The prolongation of the Russia–Ukraine War and the increasingly visible damaging effects of this conflict on Europe’s security order have brought the possibility of war back to the center of the agenda on the continent. After the end of the Cold War, Europe acted with the assumption that war was a historical exception and that large-scale military conflicts within the continent were no longer possible. However, recent statements by European leaders show that this assumption is weakening and is being replaced by uncertainty, insecurity, and a clear fear of war. Especially the references to the year 2026 stand out as a critical turning point in Europe’s security perception. This year is seen as a high-risk period because Russia may reach the full potential of its military-industrial capacity, European countries may increase their defense preparations, and elections in the United States and major European countries may have direct effects on regional and global stability. Therefore, 2026 stands out as a year in which the possibility of war is no longer only a theoretical idea but has become a concrete risk that leaders seriously consider in their strategic planning.
In this context, the statement by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán[i] that “this year may be the last period of peace for Europe” not only points to a threat coming from Russia, but also shows that Europe’s mental comfort zone about the post-peace period has been seriously shaken. Orbán’s discourse implies that the liberal assumption that European integration automatically produces peace is no longer valid. From this perspective, war is no longer seen as an excluded possibility for Europe, but as a concrete risk that must be taken into account in political planning. Orbán’s statement that “we are moving toward war” does not give the impression that Europe is being passively dragged into this situation, but rather strengthens the perception that current political choices and strategic weaknesses, such as insufficient armament, limited deterrence capacity, or the lack of full activation of collective security mechanisms, are pushing Europe toward a potential conflict environment.
In this framework, French President Emmanuel Macron’s description of the Russia–Ukraine War as a process that turns into a global conflict shows that the security risk in Europe has gained not only a regional but also a systemic dimension. According to Macron, this war has forced states to rearm rapidly and has brought military capacity back to the center of international politics. When evaluated within the context of the security dilemma, it is understood that the military steps taken by Europe to prevent war are perceived as a threat by the other side, creating a cycle that increases the possibility of war. Macron’s definition of Russia as an open threat to Europe shows that the continent no longer sees Russia as an actor to cooperate with, but as a revisionist power targeting the European order. This perception also accelerates the European Union’s search for strategic autonomy and places a more active military and diplomatic deterrence approach at the center of its defense policies.
This perspective is complemented by the statements of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. In a speech he gave in Berlin on 11 December 2025, Rutte emphasized Europe’s perception of threat and stated that a possible Russian attack on Europe could be “on the scale of the wars experienced by our ancestors and elders[ii]”. Rutte stated, “The conflict is at our door. Russia has brought war back to Europe. And we must be prepared for this,” and emphasized that the threat is no longer only around Europe, but has reached a level that directly affects the continent’s internal security. He also underlined that many NATO allies do not fully feel the urgency of the Russian threat and that defense spending and production capacity must be increased rapidly. These statements present the break in Europe’s security architecture within a historical context and show that NATO is moving away from the crisis management and limited intervention approach it adopted over the last thirty years. The expression “the risk has come to our door” shows that deterrence is no longer a theoretical concept but has become an existential necessity, while the largest military build-up on NATO’s Eastern Flank since the Cold War constitutes a concrete sign of this change in mindset. In this way, Rutte’s statements clearly reveal both the conceptual and physical reflections of the transformation in Europe’s security perception.
Statements coming from Germany reveal another dimension in which the fear of war in Europe is expressed most clearly. Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated, “If Ukraine falls, Putin will not stop; Russia has started a war not only against Ukraine but also against Europe, and its aim is to fundamentally change the borders in Europe,[iii]” clearly expressing the scope and seriousness of the threat. These statements show that Russia is positioned not only as an actor aiming to control Ukraine, but also as a revisionist power seeking to fundamentally change the European order. In addition, the fact that a country like Germany, which has historically taken a cautious approach to the use of military force, is making significant increases in its defense budget and policy changes within the framework of the Zeitenwende (era change) doctrine clearly reveals the depth of the mental transformation in Europe and European security.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s warning that the year 2026 will be even worse, and her expression of this warning in language that appeals to everyday life, show that the fear of war is no longer limited only to military and political elites but has also spread to the social level. Such discourse reveals that European societies are psychologically beginning to prepare for a long period of crisis and uncertainty. The entry of war into everyday language strengthens the perception that the belief in peace as a permanent norm in Europe is weakening and that conflict may become normal again. This psychological environment also creates a basis for discourse that strengthens the search for strategic autonomy and identity within Europe. Meloni’s earlier statement, “We are not anyone’s servants. Freedom may be costly, but it is better than being a puppet of the United States[iv]” can be evaluated exactly in this context. This expression should be read not only as a foreign policy stance but also as an emphasis on “existential freedom” triggered by security fears. This approach reflects both solidarity against the Russian threat and the need to protect an independent will and dignity in transatlantic relations.
The fear of war spreading in Europe is therefore a more complex phenomenon than a simple call to “unite against an external threat”; it also includes Europe’s desire to build its own defense, take its fate into its own hands, and avoid being trapped between global actors. This development can deeply affect public attitudes on issues such as social resilience, support for defense spending, and participation in military service, and it also plays a decisive role in debates about the future direction of the European project and the continent’s security policies.
When the rhetoric of European leaders is considered as a whole, it is seen that the fear of war in Europe regarding the year 2026 is not based on a single cause, but is instead the product of a multi-layered and interconnected security crisis. The continuation of the Russia–Ukraine War, NATO’s strategic transformation, Europe’s military capacity shortcomings, uncertainties in transatlantic relations such as U.S. President Trump’s unpredictable policies, and the reflections of global power competition on Europe stand out as the main factors feeding this fear. The harsh and warning language used by leaders aims not so much to declare the inevitability of war, but to produce deterrence, increase public awareness, raise defense budgets, and legitimize social mobilization and defense policies.
It is not academically possible to say in advance whether 2026 will definitely be a year of war. However, current indicators show that Europe no longer sees peace as an automatic or default condition and considers large-scale conflict as a realistic scenario. In this framework, increasing political, military, and social preparations across the continent shows that Europe is moving out of the security comfort zone it built after World War II and is entering a new, high-risk geopolitical period. The idea of the possibility of war is no longer only a theoretical risk, but also functions as a strategic force that shapes political decision-making processes, defense planning, and social psychology. For this reason, even if 2026 is not a definite year of war, it is clear that it marks a turning point in Europe’s security and crisis perception and that serious preparations are being made against the possibility of conflict.
[i] “Macaristan Harsh warning to the EU from Hungarian Prime Minister Orban: “All of Europe could be at war in 2026”, CNBC, 25 December 2025, https://www.cnbce.com/haberler/macaristan-basbakani-orbandan-abye-sert-uyari-2026da-tum-avrupa-savasin-icinde-olabilir -h21855, (Date of Access: 28.12.2025).
[ii] “NATO chief Mark Rutte urges allies to step up defence efforts to prevent a war waged by Russia,”, Reuters, BERLIN, 11 Aralık 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/natos-rutte-warns-allies-they-are-russias-next-target-2025-12-11/, (Date of Access: 29.12.2025).
[iii] “German Chancellor Merz warned: Pax Americana has ended”, Deutsche Welle, 14 Aralık 2025, https://www.dw.com/tr/almanya-ba%C5%9Fbakan%C4%B1-merz-uyard%C4%B1-pax-americana-bitmi%C5%9Ftir/a-75150031, (Date of Access: 29.12.2025).
[iv] @tercumanmedya, “Italian Prime Minister Meloni: We are nobody’s servants; freedom has a price.”, X, https://x.com/tercumanmedya/status/2004860151711314228?s=20, (Date of Access: 29.12.2025).
