A process that has profoundly disrupted the political structure of West Africa over the past five years and that has been described in international literature as a wave of coups, now reached a new stage with the developments in Benin on December 7, 2025.[i] There has already been much discussion, for a long time, about the potential for the wave of military rule affecting the Sahel region to spread to coastal countries. And sure enough, by Sunday morning, December 7, the sound of gunfire in Cotonou made it very clear that this concern was more than just a wild guess and rather a real threat. What really sets the Benin attempt apart from examples in neighboring countries is how fast the state’s security reflexes went into action. The regional dynamics managed to stop this uprising in about 24 hours. This failed attempt against Patrice Talon’s administration goes beyond being merely a local power struggle, as it seems to involve vital concerns for the security of the Gulf of Guinea.
Based on the timeline of events, the anatomy of the crisis seems to resemble a classic sub-Saharan African coup attempt. A group of officers calling themselves the “Military Committee for Refoundation” has arrived on the scene. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri, this group announced that they had taken control of the government, targeting strategic points in the capital, particularly the state television station ORTB’s building.[ii] Heavily concentrated around the Presidential Palace early on Sunday morning, the clashes indicate that the rebel group adopted a planned course of action.
However, unlike the scenarios in Mali or Niger, the main body of the Benin Army has remained loyal to the chain of command. More specifically, the Presidential Guard Regiment succeeded in isolating the coup elements. Such a development further proves that the reforms Talon has been implementing within the army, since he came to power, have served as an insurance policy that kept the regime in place during the crisis. The fact that discontent within the army did not spread to broader ranks could be considered a key internal factor in the failure of the coup attempt.
Explaining the matter solely through internal dynamics would be an incomplete reading. External factors, particularly the role played by Nigeria, had an undeniable influence at this moment of rupture in Benin. The Abuja administration aims to compensate for the influence it has lost in its northern Sahelian neighbors, and in order to maintain its claim to regional leadership, it has framed the threat to Benin’s constitutional order as an attack against itself. Furthermore, upon the request of French President Emmanuel Macron, Nigeria has dispatched fighter jets to suppress the uprising in Benin.[iii]This move signals the implementation of a new doctrine of proxy warfare, whereby the Paris administration, rather than getting its hands dirty in Africa, “hands over” the dirty work to its regional allies.
The Nigerian Army’s mobility along the border and the strong diplomatic reaction shown within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been the most important external factor in breaking the psychological resistance of those involved in the coup. Unlike the military regimes in the region, Benin’s coastal strategic location has been a factor in mobilizing international actors. The country’s integrated structure with the Nigerian economy is yet another factor that makes it further impossible for the world to be indifferent to this crisis. Reports from the field that France and the US are providing intelligence support confirm the Western bloc’s determination to protect its positions on the coastline, after losing ground in the Sahel.
Following the failure of the uprising, President Patrice Talon’s speech to the nation on Monday, December 8, holds symbolic importance. Talon’s composed and confident demeanor serves as a critical indicator that the rebellion has been suppressed. However, the messages read between the lines signal that Benin will shift toward a more security-oriented governance approach in the coming period. The incident, described as the adventurism of a small group, was actually fueled by the shortcomings of the army’s counterterrorism operations in the northern regions.
The pressure exerted by Al-Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated groups on Benin’s northern border has created unrest within the army. Politicians’ failure to ensure security is reflected in the barracks. A closer look at the motivation of Lieutenant Colonel Tigri and his team reveals that these security weaknesses served as a basis for legitimacy. Hence, even if the coup was suppressed, it should not be forgotten that the sociological and military reasons behind this attempt continue to remain.
Another aspect to be analyzed is the response of the general public to this development. It has already been observed that in neighboring countries, coups have been enthusiastically welcomed by the people in the streets. In contrast, the absence of similar mass demonstrations of support in the streets of Cotonou highlights the distinctiveness of Benin’s civil society. A significant portion of the population has remained distant from the idea of seeking a solution through military boots, despite the current economic difficulties.
These circumstances demonstrate that faith in the capacity of civil politics to resolve problems has not yet been completely shattered. However, such faith is on a knife edge. The coup attempt took place in an atmosphere where the gap between the government and the opposition had been widening. With opposition leaders either in exile or facing legal constraints, a political vacuum emerged, paving the way for the military to see itself as an alternative to politics. For this reason, the coming period is likely to see new coup attempts or other types of uprisings. The door to this possibility was opened on December 7. Talon’s administration may take steps to consolidate its power and attempt to silence the opposition, which could lead to a complete loss of control.
It is highly likely that the rhetoric of survivability within Beninese politics will intensify in the coming period. This will, also, inevitably lead to the security bureaucracy casting a larger shadow over the civilian sphere. Talon could use this initiative as an opportunity to launch a comprehensive purge within the army and reshape the intelligence apparatus into a more loyal structure. Such failed coups often become an opportunity for those in power to centralize authority.
It is also a likely scenario that emergency rule will be tightened in Benin. Restrictions on press freedom on security grounds and further constraints on the opposition’s political space would not be surprising. The state may even be tempted to compromise the principles of the rule of law in a defense of its own security. There could also be an abrupt transition towards a security state model. Although this would ensure the regime’s stability in the short term, it would create a paradox that would increase social tension in the medium term.
In conclusion, the events that took place in Benin on December 7 have once again highlighted the fragile nature of democracy in West Africa. The army’s presence, which swings like the “sword of Damocles” over politics, has been further established. For now, the Cotonou administration appears to have averted disaster. However, this turn of events does not mean that the problem has been resolved at its root. As long as the threats of regional terrorism and economic stagnation continue, the military’s desire to influence politics will not completely disappear.
Benin’s fate will be shaped by the lessons Talon draws from this crisis. Either the social contract will be renegotiated through an inclusive reform process, or the instruments of repression will be strengthened to consolidate power. Current circumstances suggest the latter option is more likely. Earned through Nigeria’s patronage and the loyalty of the army’s command structure, this victory offers Benin’s democracy a chance to breathe. However, it will take time for the storm clouds gathering over Cotonou’s streets, driven by harsh winds from the Sahel, to clear. To maintain sovereignty during this turbulent period, the state will lean more heavily on hard power. History has repeatedly recorded that every suppressed uprising is as much a victory for those in power as it is a painful reminder of unaddressed problems for those being governed.
[i] “Bénin : la tentative de coup d’Etat a été mise en « échec », affirme le ministre de l’intérieur”, Le Monde, 7 Aralık 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/12/07/benin-des-militaires-annoncent-a-la-television-publique-demettre-de-ses-fonctions-le-president-patrice-talon_6656341_3212.html, (Access Date: 09.12.2025).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] “Tentative de coup d’État au Bénin : ce que l’on sait du rôle de la France”, Jeune Afrique, 8 Aralık 2025, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1747593/politique/tentative-de-coup-detat-au-benin-ce-que-lon-sait-du-role-de-la-france/, (Access Date: 09.12.2025).
