties between leaders in reducing tensions, some commentators warn that repeated escalations could erode personal trust between Xi and Trump, leading to a much more difficult situation. This means that the current agreement provides only a short-term tactical respite and is far from long-term stability unless the root causes are resolved.
Despite this tactical pause, China’s 12th Xiangshan International Security Forum, held in Beijing between September 17 and 19, 2025, reflects Chinese President Xi Jinping’s efforts to strengthen China’s role in the international order by creating an alternative to the U.S. security platform, the “Shangri-La Dialogue.” [vi] Strategically important as the first forum since Donald Trump’s second term as president, this event served to spread China’s security vision by focusing on Global South countries. While the forum highlighted Xi’s desire to form a united front against U.S. influence with allies such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un, the U.S. sending a lower-level representative (military attaché) to this event compared to the previous year indicated that Washington prefers to conduct critical dialogues through closed channels.
This situation, along with Dong Jun’s warning to the U.S. not to “intimidate China” and the reactions from China and Russia to regional tensions such as US-Japan bilateral exercises, concretely demonstrates the increasing geopolitical and military competition in the Asia-Pacific beyond the diplomatic rhetoric of the Xiangshan Forum. Indeed, although the Busan summit took a tactical step back on cooperation and trade regarding Ukraine, the rhetoric of nuclear escalation and structural geopolitical competition platforms such as the Xiangshan Forum reveal that, despite personal ties between leaders, relations between the US and China are trapped in a constant cycle of tension and detente rather than achieving lasting stability, and that Trump’s guiding actions towards the international public (whether grounded or unfounded) are a fundamental factor feeding this cycle.
The current escalatory narrative in the nuclear sphere and Trump’s directive to resume nuclear testing, aim more to strengthen strategic negotiating positions than to create a permanent arms race dynamic within the international system. A highly rational prediction indicates that the U.S. and Russia will refrain from commencing actual nuclear weapons testing, considering the international legal and political costs, but will maintain nuclear tension as a means of threat. This situation will cause competition to shift to unconventional areas such as cyber and space. On the other hand, the “fragile truce” reached at the Busan Summit in US-China relations is not expected to be sustainable, as the two countries’ structural incompatibilities, such as industrial policies, technological hegemony, and trade surpluses, continue. Trump’s approach to foreign policy, relying on transactional and personal ties between leaders, will undermine institutional trust and make the relationship highly unstable. It is, therefore, strongly anticipated that new escalations in trade and regional influence competition will be inevitable, and that tactical cooperation (including on Ukraine) will remain circumstantial and temporary.
In conclusion, the foreign policy maneuvers observed by U.S. President Donald Trump during this period define the new normal of global geopolitics: a sharp contrast between tactical cooperation and structural competition. The harsh and simultaneous response to Russia’s nuclear program, the fragile truce with China, and the prominence of personalized diplomacy indicate that the international security architecture is moving further away from institutional stability. Nuclear rhetoric has been used not only as a weapon of dissuasion but also as a lever for coercive diplomacy; commercial and diplomatic compromises with China have only served as temporary respites preventing escalation rather than establishing lasting trust. Ultimately, the chain of events during this period confirms that the dynamics of conflict between major powers remain unresolved. Instead, a highly unstable international order prevails, dependent on the momentary decisions and personal relationships of leaders. This situation points to a global order where the risk of renewed tensions in strategic security and economic spheres is high soon.
[i] “Tramp Poruchil Pentagonu Nemedlenno Nachat İspytaniya Yadernogo Oruzhiya”, TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/25493563, (Access Date: 30.10.2025).
[ii] “Peskov: Ispytaniya ‘Burevestnika’ Pod Yadernyye ne Podpadayut”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/25498511, (Access Date: 30.10.2025).
[iii] Chad de Guzman, “After Russia Conducts Nuclear Weapons Tests, Trump Announces U.S. Will Restart Its Own”, Time, https://time.com/7329758/nuclear-weapons-test-us-russia-war-trump-xi-putin-missiles/, (Access Date: 30.10.2025).
[iv] Aleksandra Ivanova, “Tramp: SSHA i Kitay Budut Sotrudnichat Dlya Mira v Ukraine”, DW, https://www.dw.com/ru/tramp-ssa-i-kitaj-budut-sotrudnicat-s-celu-zaversit-vojnu-v-ukraine/a-74551600, (Access Date: 30.10.2025).
[v] Trevor Hunnicutt, Laurie Chen ve Mei Mei Chu, “Trump-Xi ‘Amazing’ Summit Brings Tactical Truce, Not Major Reset”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-xi-amazing-summit-brings-tactical-truce-not-major-reset-2025-10-30/, (Access Date: 30.10.2025).
[vi] Yu-Chen Lee, “Kitay Brosayet Vyzov Zapadnoy Modeli Bezopasnosti?”, DW, https://www.dw.com/ru/kitaj-brosaet-vyzov-zapadnoj-modeli-bezopasnosti/a-74049371, (Access Date: 30.10.2025).
