The recent developments in the South Caucasus are indicative of a profound transformation not only in Azerbaijan-Armenia relations but also in the regional balance of power. This geography, which has been shaped for many years under Russia’s absolute influence, is now turning towards a diplomatic approach in which regional actors develop their own initiatives and maintain a distance from external mediators. The most recent and symbolic example of this trend is the Aliyev-Pashinyan meeting held in Abu Dhabi at the beginning of 2025, where no third party was involved. Beyond addressing technical issues such as border delimitation and transportation lines, the very format of the meeting itself marked a turning point where the notion of a “South Caucasus without Russia” became concrete.[1]
At this meeting, the parties instructed their border delimitation commissions to work on a technical level and defined bilateral negotiations as the most efficient resolution format, indicating that practical interests have taken precedence over historical disputes. However, despite the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcing on March 3, 2025, that a draft peace treaty had been prepared, its non-disclosure to the public and the opposition’s accusations against Pashinyan of “capitulation” reveal the internal fragility of the peace process.[2] This political resistance in Armenia is not merely a matter of foreign policy debate but also a reflection of the tension between the country’s westward orientation and its dependence on Russia.
From Russia’s perspective, the significance of these developments lies not only in the distancing of the parties from itself but also in the dysfunction of traditional control mechanisms in the region. In his statement on July 10, 2025, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov emphasized that the peace treaty to be signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan would bring stability and that Moscow supports this process; however, this is in fact an expression of the fear of exclusion and an attempt to regain diplomatic standing.[3] Russia is no longer an active player in the South Caucasus but has regressed to the position of an external observer attempting to integrate into the process retrospectively.
This process of regression is manifesting not only at the diplomatic level but also on the military front. As announced by the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Service on July 5, 2025, the deployment of new personnel by Russia to the Gyumri Base is interpreted as a strategic initiative by Moscow to reestablish its influence in the South Caucasus.[4] However, these claims were swiftly denied by Armenia, which declared that its territory would not be used against its neighbors.[5] This statement emerges as another indication that Yerevan is distancing itself from Moscow and redirecting its defense cooperation towards new partners such as India.[6] This demonstrates that Armenia is in search of a fundamental axis shift in its security architecture.
In contrast, Azerbaijan is redefining its relations with Russia in a more direct and assertive manner. The death of two Azerbaijani citizens in detention in Yekaterinburg prompted a direct reaction from Baku against Russia; the Sputnik office was raided, its employees were detained publicly, and document checks on Russian citizens were intensified. Following the downing of an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft by Russia in 2024 and Putin’s compelled apology, it has become evident that Azerbaijan has evolved from being a passive to a defiant actor in diplomatic terms.[7] In this new era, the Azerbaijani government emphasizes independence to its domestic audience while projecting an image to the outside world of a flexible and pragmatic actor aligned with regionalism, positioned as a strategic transit corridor along the East-West axis, and open to integration with the West.
In this context, the involvement of the opposition in Azerbaijan, calling for the annulment of the Russia-Azerbaijan alliance declaration dated February 22, 2022, and for integration with the European Union, represents not only a foreign policy preference but also a signal of a shift in the regime’s vision. As Ali Kerimli has pointed out, the peoples of Armenia and Azerbaijan now reject being pitted against each other by Moscow for centuries and prioritize the pursuit of solutions beyond Russia for a peaceful future.[8]
In an effort to prevent this rupture, Russia has brought larger-scale regional initiatives back onto the agenda. In a statement made in Pyatigorsk by Dmitry Masyuk, Deputy Director of the Fourth Department for CIS Countries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was emphasized that the South Caucasus should not become a conflict zone and that cooperation with the countries in the region based on “spiritual values” should be maintained.[i] Masyuk’s remarks indicate that Russia is attempting to evolve from its former so-called “big brother” role towards a softer, ostensibly egalitarian diplomatic discourse. However, it is clear that this transition does not correspond to the realities on the ground.
Within this scope, the “3+3” format brought to the agenda reflects Russia’s desire to preserve its control over the South Caucasus through a multilateral mechanism. This format, proposed by Azerbaijan and Türkiye at the end of 2020, has thus far resulted in meetings in Moscow, Tehran, and Istanbul with the participation of Russia, Iran, and Armenia. However, Georgia remains distant from this process, although Moscow appears to be signaling an “open door” policy towards the ruling Georgian Dream Party (GDP) government in this context.[ii] While this format theoretically holds the potential to enhance intra-regional coordination, in practice, it produces limited impact due to the reservations of countries like Georgia, which maintain balanced relations between East and West, prioritize their national interests, and have had significant portions of their territories under occupation since the 1990s, and particularly since 2008. In Georgia’s case specifically, the historical memory of anti-Russian sentiment reinforces[iii] the societal basis of its distant stance towards this format.
In light of all these developments, Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” project stands out as a new transportation and diplomatic initiative developed in response to Russia’s strategic pressures over the Zangezur Corridor. This project is not only an alternative transportation plan but also a geopolitical counter-move aimed at eliminating Russian influence. The involvement of the United States through private security companies and Türkiye’s role as a regional security guarantor demonstrate that the South Caucasus is once again being repositioned within the context of international power competition.
Azerbaijan’s recently pursued multi-dimensional and controlled foreign policy has positioned it relatively more advantageously within the Russia–Armenia–Azerbaijan triangle. The consolidation of its military and administrative control over Karabakh has enabled Baku to become the actor determining the balance of power on the ground; this has been reflected in diplomatic negotiations, allowing the Azerbaijani government to adopt a more assertive and directive stance. In contrast, Armenia’s experience of strategic uncertainty following the developments after 2020 has increased both its internal political fragility and external dependency. Despite the Pashinyan government’s pursuit of peace, its failure to convince domestic public opinion has led to a protracted process, while in Azerbaijan, a perception of leadership managing the process and taking initiative has emerged. Moreover, Baku’s increasingly confrontational rhetoric towards Moscow and its orientation towards alternative security and political partnerships have become concrete indicators of a search for a new balance of power that challenges Russia’s absolute dominance in the South Caucasus.
Despite this advantageous outlook, the main potential risk area for Azerbaijan in the upcoming period lies in the necessity of managing relations with Russia without a complete rupture. Although Baku has openly challenged Moscow through media operations and public opinion campaigns, the economic, security, and regional energy dynamics between the two countries continue to produce mutual interdependence. On the Armenian side, there is an effort to reduce dependency on Russia by turning to new actors such as India; however, this reorientation has not yet created a sustainable and institutionalized foreign policy axis. Under these conditions, Azerbaijan’s ability to maintain its position based on military success and diplomatic autonomy depends on its capacity to simultaneously continue direct negotiations with Armenia while preserving a cautious distance with Russia. Otherwise, the possible resurgence of coercive moves in the region could strain fragile balances and jeopardize the sustainability of current gains.
In this context, Armenia’s distancing from Russian-led military alliances and the establishment of defense relations with alternative actors such as India, along with Azerbaijan’s pursuit of parallel dialogues with regional actors –particularly Türkiye– through multi-faceted diplomacy, indicate the possibility of a new peace architecture in the South Caucasus. The durability of this new equation, however, depends on the ability of the parties to define and sustain their interests not through a zero-sum logic but through an understanding based on mutual benefit. This quest for peace excluding Russia represents not merely a foreign policy preference for both countries but also the most tangible test of their claim to be independent states.
[1] “V Abu-Dabi Nachalis Peregovory Pashinyana i Aliyeva”, Nasha Niva, https://nashaniva.com/ru/372087, (Access Date: 11.07.2025).
[2] “Pashinyan i Aliyev Prinyali Sovmestnoye Zayavleniye po Itogam Dvustoronnikh Peregovorov”, TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24482357, (Access Date: 11.07.2025).
[3] “Peskov: Mir Mezhdu Armeniyey i Azerbaydzhanom Privneset na Kavkaz Predskazuyemost’”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/24480913, (Access Date: 11.07.2025).
[4] Holovne Upravlinnya Rozvidky MO Ukrayiny, “Moskva Rozshyryuye Viyskovu Prysutnist u Virmeniyi na Tli Zahostrennya Vidnosyn iz Azerbaydzhanom”, Telegram, https://t.me/DIUkraine/6372, (Access Date: 11.07.2025).
[5] Kateryna Hodunova, “Yerevan denies Ukraine’s report on Russia increasing military footprint in Armenia”, The Kyiv Independent, https://kyivindependent.com/armenia-denies-ukraines-intelligence-reports-on-russias-operations-at-military-base-on-its-soil-06-2025/, (Access Date: 11.07.2025).
[6] “Armenia Turns to India for Arms Amid Growing Rift With Russia”, United24 Media, https://united24media.com/latest-news/armenia-turns-to-india-for-arms-amid-growing-rift-with-russia-8374, (Access Date: 11.07.2025).
[7] Bashir Kitchaev, “Why Is Azerbaijan Ramping Up Tensions With Russia?”, Carnegie Politika, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/07/azerbaijan-russia-arguments?lang=en, (Access Date: 11.07.2025).
[8] Anton Filippov, “Why the South Caucasus Became Russia’s New Target and What Could Stop It”, European Pravda, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2025/07/8/7215448/, (Access Date: 11.07.2025).
[i] “MID: RF Vazhno ne Dopustit Prevrashcheniya Yuzhnogo Kavkaza v Arenu Protivostoyaniya”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/24400623, (Access Date: 11.07.2025).
[ii] “Rossiya Schitayet Format ‘3+3’ Odnim iz Opornykh Elementov Yevraziyskoy Bezopasnosti”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/24400293, (Access Date: 11.07.2025).
[iii] In the context of Georgia’s societal dynamics, the tendency toward “Russophobia” or “anti-Russian sentiment” is a defining factor.
