Analysis

The USA Policy on Venezuela and the Pursuit of Regional Legitimacy

Trump wants to creat a pro-US bloc in Latin America.
The military call is not an actual preparation but a diplomatic show of power.
Trump’s move has created a new political polarization around Venezuela.

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The President of the United States (USA), Donald Trump, called on three countries in Latin America (Argentina, Ecuador, and El Salvador) to join the military deployment in the Caribbean.[i] It is stated that this call, apparently not military, actually carries the nature of a political message. It shows that the Washington administration has once again accelerated its efforts to increase pressure on Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and wants to give this process a basis of regional legitimacy. It is evaluated that such requests of the USA are usually made to create an image of “regional solidarity” and do not mean an actual preparation for war.

At the core of Trump’s request lies the goal of creating a “pro-U.S.” bloc in Latin America. This strategy is designed both to limit the influence of external actors such as China and Russia in the region and to isolate the Maduro administration. However, this time, instead of a military intervention, the element of a “political show” and psychological pressure has come to the forefront. The U.S. administration wants to create visible deterrence against the Maduro regime by expanding the presence of its naval forces off the coast of Venezuela. This has been evaluated not as a preparation for war in the classical sense but rather as a diplomatic show of power. What is important for Washington is that a few countries from Latin America support this plan, even symbolically; because in that case, the move can be presented to the international public not as a unilateral act but as a multilateral initiative.

From Argentina’s point of view, the situation has become especially complicated. The country’s economic crisis has seriously limited its defense budget. The Buenos Aires administration has clearly stated that its own navy does not have the capacity to actually take part in such a deployment.[ii] Military sources stated that possible participation could be at a symbolic level, like the role in the 1991 Gulf War, meaning that it would be limited to a form of support called “symbolic participation.” Moreover, according to the Argentine Constitution, the approval of the parliament is required to take part in such an external military mission. Although the Javier Milei government seems ideologically close to Trump, the balance in the parliament has shown that such a decision would not pass easily. In addition, despite Milei’s pro-U.S. rhetoric, the nationalist and left-wing opposition inside the country has described the military step against Venezuela as “serving foreign interests.”

Ecuador’s position has followed a more cautious course. The country has been dealing with increasing drug violence and security crises in recent years. Therefore, it has had difficulty maintaining its internal stability. Under these conditions, taking part in a military mission in the Caribbean has been risky both financially and politically. However, the Quito administration, which wants to maintain close relations with the U.S., has found it appropriate to give symbolic support through non-military contributions such as intelligence sharing or logistical support. This has allowed Ecuador both to strengthen its ties with Washington and to avoid the risk of direct conflict. In addition, since Ecuador has a security structure dependent on American aid, it has also been diplomatically difficult to completely reject such a request.

Among the three countries, El Salvador has been the one that could give the clearest support to U.S. policies. President Nayib Bukele has followed a line that has been compatible with Washington since the Trump era and has even been seen as the reflection of Trump’s political agenda in Latin America. Bukele’s security policies, especially the “iron fist” strategy in the fight against organized crime, have shown parallels with Trump’s anti-immigrant and authoritarian-leaning rhetoric. In 2025, the imprisonment of 250 Venezuelan migrants sent to El Salvador by the U.S. in the CECOT prison has been a clear sign of this close coordination between the two countries. In this context, Bukele’s participation in a symbolic mission against Venezuela has been a pragmatic choice both to maintain his political closeness with Trump and to obtain new security funds from the U.S.

This development has meant a clear signal of encirclement for Venezuela. The Maduro administration has long used the U.S. military threats with the discourse of “imperialist intervention” to consolidate the domestic public opinion. Such a situation has opened the door to new diplomatic conflicts in Latin America. Especially, despite Colombia’s harsh stance against Maduro, Gustavo Petro’s statement “There is no such thing as the Cartel de los Soles” has shown how differently the leaders in the region have taken positions toward such initiatives.[iii] Russia, China, and Iran, which are Venezuela’s allies, have also closely followed this development and have likely increased their defense support to Caracas.

This military deployment plan has also led to serious debates in terms of international law. A naval operation that is not approved by the United Nations (UN) or the Organization of American States (OAS) has been considered an intervention in sovereignty. Although U.S. interventions in Latin America since the 1980s have generally been legitimized on the grounds of “democracy and human rights,” such initiatives have created long-term negative effects and strengthened anti-American sentiments among the people in the region. Therefore, in constitutional democratic systems like Argentina, such a step has caused strong debates both in domestic law and in public opinion. In addition, Article 2 of the UN Charter clearly prohibits one country from intervening in the internal affairs of another, so this kind of deployment has been evaluated as a step incompatible with international law.

Trump’s request has had the potential to create a new geopolitical bloc in Latin America. The difference between right-wing governments close to the U.S. (Milei, Bukele, Noboa) and left-leaning administrations on a more independent line (Petro, Lula, Boric) has been deepening. This has led to the revival of an ideological division reminiscent of the Cold War period. The appearance of Argentina and Ecuador on the U.S. side has pushed countries like Brazil and Mexico to take a “balancing” position against Maduro. Thus, the region has entered a new period of polarization. In addition, Washington’s use of such coercive diplomatic methods has created an opportunity for China to increase its soft power in Latin America, because Beijing has offered an alternative partner for the regional countries with the emphasis on non-interventionist cooperation.

In conclusion, Trump’s invitation to Argentina, Ecuador, and El Salvador has been a move containing a political messagerather than a military reality. Argentina’s economic constraints, Ecuador’s internal security problems, and El Salvador’s closeness to Trump show that each country has evaluated this plan at different levels for different reasons. However, the common point is that this initiative has been a show of strength aimed at re-establishing U.S. influence in Latin America. While Washington wanted to create a perception of regional legitimacy, this move has caused a crisis of trust and new polarizations among the countries in the region in the long term. Ultimately, this initiative has had the potential to go down in history as a symbolic show of power that deepened the geopolitical fault lines in Latin America rather than solving the Venezuela Crisis.


[i] Ferrer, Elias. “Trump Asked Argentina, Ecuador, and El Salvador to Join Military Deployment Against Venezuela, According to La Política Online”, Guacamaya VE, guacamayave.com/en/trump-asked-argentina-ecuador-and-el-salvador-to-join-military-deployment-against-venezuela-according-to-la-politica-online/, (Access Date: 12.10.2025).

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Ibid.

Ali Caner İNCESU
Ali Caner İNCESU
Ali Caner İncesu graduated from Anadolu University Faculty of Business Administration in 2012. He continued his education with Cappadocia University Tourist Guidance associate degree program and graduated in 2017. In 2022, he successfully completed his master's degrees in International Relations at Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University and in Travel Management and Tourism Guidance at Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University. In 2024, he graduated from the United States University of Maryland Global Campus (UMGC) Political Science undergraduate program. As of 2023, he continues his doctoral studies at Cappadocia University, Department of Political Science and International Relations. In 2022, Mr. İncesu worked as a special advisor at the Embassy of the Republic of Paraguay in Ankara. He is fluent in Spanish and English and is a sworn translator in English and Spanish. His research interests include Latin America, International Law and Tourism.

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