The Taliban Disturbance in Russia Caused by the Oslo Meetings
The Taliban delegation conducted various negotiations with the representatives of the United States (USA), the European Union (EU) and in Oslo, the capital of Norway, on January 23-25, 2022.[1] This development, however, caused disturbance in the Kremlin, whose demand is to hold the initiative in the Afghan Question. The reason is that Russia keeps abreast of all the latest developments in Afghanistan and believes that the Western influence in the aforementioned country should be restricted.
According to Russian decision makers, Afghanistan’s implementation of pro-West, in particular pro-USA, policies means limiting Russian penetration in the Eurasian geography, which is considered the heartland of the world. At the same time, it may become possible for the Western influence in the region to spread to Central Asia, which is a post-Soviet space, through Afghanistan. Yet, this does not coincide with the policies implemented by Russia within the framework of the Primakov Doctrine, which is also referred to as the “Near Abroad Doctrine” because within the framework of the doctrine in question, the Moscow administration is in favor of maintaining Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet space. For this reason, the Kremlin considers Afghanistan as an “Extension of Its Near Circle”.
Moreover, Russia is concerned that the instability that will occur by the power gap in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the USA will affect Central Asia and Russian Muslims. In other words, if the Kremlin does not carry out a pro-active policy in the face of the Afghan Question, it is worried that proxy wars will be carried to Russian territory. In this context, Russia’s approach focuses on attracting the Taliban to the ground of cooperation by including the country in the projects, rather than radicalizing the Taliban by isolating Afghanistan from society. In the meantime, Russia also endeavors to increase its influence in Central Asia by using the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) due to regional risks and threats. In this sense, it can be argued that Russia, which increased the number of military personnel in Tajikistan and conducted exercises with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, tries to turn the current crisis into an opportunity.
At the same time, this crisis opportunism enables Moscow to keep its hand strong in its negotiations with the Taliban. The Kremlin gives the message that, if necessary, it can marginalize the Taliban within the framework of its security policy in Central Asia; but with its actions, it reveals that its priority is to draw the Taliban to the ground of international cooperation.
As it is known, Moscow, which was the first capital to declare that its diplomatic personnel in Afghanistan would continue their activities after the Taliban’s capture of Kabul, also developed a de facto cooperation with the Taliban through the conferences it held in the process. In this framework, Russian President Vladimir Putin has also announced that he is preparing to remove the Taliban from his country’s list of terrorist organizations.[2] However, there is no state that officially recognizes the Taliban Government, which was established on October 7, 2021. In this regard, it is seen that the international community demands to be established a government that will include all identity groups in Afghanistan.
This demand brings mediation diplomacy to the agenda. Undoubtedly, the main country that comes to the fore in the context of mediation diplomacy is Iran, which managed to get the leader of the Panshir Movement Ahmad Massoud and the Shiite warlord Ismail Khan to meet with the Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaki in Tehran. However, this meeting also became the indicator of the fact that Moscow and Tehran are in competition to hold the initiative in the Afghan Question. As a matter of fact, while Iran’s mediation was being discussed, the Spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, stated on January 13, 2022, that Moscow could host meetings between the Taliban and the opposition.[3] It was claimed that after these words, Deputy Prime Minister of the Taliban administration Mullah Abdul Gani Brother and Defense Minister Mullah Yaqub went to Moscow.[4]
Although this situation shows the division and rivalry in Afghanistan-centered developments in Moscow-Tehran relations, the event that really disturbed the Kremlin was the Oslo Meetings. Although no official recognition decision appeared from these meetings, the impression that Afghanistan’s reserves blocked by the USA would be released, and the idea that the international community would develop a de facto way of working with the Taliban in terms of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan emerged. This indicates that the Taliban is perceived by the West as a de facto workable actor even though it is not officially recognized.
The situation in question brought up the possibility of Russia’s being out of action in the Afghan Question; thus, worried Moscow. In this context, Russian Ambassador to Dushanbe Igor Lyakin-Frolov stated that some militants in various terrorist organizations operating in northern Afghanistan pose a threat to Tajikistan. Lyakin-Frolov used the following expressions in his statement:[5]
“There is a threat. According to some data, around 6,000 militants from various terrorist organizations operate in the northern regions of Afghanistan. Jamaat Ansarullah and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are among these organizations.”
Lyakin-Frolov’s statements aim to create the appropriate basis for the CSTO to increase its effectiveness by expressing the concerns of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Jamaat Ansarullah is recognized as a terrorist organization by Tajikistan. Jamaat Ansarullah, known to be loyal to the Taliban, was also assigned by the Taliban to the Tajikistan border to guard the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border, which worries the Dushanbe administration. As a matter of fact, Tajikistan has previously held exercises with the CSTO in the region due to the aforementioned concern. Now, it is known that Tajikistan Army is carrying out exercises in Dashti Castle region. The Moscow administration, on the other hand, has the opportunity to both increase the number of soldiers in Tajikistan and expand its military influence in the country through the CSTO by keeping the aforementioned concerns alive.
It is noteworthy that the Russian Ambassador also included the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in his statements. In this context, Moscow wants to raise the concerns of Uzbekistan and seeks ways to make the aforementioned country dependent on itself in the context of military security. In this sense, Russia may be aiming for Tashkent to return to the CSTO by bringing Uzbekistan’s concerns to the agenda from a security perspective. In this regard, it is remembered that the Kremlin made calls to Uzbek decision makers; however, Tashkent, which took care to implement a multi-vector foreign policy, did not return to the organization.
Similarly, Russia’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, in his statement dated on February 1, 2022, claimed that the Taliban may face a comprehensive resistance in the spring of 2022.[6] Undoubtedly, this claim can be interpreted as a warning from Russia to the Taliban. The Moscow administration is giving the message to the Taliban that it can support opposition organizations if it is positioned as the West’s partner in the region.
As a result, the negotiations carried out by the Taliban in Norway worried Russia, which wanted to hold the initiative in the Afghan Question. For this reason, Moscow felt the need to give a message to the Taliban. The message in question is “If you get out of my control, you will be the other of my securitization policy in the region.”.
[1] “Afghanistan: How the Taliban Stand to Benefit from Norway Talks”, Deutche Welle, https://www.dw.com/en/afghanistan-how-the-taliban-stand-to-benefit-from-norway-talks/a-60548374, (Date of Accession: 03.02.2022).
[2] “Putin Says Russia Mulling Removing Taliban from Terrorist List”, RFERL, https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-taliban-terror-list/31523297.html, (Date of Accession: 03.02.2022).
[3] “روسیه: آماده میزبانی از مذاکرات طالبان با مخالفان آن هستیم”, Ufuq News, https://ufuqnews.com/archives/195026, (Date of Accession: 17.01.2022).
[4] “Reports Uncertain About Mullah Baradar’s Trip to Moscow”, Tolo News, https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-176443, (Date of Accession: 03.02.2022).
[5] “Threat to Tajikistan from Militants in Northern Afghanistan Still in Place-Diplomat”, TASS, https://tass.com/world/1394779, (Date of Accession: 03.02.2022).
[6] “کابلوف: احتمال دارد طالبان در بهار سال آینده با مقاومت گستردهای مواجه شوند”, Etilaatroz, https://www.etilaatroz.com/135766/kabulov-says-taliban-are-likely-to-face-widespread-resistance-next-spring/, (Date of Accession: 03.02.2022).
