In recent years, the South Caucasus has become one of the arenas of geopolitical rivalry not only for regional actors but also for global powers. This geography, shaped by Russia as a traditional sphere of influence, has been redefined in the context of new quests for balance following the 2020 Karabakh War. Particularly, Armenia’s West–oriented alignment and its tendency to distance itself from regional alliances have created deep fractures in the Moscow–Yerevan axis. However, the strategic vacuum caused by these ruptures has led Russia, as of 2025, to pursue a more flexible, multilateral, and alliance–based foreign policy toward the region. In this context, Lavrov’s visit to Yerevan reflects not only a focus on bilateral relations but also Moscow’s desire to redefine its position in the South Caucasus.
The Western–centered and radical foreign policy orientation adopted by the Armenian government under the leadership of Nikol Pashinyan after the 2020 Karabakh War has led to significant ruptures in the strategic alliance structures built in the post–Soviet period. With public discussions emerging around the possibility of withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), it has become evident that the historical bonds between Moscow and Yerevan have eroded, and Russia has begun to adopt a more neutral and, at times, distant stance toward Armenia. In this context, it can be stated that Russia’s long–established influence in the region –encompassing its post–2008 Russo–Georgian War dominance– has been seriously weakened by Pashinyan’s pro–Western orientation and developments such as the recent Jet Crisis with Azerbaijan.
As of 2025, Russia’s efforts to reconstruct its geopolitical position in the South Caucasus appear to be gaining momentum. One of the most concrete steps in this strategic comeback was the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Yerevan on May 21, 2025. In his meetings with Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan and Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, Lavrov publicly reaffirmed Moscow’s determination to strengthen allied relations with Yerevan and to reestablish guarantees for Armenia’s security.[i]
In the background of these meetings lie the understandings reached between Vladimir Putin and Nikol Pashinyan in the autumn of 2024, and it is understood that Lavrov’s visit served to continue this framework. In this regard, Lavrov emphasized the strategic importance of joint patrols on the Iranian and Turkish borders by referring to the 30–year military base agreement and the 10–year humanitarian cooperation framework. He also noted significant growth in the energy, food, and industrial sectors as of 2024. Furthermore, highlighting the development of cultural cooperation, Lavrov stated that over 700 events had been organized and that the “Days of Armenian Culture” would be held in Russia in the autumn.
On the same day, May 21, 2025, in his meeting with President Khachaturyan, Lavrov once again confirmed that Moscow and Yerevan remain strategic partners and allies. Despite provocative questions posed during the press conference, Lavrov emphasized that both parties remain committed to their obligations and that the continuation of these relations carries an important political message.
Following the visit, the Speaker of the Armenian Parliament, Alen Simonyan, emphasized during a press conference held on May 19, 2025, that there was no ongoing discussion in the country regarding the removal of Russia’s military base, stating, “There is no such topic; Armenia is not currently considering the withdrawal of the Russian military base”,[ii] thereby declaring that such an agenda was excluded.
In Lavrov’s diplomatic engagements, cooperation focused solely on security was not the only priority; the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process also occupied a significant place. In his speech at a conference held in Moscow on May 23, 2025, Lavrov emphasized that a peace agreement is critical not only for regional stability but also for the realization of Armenia’s geoeconomic projects such as the “Crossroads of Peace”. He noted that this process had become possible thanks to trilateral summits and affirmed that Moscow would continue to support the peace process.[iii] He further stated that, should relations with Turkey normalize and transport–economic barriers be removed, the South Caucasus could become a strong actor on Eurasia’s competitive logistics map.
Another noteworthy development in this process was reflected in the public statement made in Yerevan on May 22, 2025. Armenian Minister of Economy Gevorg Papoyan stated that the government had no plan to withdraw from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and that the legislative measures prepared for integration with Europe did not envisage such a withdrawal.[iv] This statement demonstrates that while Armenia has strengthened its relations with the West, it has not officially questioned its EAEU membership and is attempting to follow a balancing policy among economic alliances.
During the meetings held on May 21, 2025, Lavrov also expressed satisfaction with Armenia’s willingness to strengthen its alliance ties, stating that security systems centered on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) had proven unsuccessful. He underscored that multilateral Eurasian structures such as the CSTO, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the EAEU, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) offer a fairer and more sustainable security model. Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan, on the other hand, stated that existing commitments remained in effect but voiced certain justified concerns regarding their consistent implementation.[v]
Another area in which Russia sought to maintain diplomatic balance during this period was the issue of arms deliveries. At a press conference held in Yerevan on May 22, 2025, Lavrov explained that payments for undelivered weapons to Armenia had been redirected to other sectors and that there was no dispute regarding the matter. Due to the war in Ukraine, Russia had prioritized its own defense needs; however, some of the systems pledged to Armenia were still being delivered. Lavrov further stated, “If they want to establish a French base, that is their choice; we will not impose anything”,[vi] indicating that Russia was not opposed to Armenia’s military cooperation with external actors. Nonetheless, he reminded that France is part of the anti–Russia bloc and emphasized that allies should carefully consider their strategic preferences in arms procurement.
Another manifestation of Armenia’s multi–vector foreign policy orientation is the emergence of rumors at the beginning of 2025 regarding a possible withdrawal from the CSTO. Despite warnings from Artur Vanetsyan, leader of the “Homeland” Party, that such a withdrawal could jeopardize national security, and despite Moscow’s denial of these speculations, a report published by Armenia’s Foreign Intelligence Service indicated that an active return to the CSTO in 2025 was considered unlikely.[vii] As this process unfolded, the Armenian Parliament passed a bill initiating the European Union integration process in March 2025, and President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed it into law on April 4, 2025–an institutional signal of a shift in foreign policy direction.
The position of the opposition in response to these developments is also noteworthy. On May 19, 2025, former Armenian President and leader of the opposition “Armenia” bloc, Robert Kocharyan, stated that the country should repair its deteriorating strategic relations with Russia and called for the establishment of a deep strategic partnership with Iran in order to build a new regional balance model among the three countries. Addressing public discourse surrounding the idea of a “Union State”, Kocharyan clarified that such a proposal had never been considered during his tenure, and that he had never aimed to integrate Armenia into the political union of Russia and Belarus.[viii]
The limited structural support Armenia expects from the West, and the anticipation that this support may decline further during Trump’s second term, has prompted the Pashinyan Government to reassess its strategic risks. Within this framework, it is likely that Yerevan will maintain a position of suspending –rather than completely severing– its CSTO membership, avoiding a full break with Russia in its security architecture. The diplomatic rapprochement initiated with Lavrov’s visit to Yerevan on May 21, 2025, has laid the groundwork for this pragmatic process. Armenia’s continued efforts to restructure and maintain its cultural and economic ties with Russia, its avoidance of changes regarding the military base, and its continued, albeit symbolic, participation in regional frameworks such as the EAEU, can be interpreted as a strategic signal of balance sent to Moscow. In this scenario, Russia will attempt to draw Armenia back into its orbit not through hegemonic pressure, but by constructing a narrative of “alliance” based on economic and security cooperation.
However, Moscow’s quest to re–establish a hegemonic order in the South Caucasus has become significantly constrained in the present day compared to the conditions of the post–2008 period. The growing influence of regional actors –particularly Turkey– Azerbaijan’s independent and multi–vector foreign policy maneuverability, and Georgia’s balance–oriented approach with a still ongoing, albeit suspended, pursuit of integration with the West constitute key dynamics that prevent Russia from constructing a unipolar regional order. In this respect, it is observed that Moscow has adopted a more flexible approach based on a “regional cooperation platform” as a means of countering EU enlargement and NATO influence, rather than relying on classical hegemony strategies.
This new orientation aims to sustain Russia’s presence in the region within the framework of a multipolar regionalization paradigm. By placing hegemonic aspirations in the background, Moscow seeks to develop balanced and multilateral relations with regional states such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on the basis of mutual interdependence. In this context, initiatives such as the “Crossroads of Peace” and the “3+3 format” proposed by Lavrov can be interpreted as reflections of Russia’s strategic adaptation effort–shifting away from direct dominance in the region toward a system rooted in cooperation and alliances.
Ultimately, Armenia’s West–centered orientation after 2020 has led to serious ruptures in its relations with Russia, prompting a need for Moscow to redefine its influence in the South Caucasus. The Pashinyan Government’s distancing from the CSTO and its turn toward the European integration process have brought Yerevan to the threshold of a strategic balancing policy. In this context, Lavrov’s visit between May 21–23, 2025, demonstrates that Russia has embraced a new regional approach based on multilateral cooperation rather than hegemony, and that Armenia is seeking to reposition itself within this framework. This process, shaped by regional realities, points to the emergence of a new equilibrium order in the South Caucasus–one based on limited alliances and mutual interdependence rather than unilateral dominance.
[i] “Lavrov v Yerevane: Rossiya Sokhranit Voyennoye i Gumanitarnoye Prisutstviye v Armenii”, Real Tribune, https://realtribune.ru/lavrov-v-erevane-rossiya-sohranit-voennoe-i-gumanitarnoe-prisutstvie-v-armenii, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[ii] “Armeniya ne Obsuzhdayet Vyvod Rossiyskoy Voyennoy Bazy so Svoyey Territorii”, TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23979491, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[iii] “Moskva Gotova Sodeystvovat Podpisaniyu Mirnogo Dogovora Mezhdu Baku i Yerevanom”, Verelq, https://verelq.am/ru/region/show/100917, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[iv] “V Armenii Zayavili, Chto Vykhod iz YEAES ne Stoit na Povestke Dnya”, Vedomosti, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2025/05/22/1111888-v-armenii-zayavili-chto, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[v] “Armeniya ne Sobirayetsya Pereformatirovat Soyuznicheskiye Otnosheniya s Rossiyey – Mirzoyan”, News Armenia, https://newsarmenia.am/news/politics/armeniya-ne-sobiraetsya-pereformatirovat-soyuznicheskie-otnosheniya-s-rossiey-mirzoyan/, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[vi] “Rossiya i Ukraina Proveli Obmen Plennymi v Formate 307 na 307”, Interfax, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/1027558, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[vii] “Lavrov: Rossiya Zainteresovana v Aktivnom Uchastii Armenii v ODKB”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/24003751, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
[viii] “Kocharyan Prizval Vosstanovit Strategicheskiye Otnosheniya s Rossiyey”, Dzen, https://dzen.ru/a/aCsKbgseIwtkCvJ1, (Access Date: 25.05.2025).
