In the increasingly intense competitive environment of global politics, new Asia-centered power balances are coming to the fore, and relations among Russia, China, and India have become one of the most critical elements of this transformation. The sanctions imposed by the West through the Ukraine War, the United States’ (US) intensification of trade wars, and the European Union’s (EU) limited influence over the Global South have accelerated the search for alternative alliances in Eurasia. In this context, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit, held on 1 September 2025 in Tianjin, China, not only underscored regional security cooperation but also revealed a new geopolitical picture shaped by India’s policy of neutrality, China’s global vision, and Russia’s strategy to overcome Western isolation.
The SCO Summit held on 1 September 2025 in Tianjin, China, offered indications of new ruptures and restructurings in global power balances beyond the agenda of regional security and cooperation. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China after a seven-year hiatus was interpreted as a symbolic step toward re-establishing trust following the 2020 border clashes. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s emphasis that “China and India should be partners, not rivals,” together with Modi’s reference to an “atmosphere of peace and stability,” demonstrated the efforts of both countries to shift from rivalry toward cooperation.[1] This development emerged at a time when the United States was imposing heavy tariffs on Indian goods and Russia was under sanction pressure due to the Ukraine War, thus indicating the formation of a new axis of rapprochement centered on Asia.
These developments constitute a critical challenge for the West. The statement made by the European Commission on 1 September 2025 regarding China and India pointed out that the strategic contacts these two countries established with Russia were directly determinative in the course of the Ukraine War. Brussels evaluated these relations not merely in the context of trade and diplomacy but at a scale capable of influencing the trajectory of the conflict. However, the energy and security interests of India and China suggest that they will only give limited responses to EU demands.[2] From this perspective, it can be argued that Europe now perceives more clearly the limits it faces in the Global South within the framework of its strategy to isolate Russia.
During the summit, the cordial images of Modi with Putin symbolically reflected the deepening trust-based ties along the Moscow–New Delhi axis. Putin’s address of “My dear friend” and Modi’s remark that “India and Russia stand shoulder to shoulder even in the most difficult times” drew particular attention.[3] These statements emphasized the continuity of the special strategic partnership between the two countries. Modi’s meeting with Zelensky on the same day, where he stressed the importance of a peaceful resolution, revealed India’s determination to continue its balancing policy.
In fact, this balancing policy enhances New Delhi’s maneuvering capacity in a global environment of increasing polarization. US President Donald Trump’s targeting of India with high tariffs can be interpreted as a strategy of exerting indirect pressure through India rather than confronting China directly. Ironically, this situation brings India and China closer together, while also raising the possibility that Russia might be sidelined in the process.[4]
At the Tianjin summit, the cooperation strategy extending to 2035, accepted by India, China, and Russia under the discourse of a “coalition of the strong,” together with the establishment of the SCO Development Bank, demonstrates that economic integration will deepen. While the aim is to develop alternative mechanisms in the fields of energy, technology, and infrastructure, it was also decided to increase joint exercises in the fight against terrorism. The exclusion of the Ukraine issue from the final documents indicates the organization’s will to remain neutral.[5]
Prior to the summit, the suspension of Russian oil purchases by Indian state refineries due to the 100 percent tariffs threatened by Trump showed that New Delhi was seeking a pragmatic balance between economic interests and geopolitical considerations.[6] Although India incurred short-term losses, this step was part of its long-term strategy to avoid sanctions. At this point, India’s flexible diplomatic approach makes it a unique actor capable of maintaining relations simultaneously with both the West and the Eurasian bloc.
Putin’s extensive visit to China from 1 to 4 September 2025 was a concrete demonstration of Moscow’s strategy to break Western isolation and lean toward an Asian axis. The joint message of “we are three friends” delivered by Xi Jinping, Modi, and Putin during the visit received wide coverage in world media, while the Chinese press emphasized that relations had reached “the most mature and strategic stage in history.”[7] For Russia, the aim here was to demonstrate that it is not alone against the West, while for China it was to reinforce its claim to global leadership.
The revival of the trilateral partnership is considered an updated version of the “Russia-India-China (RIC) Triangle,” first proposed in the 1990s by then-Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. Following the 2024 Kazan BRICS Summit, the normalization process between India and China paved the way for this triangle. Trade conducted in national currencies aims to reduce dependence on the dollar and eliminate sanction risks.[8] However, the fact that RIC is framed within a flexible structure without rigid commitments shows an awareness of the fragility created by the divergent orientations of the parties.
In this context, Russia’s shift of fertilizer exports toward Asia and South America is an indication of its search for new markets in the face of weakening ties with the EU.[9] China’s increasing share in the European market and India’s turn to Russian fertilizers demonstrate that this ground for economic cooperation will strengthen. The European policy of pressuring Russia through sanctions, in turn, is shifting global trade flows toward the Asian axis and accelerating the establishment of a Eurasia-centered alternative order.[10]
International media characterizations of Putin’s visit as a “double-barreled shotgun” summarize Russia’s foreign policy strategy of both responding to current crises and constructing a long-term ideological partnership through historical memory. The first barrel represents the effort to strengthen the multipolar order through the SCO; the second barrel reinforces the symbolic partnership of China and Russia through historical victory commemorations.[11] This dual-layered approach creates breathing space for Russia while simultaneously enhancing China’s global role.
Thus, at this stage, the SCO Summit has not only been a diplomatic gathering but also a turning point that has shaped the new parameters of an Asia-centered balance of power. The revival of the RIC Triangle represents a search for balance against the pressure policies of the EU and the United States, while India’s policy of neutrality and China’s global vision are the primary factors that will determine the future of this partnership. The development of unilateral pressure strategies by Europe and the United States without taking this new reality into account may further intensify geopolitical rivalry.
One of the most probable developments in the coming period will be India’s continuation of oil purchases from Russia not by halting them completely but through indirect channels. The suspension of purchases by state refineries due to the harsh tariffs announced by Trump was a short-term pressure measure; however, from the perspective of India’s energy security, it seems unlikely that New Delhi would completely abandon cheap Russian oil. Therefore, the activation of “shadow trade” routes through private companies suggests that India will seek to balance Washington’s economic pressures while preserving its energy supply security. This situation will allow India, in line with its neutrality, to appear aligned with the West while also sustaining its strategic interests with Russia.
Another likely scenario is the rapid implementation of the “2035 Cooperation Vision” announced at the SCO Summit through concrete projects. In particular, the establishment of the SCO Development Bank and the expansion of trade in national currencies will reduce dependence on the dollar and give economic depth to trilateral cooperation. China’s increasing share in the European fertilizer market, Russia’s redirection of its exports toward Asia, and India’s emergence as both a key consumer and an active participant in this trade network will collectively bring the RIC Triangle into prominence. In this way, the RIC would not only constitute a symbolic strategic partnership but could also evolve into a de facto economic bloc in energy, agriculture, and finance against Western sanction policies.
In conclusion, the SCO Summit held on 1 September 2025 in Tianjin revealed a geopolitical picture in which India continues its search for balance through neutrality, China demonstrates a will to transform regional rivalry into cooperation, and Russia turns toward the Asian axis to circumvent Western sanctions. The reemergence of the RIC Triangle has taken shape not only as a symbolic rapprochement but also as an initiative to build an alternative order in energy, trade, and finance in the face of Western pressures; this outcome has shown that the unilateral strategies of the European Union and the United States have generated only limited impact in the Global South. In this framework, the SCO Summit will be remembered as a milestone marking the crystallization of new Asia-centered power balances.
[1] Laura Bicker ve Stephen McDonell, “China and India pledge to be ‘partners not rivals’”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyrwv0egzro, (Access Date: 01.09.2025).
[2] “Yevrokomissiya Prizyvayet Kitay i Indiyu ne Podderzhivat’ Rossiyu”, TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24925139, (Access Date: 01.09.2025).
[3] “Modi Says Russia and India stand Together Even in Difficult Times”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/modi-says-russia-india-stand-together-even-difficult-times-2025-09-01/, (Access Date: 01.09.2025).
[4] Saahil Menon, “Russia Risks Being Left Out of Tightening India-China Relations”, The Moscow Times, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/08/28/russia-risks-being-left-out-of-tightening-india-china-relations-a90372, (Access Date: 01.09.2025).
[5] “Rossiya, Indiya i Kitay Formiruyut ‘Soyuz Silnykh’”, Vıbor Naroda, http://vybor-naroda.org/vn_exclusive/291002-rossija-indija-i-kitaj-formirujut-sojuz-silnyh.html, (Access Date: 01.09.2025).
[6] Aleksandr Kovalyev, “Indiya Yakoby Priostanovila Zakupki Rossiyskoy Nefti Posle Ugroz Trampa. No Vryad li Nadolgo”, Moskovskiye Novosti, https://www.mn.ru/smart/indiya-yakoby-priostanovila-zakupki-rossijskoj-nefti-posle-ugroz-trampa-no-vryad-li-nadolgo, (Access Date: 01.09.2025).
[7] “Pokazali ‘Kulak’: Zachem na Samom Dele Putin Priletel v Kitay”, RTVI, https://rtvi.com/stories/pokazali-kulak-zachem-na-samom-dele-putin-priletel-v-kitaj/, (Access Date: 01.09.2025).
[8] “Rossiya, Indiya i Kitay Formiruyut Soyuz Dlya Protivodeystviya Sanktsiyam Trampa”, Radio1, https://radio1.ru/news/politika/rossiya-indiya-i-kitai-formiruyut-soyuz-dlya-protivodeistviya-sanktsiyam-trampa/, (Access Date: 01.09.2025).
[9] “RF Uvelichit Postavki Udobreniy v Indiyu i Kitay do Rekordnykh Pokazateley”, Rambler, https://news.rambler.ua/economics/55228518-rf-uvelichit-postavki-udobreniy-v-indiyu-i-kitay-do-rekordnyh-pokazateley, (Access Date: 01.09.2025).
[10] Georgios Georgiou, “Europe, China and Russia Redraw Fertiliser Trade Map, Boosting Small Bulkers”, Riviera, https://www.rivieramm.com/news-content-hub/europe-china-and-russia-redraw-fertiliser-trade-map-boosting-small-bulkers-85955, (Access Date: 01.09.2025).
[11] “Yuriy Tavrovskiy: ‘Vizit Prezidenta Rossii v Kitay – eto ‘Putinskaya Dvustvolka’”, Valyuta v Nalichii, https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/681687, (Access Date: 01.09.2025).
