Water insecurity in Central Asia has evolved from an environmental concern into a multidimensional security crisis that threatens regional stability. Climate change, population growth, and the collapse of Soviet-era infrastructure have weakened sustainable water management across the so-called “C5” countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The sharing of transboundary rivers has transformed water into a bargaining tool and a means of strategic pressure in inter-state relations. External developments such as China’s dam investments and Afghanistan’s construction of the “Qosh Tepa Canal” have placed the water crisis at the core of geopolitical competition. This situation poses risks not only to the region but also to Russia’s environmental security and domestic stability, producing decisive effects on mass migration, the energy-food-water balance, and foreign policy priorities.
The increasingly acute water insecurity in Central Asia has transcended being merely an environmental threat, turning into a multidimensional crisis that undermines regional stability. Shrinking water resources due to climate change can no longer meet the demands of a growing population. The collapse of infrastructure inherited from the Soviet era and unsustainable approaches to water management have hindered the C5 countries –Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan– from developing structural solutions. Moreover, tensions surrounding the allocation of cross-border waterways have rendered water not only a natural resource but also a geopolitical bargaining chip and a tool of strategic coercion. Consequently, access to water for the region’s more than 82 million inhabitants now depends not merely on natural availability, but also on political decision-making processes and the behavior of external actors.[1]
The regional implications of this multilayered crisis were addressed at the 2024 EDB Forum, within the framework of water-energy-food security. International institutions, development banks, state representatives, and experts examined the issue through a comprehensive lens. The fact that the agricultural sector consumes approximately 80% of regional water resources –40% of which is lost due to inefficiencies– has underscored the necessity of transitioning to modern digital monitoring systems and efficient irrigation technologies. Furthermore, the Qosh Tepa Canal, scheduled to become operational in 2028, signals alarm both environmentally and politically, as it carries the potential to permanently alter Central Asia’s water balance.[2] In this context, the restructuring of regional institutions such as IFAS, the formation of domestic irrigation technology clusters, and the institutionalization of trilateral international agreements have become indispensable and urgent imperatives.
The trilateral agreement signed among Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, which foresees the allocation of water from the Buhri Tochik dam for agricultural irrigation, constitutes not only a form of technical coordination but also a diplomatic step aimed at preventing past water and border conflicts. The destructive legacy of Soviet-era policies that led to the desiccation of the Aral Sea is now being addressed through bilateral and multilateral agreements concerning the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. However, the absence of a binding water governance mechanism that includes all regional states, especially in the face of externally driven projects such as the Qosh Tepa Canal, continues to deepen the crisis and transform it into an even more severe security dilemma.[3]
This structural vulnerability has begun to pose a threat not only at the regional level but also to Russia’s environmental and political stability. As highlighted in the analysis by the Jamestown Foundation, the growing risk of mass migration from Central Asia toward the north is creating a new security gap for Moscow.[4] In this context, Soviet-era proposals to divert water from the Ob and Irtysh rivers in Siberia to Central Asia have been brought back into discussion. However, Moscow is rejecting these demands by citing its own domestic water crisis –declining river levels, increasing drought, and forest fires– and, unlike China, is demanding economic compensation for any potential water exports.[5]
At this juncture, Moscow views poor resource management in Central Asia as the root cause of the problem and resists being positioned as a “water supplier” to the region. Meanwhile, the growing influence of China and Afghanistan –both altering river flows through dam construction– is generating new geopolitical equations that may undermine Russia’s regional influence. Central Asian countries are exerting indirect pressure on Moscow by warning that, should these proposals continue to be ignored, millions of people may migrate northward due to environmental causes. Yet, this discourse is occasionally interpreted in Russian political circles as “ecological blackmail,” further deepening the bilateral trust deficit.
Russia’s technical capacity and engineering infrastructure present significant potential for generating solutions to the crisis. At the “Strong Ideas for the New Times” forum held in Moscow, the “Russia’s Water Potential” project –developed by the Higher School of Economics and presented in a session attended by President Vladimir Putin– sought to concretize Russia’s ambition to become a global water power. The project emphasized that the country possesses 20% of the world’s freshwater reserves and argued that this advantage could be transformed into a strategic economic opportunity. However, it also stressed the need for structural measures such as calculating the water footprint of products, developing public-private investment models, and expanding the use of purification technologies.[6]
At the local level, Russia has also undertaken various interventions to address the water crisis. Sevastopol Governor Mikhail Razvozhayev stated that projects initiated following the 2020 water crisis had significantly reduced water losses, and that the activation of strategic infrastructures such as the Belbek water intake station had helped prevent potential water shortages in the city.[7] However, such micro-level interventions remain insufficient in the face of macro-environmental threats originating from Central Asia. Indeed, potential mass migration waves east of the Urals pose a risk not only to the country’s ethnic composition but also to Russia’s internal political stability.
The water scarcity crisis has become more than just an environmental issue; it now serves as an indicator of a multidimensional geopolitical transformation directly linked to energy policies, food security, and population movements. The problems surrounding water sharing in Central Asia and Russia’s cautious stance on the matter are reshaping regional power balances while expanding the maneuvering space of actors like China. Moscow’s failure to respond to these demands in a timely and constructive manner not only weakens its regional influence but also increases the risk of domestic social unrest. Consequently, for Russia, water is no longer merely a resource to be directed – it is increasingly becoming a central security dossier that must be actively managed.
While the deepening water insecurity in Central Asia may appear to be an environmental threat in the short term, it could in the medium and long term signal structural ruptures capable of affecting both the regional security architecture and the global geopolitical balance. Climate change, population growth, and the collapse of post-Soviet water infrastructure are pushing the C5 countries to take urgent and lasting measures. At the same time, water-sharing disputes among these states are becoming increasingly strategic and conflict-prone. Simultaneously, external interventions such as China’s dam projects and Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal are transforming water into not only a scarce resource but also a fundamental instrument of regional power rivalry. Russia’s rejectionist attitude toward proposals to divert water from Siberian rivers and its framing of the crisis as a political pressure tool rather than merely a technical issue risk pushing regional countries into deeper cooperation with China and global development actors. As the Jamestown Foundation has pointed out, failure to manage this water crisis may result in mass migration waves from Central Asia into Russia, threatening both the ethnic composition and internal political balances of the country. In the context of a foreseeable future, if Moscow fails to formulate a long-term strategy grounded in “water economy” and to convert its technical capabilities into regional solidarity, it will not only lose its influence in Central Asia but will also pave the way for internal security crises east of the Urals.
In conclusion, water insecurity in Central Asia –driven by climate change, population growth, and the collapse of Soviet-era infrastructure– has evolved from an environmental concern into a geopolitical security issue. The sharing of water among the C5 countries exacerbates regional dis-coordination, while external factors such as China’s dam projects and Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal further complicate the issue. Russia perceives these developments as a multifaceted risk threatening both its regional influence and internal stability. Faced with demands for water transfers from Siberian rivers, Moscow has refrained from engagement, citing its own water crisis and economic burdens–thus allowing actors like China to expand their sphere of influence. If Russia cannot transform its technical capacity into constructive regional cooperation, it risks not only forfeiting its influence in Central Asia but also facing security and societal stability crises east of the Urals.
[1] “Water Insecurity in Central Asia”, Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/report-launch-water-insecurity-in-central-asia/, (Access Date: 08.07.2025).
[2] “Water Crisis in Central Asia: from Diagnostic Assessment to Decisive Action”, Eurasian Development Bank, https://eabr.org/en/press/news/water-crisis-in-central-asia-from-diagnostic-assessment-to-decisive-action, (Access Date: 08.07.2025).
[3] Genzia Fides, “Strany Tsentralnoy Azii Stremyatsya Sokhranit Vodnyye Resursy”, Check Point, https://check-point.kz/publication?id=6128, (Access Date: 08.07.2025).
[4] Paul Goble, “Central Asia’s Water Crisis Becoming Russia’s Problem”, The Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/program/central-asias-water-crisis-becoming-russias-problem/, (Access Date: 08.07.2025).
[5] “Vodnyy Krizis v Tsentralnoy Azii. Vlasti Regiona Vnov Predlagayut Ispolzovat Vodu Sibiri”, Podrobno, https://podrobno.uz/cat/world/vodnyy-krizis-v-tsentralnoy-azii-vlasti-regiona-vnov-predlagayut-ispolzovat-vodu-sibiri/, (Access Date: 08.07.2025).
[6] “Issledovateli VSHE Predstavili Proyekt ‘Vodnyy Potentsial Rossii’”, RBK Kompanii, https://companies.rbc.ru/news/DvZ6mdyImG/issledovateli-vshe-predstavili-proekt-vodnyij-potentsial-rossii/, (Access Date: 08.07.2025).
[7] “Razvozhayev: Riskov Dlya Vodosnabzheniya Sevastopolya, Nesmotrya na Vesennyuyu Zasukhu, Net”, TASS, https://tass.ru/obschestvo/24395243, (Access Date: 08.07.2025).
