To evaluate Japan’s foreign and defense policies, The Ankara Center for Crisis and Political Studies (ANKASAM) presents below the interview with Simran Walia, Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi, India.
1. What are the reasons for Japan being subjected to additional tariffs by the Trump administration in the United States? What did Japan fail to do in its foreign and defense policies towards the US?
The Trump administration imposed additional tariffs on Japan for several reasons, most of which were related to trade imbalances and concerns over unfair trade practices. One of the main reasons for the tariffs was the large trade deficit that the United States had with Japan. The U.S. imported significantly more from Japan than it exported to it, and President Trump aimed to address this imbalance by increasing tariffs on Japanese goods, which he believed would incentivize Japan to buy more from the U.S. and reduce the trade deficit.
Furthermore, a significant part of the tariffs was focused on Japan’s automobile industry. The U.S. argued that Japan’s trade practices were harmful to American auto manufacturers, particularly in the context of the U.S. market being dominated by Japanese carmakers like Toyota and Honda. Trump claimed that Japan’s automotive practices were unfair to U.S. manufacturers, and he sought to level the playing field by imposing tariffs on imported Japanese cars and auto parts.
The Trump administration raised concerns that Japanese markets were not open enough to U.S. products, particularly in sectors like agriculture, where American farmers faced restrictions on exports to Japan. The U.S. sought to negotiate better access to the Japanese market for American products. Trump’s broader “America First” economic strategy focused on protecting American industries from what he perceived as unfair trade practices by other countries. Japan, along with other nations, was seen as a part of this global trade system that Trump felt disadvantaged U.S. workers and industries.
The impact of higher auto duties could be significant, as approximately one-third of Japan’s exports to the United States are in the automotive sector. Some projections suggest that Japan’s automobile production could drop by nearly 14%, with a 0.34% decline in real GDP. Additionally, the direct tariffs imposed on Japan are not the sole disruption looming. Japanese companies have made substantial investments across North America, resulting in highly integrated production networks.
Regarding the defence policies towards the US, Japan has been criticized for not contributing enough to defense costs under its security alliance with the U.S. Despite Japan’s reliance on the U.S. for security, particularly through the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, there have been concerns that Japan has not done enough to share the financial and military burden. The U.S. has often pressed Japan to increase its defense spending and contribute more to regional security, especially as U.S. resources in the Pacific are spread thin.
Japan’s pacifist constitution, particularly Article 9, has limited its ability to engage in collective security actions outside its own territory. While Japan has gradually taken more proactive steps to support U.S. defense efforts (e.g., in the Middle East and supporting U.S.-led operations), critics argue that Japan has not done enough to evolve its defense posture to match changing regional security dynamics, especially with the rise of China and North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs.
While Japan has been a key ally of the U.S., it has sometimes been seen as not fully aligning with U.S. strategies on global issues, whether it’s on trade, climate change, or other international concerns. There have been instances where Japan has preferred to follow a more neutral or independent path, which can complicate coordination with the U.S. Japan’s foreign and defense policies have sometimes been viewed as falling short in terms of burden-sharing, economic fairness, and proactive security measures in the face of rising regional threats, leading to frustrations in the U.S.-Japan relationship.
2. How do you see the future of the trilateral military-defense-security cooperation between Japan, the USA, and South Korea? Do you think the political crises in South Korea and Trump’s presidency will weaken this partnership?
There are strategic reasons why the US, South Korea, and Japan trilateral is important. It enables the US and its Indo-Pacific allies to communicate cohesiveness, debate regional issues, and work together to create responses to provocations.
To counter the growing threats from China, North Korea, and Russia, there is room to strengthen deterrence capabilities and improve collective defense integration. Establishing such minilateral cooperation calls for persistent, methodical, and silent diplomacy.
However, such partnerships are viewed as sources of possible short-term gain rather than long-term strategic worth in Trump’s diplomacy and perspective. Additionally, his administration lacks the political will and diplomatic clout to maintain the engagement that has so far helped the US, South Korea, and Japan trilateral. At the August 2023 Camp David Summit, a “new era” of trilateral collaboration was ushered in. Since then, the trilateral mechanism has improved the restoration of South Korea-Japan relations, allowed Seoul to take on a more active role in the area, and increased the three countries’ strategic alignment on China and North Korea policy.
Despite the shared strategic interests, historical and territorial issues between Japan and South Korea have at times hampered trilateral cooperation. Disputes over issues like the “comfort women” during World War II, territorial claims over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands, and trade tensions have created a complex relationship. These issues occasionally prevent full cooperation between Japan and South Korea, even if both countries value the U.S. alliance.
The U.S. plays a crucial role in managing the trilateral relationship, acting as a bridge between Japan and South Korea. The U.S. has been instrumental in facilitating dialogue and encouraging deeper cooperation, especially on defense matters. The Biden administration, in particular, has made efforts to strengthen trilateral cooperation, recognizing that the U.S.-Japan-South Korea partnership is vital for regional stability and the broader Indo-Pacific strategy.
Furthermore, the three countries are likely to increase cooperation in defense technology development, including more advanced missile defense systems, intelligence-sharing platforms, and space-based surveillance. This collaboration will improve their collective ability to respond to regional threats.
The trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea is primarily driven by shared strategic concerns, especially regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats and China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. These security priorities are unlikely to be significantly affected by domestic political turmoil in South Korea. Even with a change in leadership, the core national interests of South Korea regarding regional security will remain largely unchanged.
Regarding the US perspective, in order to further his America First goal, Trump sees partnerships as dependencies that should be used to their fullest potential. The Trump administration’s erratic and inconsistent bilateral demands of not one, but two partners will make it difficult for trilateral cooperation to navigate.
The trilateral mechanism may be impacted by disagreements over the cost-sharing of US forces in South Korea and Japan, their trade balance with the US, Trump’s proposals for reciprocal tariffs, and military spending. A stronger argument for the value of trilateral cooperation might be made to Trump as the external security situation in northeast Asia deteriorates as a result of deeper military connections between China, Russia, and North Korea. Additionally, the three nations might concentrate on fresh approaches to collaboration that fit his domestic agenda. Building ships together to make up for the US Coast Guard and Navy’s posture shortfall might serve as a temporary fix for future collaboration.
3. Could Japan’s increase in its defense-security posture in the Indo-Pacific lead it to a disaster similar to the mistakes it made during World War II?
Japan’s aggressive expansionist policies in the 1930s and 1940s were driven by imperial ambitions, a desire to secure resources, and a belief in its destiny to dominate East Asia. This led Japan into direct conflict with Western powers, particularly the U.S., resulting in disastrous consequences. Whil, in the current scenario, Japan’s defense posture is more focused on deterrence and regional security rather than territorial expansion. The international order, led by institutions like the United Nations and regional alliances like the U.S.-Japan alliance, emphasizes diplomacy, multilateral cooperation, and stability. Japan is now a pacifist nation (with constitutional restrictions on military force), and its defense policies are aligned with international norms and collective security frameworks.
Japan’s post-WWII constitution, particularly Article 9, renounces the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. While Japan has progressively increased its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in recent years, this expansion is primarily aimed at self-defense and peacekeeping operations rather than offensive military action. The current Japanese government has committed to constitutional limits on military activities, which helps prevent a repeat of past mistakes.
Japan is a key player in the global economy and is highly interdependent with other countries, particularly in trade and technological exchange. A military confrontation would severely disrupt Japan’s economic interests, making war an unlikely option. Additionally, Japan’s defense policies are generally aimed at maintaining peace and stability, which supports economic continuity rather than military aggression.
Japan’s primary security concern is China’s growing military and economic power. However, Japan is not pursuing expansionist policies. Instead, Japan’s defense posture is focused on countering potential aggression through defensive capabilities and multilateral alliances. While Japan’s rising defense capabilities could create tensions, especially with China, Japan is unlikely to follow the path of aggression it did in the past. Diplomatic engagement, economic ties, and multilateral security arrangements all work to stabilize the region.
Japan’s recent revision of its National Security Strategy (NSS) document in December 2022 also reflect Japan’s willingness to increase its defence spending and acquiring counter-strike capabilities in a situation of an attack. This implies that Japan is ready to expand its defence capabilities in terms of ‘self-defence’ which is also constitutional under its current constitution. While Japan’s increase in its defense-security posture in the Indo-Pacific does require careful management to avoid miscalculations and regional tensions, it is highly unlikely to lead to a disaster similar to the mistakes made during World War II. Today, Japan is a key democratic partner within a multilateral security environment, bound by its pacifist constitution and the global order that emphasizes diplomacy, cooperation, and conflict resolution.
