The Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) presents its interview with Prof. Dr. Kamshat Saginbekova from the School of International Economics at Maqsut Narikbayev University, focusing on strategic trade control, non-proliferation, and regional security policies in Central Asia.
1. Why is strategic trade control critically important for countries? What are the key elements necessary for its effective implementation?
Strategic Trade Control (STC) is critically important for several reasons. Its primary role is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and the misuse of dual-use items—goods, software, and technologies that have both civilian and military applications. This is a matter of national, regional, and global security, non-proliferation. Beyond security concerns, STC also plays an essential role in economic development and knowledge security by regulating and protecting the transfer of emerging and advanced technologies between countries and restricting the access of these technologies to competitor countries.
In today’s globalized economy, STC has evolved into a strategic tool of foreign policy and economic statecraft. While initially focused on restricting sensitive technology access during the Cold War, particularly against the Soviet Union, export controls now influence broader economic and technological power balances. This shift explains why some countries prefer the term “strategic trade management” (STM) to reflect its dual function: maintaining security while securing economic advantages in cutting-edge industries.
To understand STC, we can have a quick look at its concept. STC refers to exceptions from free trade for non-economic reasons, as outlined in GATT’s General and Security Exceptions, Articles XX and XXI. The exceptions are also reinforced by internationally and legally binding treaties and multilateral export control regimes, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Australia Group (AG), among others. Countries can apply any of these restrictive provisions for foreign policy objectives.
While STC primarily aims to ensure security, it also seeks to facilitate legitimate trade in strategic items, such as military and dual-use items. This requires a delicate balance between security enforcement and ensuring unrestricted access to global markets for authorised transactions and economic development.
The cases of A.Q. Khan’s illicit nuclear proliferation network and the 9/11 terrorist attacks exposed critical gaps in global security, demonstrating how weak export controls could allow non-state actors to acquire WMDs. Khan’s black-market operations exploited regulatory weaknesses, enabling nuclear technology to reach Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Meanwhile, 9/11 highlighted the threat of terrorist organizations seeking WMDs, raising concerns about unauthorized transfers of sensitive materials.
In response, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 (2004) (UNSCR 1540), making export control a legal obligation for all UN member states. By mandating national-level export controls, stronger border security, and compliance mechanisms, UNSCR 1540 reinforced STC as a global security imperative, ensuring that sensitive technologies and materials do not fall into the wrong hands.
Countries that sign international treaties and agreements commit to implementing national export control systems, ensuring compliance with international obligations. This legal responsibility extends beyond governments to companies involved in international trade of strategic items, which must also adhere to national export control regulations. To comply and mitigate risks, businesses establish Internal Compliance Programs (ICPs) tailored to their specific trade activities and risks related to an item, operations, end-use and end-user.
Today, export controls are not just relevant for companies but also for research institutions and universities. Many academic and research institutions involved to international research collaborations, producing innovative technologies and software that go beyond fundamental research. In an era of emerging technologies and high-priority sectors, even seemingly minor actions, such as sharing sensitive information via email, cloud, or at a conference, could constitute a violation of international, regional and national trade control regulations.
For the effective implementation of STC, key elements must be maintained at the country level. The question of efficiency is debatable due to varying definitions and criteria used to measure it. These elements depend on the specific context of the country, such as whether it is an exporter of strategic items, a transshipment point, or an importer of dual-use technologies. The main approaches and recommendations for these elements are included in several international documents and agreements, such as UNSCR 1540, WA, MTCR, NSG, and AG, which outline requirements for countries to establish robust export control systems to enhance global security and prevent the proliferation of dangerous technologies.
The approaches may vary, but key elements generally include the following:
- A robust legal framework for legitimate trade and security matters that addresses emerging trends and challenges, particularly those related to the intangible nature of items and clauses concerning human rights and cyber surveillance. It includes compliance with the legal and political commitments of countries, and security commitments at different levels (global, regional, and national). It identifies the scope and operations under trade control as well.
- Licensing and authorizations for the export (and in some cases, import) of controlled items.
- National control lists.
- A catch-all clause to cover items not listed.
- Customs and border control to prevent unauthorized physical transfer of goods.
- Enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with export control regulations.
- Training and awareness-raising to inform relevant stakeholders, including capacity building, private sector engagement, research institutions and universities involvement, and international cooperation and information sharing.
2. Significant changes have occurred in global geopolitical dynamics in recent years. How have these changes affected Central Asian countries?
Indeed, significant changes in global geopolitical dynamics have occurred in recent years, driven by conflicts, economic competition, and technological advancements. These shifts have undoubtedly affected Central Asian countries. To understand their impact, we can consider the broader trends and then focus on implications related to export control.
Three key geopolitical developments have particularly shaped the global order: the Russia-Ukraine war and Western sanctions, the US-China technology competition, and the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. Each of these events has affected the Central Asian region in different ways.
The Western sanctions imposed on Russia have significantly disrupted regional trade dynamics, engaging Central Asian countries to adapt to new trade and regulatory challenges. Given their deep economic and trade ties with Russia, particularly through the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian countries have had to navigate the risks of secondary sanctions while maintaining trade stability. One of the most pressing concerns has been the rise of re-exports, where sanctioned goods such as advanced electronics and industrial components have been rerouted through Central Asia, drawing international attention. Reports from the U.S. and EU have highlighted Armenia (an EAEU member country), Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan as potential transit hubs for these restricted items.
As Russian trade and energy routes have become restricted and riskier, Central Asian and Western countries have been seeking new trade and energy routes to maintain economic and energy stability. One potential solution is the Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route), which connects Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea and Türkiye. This route has attracted significant global attention and importance. This corridor promises to become one of the most efficient routes after overcoming obstacles such as infrastructure investments, ensuring a clear network of complex roads with different modes of transport connections, considering the layers of logistical and bureaucratic frameworks between countries, and climate conditions. As European countries are still reducing reliance on Russian energy and looking for alternative energy sources, Central Asia, rich in oil and gas region, can gain the benefits from expanding exports through alternative pipelines and agreements, particularly with China, the EU, and Middle Eastern partners.
The US-China technology competition has intensified, particularly in high-priority sectors, and includes the counter-reactions of both sides by tightening export controls of advanced technologies. This, in turn, has reshaped global supply chains, and these shifts have indirectly affected Central Asia. As the US and its allies restrict China’s access to critical technologies such as AI, 5G networks, and advanced microchips, China has looked for alternative suppliers, increased self-reliance, and expanded partnerships with emerging economies, including those in Central Asia.
For Central Asian countries, this competition presents both challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, new export controls on semiconductors and dual-use technologies mean that companies operating in Central Asia must ensure compliance with evolving trade regulations and sanctions to avoid violating US and EU restrictions. This has led to greater scrutiny of technology-related exports passing through Central Asia to China or Russia. On the other hand, as China expands its technology footprint in the region, investing in digital infrastructure, telecommunications, and AI-driven projects, Central Asian nations have benefited from increased connectivity and economic cooperation.
However, these developments have also drawn Western concerns over cybersecurity risks and data privacy, placing Central Asian governments in a delicate position between maintaining strong economic ties with China while addressing US and EU security concerns.
Moreover, the race for rare earth minerals, which are crucial for semiconductor production and renewable energy technologies, has elevated geopolitical interest in Central Asia. Countries like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan hold significant reserves of critical raw materials, attracting attention from both Western and Chinese companies looking to secure supply chains amid rising trade tensions.
The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan has increased concerns over border security, terrorism, and drug trafficking, prompting Central Asian states to strengthen regional cooperation. Additionally, as cybersecurity threats and digital espionage risks grow amid increased reliance on Chinese and Russian digital infrastructure, governments in the region face the challenge of balancing technological development with national and regional security interests.
As global tensions escalate, export controls have become highly relevant for Central Asian countries. Western partners have increased pressure on Central Asian governments to tighten export controls and prevent the diversion of sensitive technologies to sanctioned individuals and entities, particularly in Russia, and to prevent the support of Russia’s military industry. Despite Central Asian countries’ efforts in advancing trade control systems, a variety of challenges remain, particularly in monitoring complex trade routes and ensuring companies comply with international regulations and export control best practices. Transit risks, lack of awareness among business entities remain major concerns. Additionally, scientific collaborations involving Russian and Chinese universities and research centers in various high-priority sectors pose compliance risks and illicit technology transfer, as knowledge transfer could unintentionally support military applications. To address these challenges, Central Asian governments should improve the legal framework and keep it up to date, invest in training of state officials, raise awareness among business entities and research institutions, and enhance ICPs to ensure they align with international, regional and national trade control standards.
3. How are Central Asian countries impacted by the China-US trade tensions? Is it possible for them to turn this situation into an advantage?
Central Asian countries have opportunities to turn this situation to their advantage. The escalating trade war between China and the US has led to shifts in global supply chains and trade patterns, as we discussed.
Central Asian countries, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, have seen increased Chinese investment and trade as China seeks to diversify its economic partnerships and reduce reliance on US imports. This has resulted in greater economic integration with China, with projects such as the BRI playing a crucial role in regional infrastructure development. Chinese companies have expanded their presence in Central Asia, providing advanced technologies such as 5G networks and AI-powered systems. For example, Kazakhstan has a variety of Chinese investment-based projects, as well as cars and devices produced by China for personal consumption. For Kazakhstan, China is a major supplier of these technologies through various modes for individuals and companies across different sectors.
Central Asian countries can leverage the China-US trade tensions to their benefit in several ways. First, with traditional trade routes becoming restricted, Central Asian states can strengthen alternative corridors like the Middle Corridor connecting them to Europe. This diversification can enhance their strategic importance and economic stability.
Second, the need for China to find new partners has led to even more increased investments in Central Asia. Countries in the region can capitalize on this by improving their infrastructure and technological advancements to boost connectivity, economic growth, and innovation. For example, this year has officially seen the beginning of construction on the railway connection linking China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan as part of the BRI.
Third, Central Asia can become key players in the global market for critical materials by securing supply chains and attracting investment from both Western and Chinese companies. This is due to their significant reserves of rare minerals, which are crucial for semiconductor production and renewable energy technologies.
However, despite all these positive aspects, closer and deeper cooperation with China brings increasing dependence on China.
Additionally, Central Asian countries can enhance regional cooperation to create a more unified and resilient economic bloc, diversify their trade partners beyond China and the US, and develop local industries to boost domestic production capabilities. Promoting sustainable practices and investing in education and training programs can build a skilled workforce that supports advanced technological industries. Leveraging their strategic location between Europe and Asia can further position Central Asia as a major transit hub for global trade.
To sum up, while the China-US trade tensions present challenges, Central Asian countries have the potential to smartly turn these geopolitical shifts into strategic advantages by diversifying trade and energy routes, attracting investment wisely, enhancing technological capabilities, exploiting rare minerals, strengthening regional cooperation, and leveraging their strategic location.
