In the international system, security is being redefined not only through the number of armed forces and their technological superiority, but also through production capacity, the continuity of supply chains, and the establishment of dominance in the information domain. In the conflict environments of the 21st century, as important as the production of conventional war tools is the sustainability of this production and its strategic direction, which has become one of the fundamental components of deterrence. In this context, the Russia-Ukraine War constitutes a critical example in terms of showing how military power has been reshaped on the battlefield and how a new architecture of power has emerged beyond classical understandings of security. The war is being waged not only on the front lines, but also in production lines, in the skies, at diplomatic tables, and on information platforms, turning into a multidimensional test that challenges both the internal capacity and the external policy flexibility of states.
The Russia-Ukraine War has become one of the rare examples in the field demonstrating how states can turn their strategic production capacity into a tool of deterrence, beyond the classical projection of military force. In the early months of the war, it was observed that Russia had suffered a significant setback in drone technology, while initially maintaining an advantageous position in traditional munitions like artillery shells. However, Europe’s intensive supply of munitions to Ukraine quickly eroded this advantage and made it inevitable for Russia to restructure its defense economy based on logistical depth. What is particularly striking here is that Russia, by rapidly mobilizing its Soviet industrial legacy, was able to reach two to three times the total munitions production capacity of Europe within just one year.
The course of the war has also served as an awakening for the Europe-centered West. It was belatedly recognized that artillery shells, which had been traditionally regarded as “secondary” elements, actually play a critical role in wars involving extensive land borders. Even the United States (US), upon recognizing this deficiency, has entered into a joint production process with Turkey, showing that in the new period, the concept of a capacity-based security architecture is being redefined not only within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but also with actors outside NATO.
In addition to this technical and industrial transformation, the war is also being waged intensively in the information domain. The allegations reported in the press on 24 May 2025 that Ukrainian soldiers executed their comrades who wanted to surrender in the Donetsk region can be evaluated not as a classic battle report, but as an “information operation” constructed within the context of psychological warfare.[1] Through such allegations, it is intended to create the perception that there is a moral breakdown within the Ukrainian Army and that the command echelon is trying to maintain unity through repressive methods. This is a clear example of strategic communication techniques aimed both at creating an atmosphere of panic on the domestic front and at undermining the legitimacy of the Kyiv government in the international arena.
On the same day, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that four Ukrainian fixed-wing drones were destroyed in the airspace over regions such as Kursk and Crimea,[2] showing that the war is being shaped not only by land and air elements, but also along the axis of “air superiority” based on the control of airspace.
The attack carried out on the night of May 23-24 against Kyiv, involving 14 ballistic missiles and nearly 250 drones, should be analyzed within the framework of a multi-layered military pressure doctrine. Described by Ukrainian officials as “one of the most intense combined assaults on the capital,” this operation targeted not only infrastructure but also civilian living areas in districts such as Holosiivskyi, Obolonskyi, and Dniprovskyi, implementing an asymmetric attrition strategy.[3] Particularly significant is that the attack took place immediately after the prisoner exchange agreement reached in Istanbul,[4] which reveals that Russia is continuing its classical “dual war strategy” by maintaining a presence at the negotiating table while simultaneously intensifying pressure on the battlefield. This demonstrates that contemporary wars are no longer waged solely on the front lines; they are conducted simultaneously at the negotiating table, in diplomatic corridors, and within the media sphere.
Meanwhile, another factor altering the tactical nature of the war has been Russia’s emerging superiority in FPV and fiber-optic connected drones. Especially the new-generation drones like Molniya-1, which are resistant to electronic jamming, have been observed to target not only the front lines but also civilian and military elements in the rear, thereby significantly weakening Ukraine’s strategic depth.[5] This situation not only causes physical damage; it also operates a process of moral attrition aligned with psychological warfare doctrines through the persistent presence of a threat.
On the economic front of the war, the European Union (EU), with the 17th sanctions package approved on May 20, 2025, has aimed to increase pressure on Moscow, targeting a range of multi-layered actors including approximately 200 “shadow fleet” tankers belonging to Moscow, China- and UAE-based companies accused of circumventing sanctions, and judicial figures involved in the Navalny and Kara-Murza cases.[6] However, the fact that this package has been evaluated as “ineffective” by some EU circles indicates that Europe is experiencing coordination problems at a strategic depth. Indeed, the lukewarm stance of U.S. President Trump towards sanctions and Moscow’s rejection of a 30-day ceasefire proposal show that it is no longer normative alignment but interest-based divisions that are becoming decisive in the transatlantic alliance.
The 18th sanctions package, which has been prepared to address these strategic inconsistencies, signals a more direct form of economic warfare. According to Bloomberg, the package includes measures such as removing more than 20 Russian banks from the SWIFT system, reducing the price cap for Russian oil, permanently banning the Nord Stream pipelines, and imposing new trade restrictions totaling 2.5 billion euros.[7] These steps aim not only to reduce Moscow’s energy revenues but also to structurally cut off its access to Western technology. However, the fact that these measures also depend on the unanimous approval of all EU members exposes the institutional fragility Brussels faces in its foreign policy-making process.
Additionally, Ukraine’s rapidly growing defense industry throughout the war is undergoing a test of its internal dynamics. In an open letter sent by domestic companies to President Zelensky, there has been a demand to lift the restrictions on the export of drones and other technologies; this demand has emerged as a critical issue for the sector’s R&D development and financial sustainability.[8] Despite the stated production capacity of 20 billion dollars expressed in the letter, it has been emphasized that many companies are struggling to survive due to export barriers, revealing how fragile the relationship between security and technology can become under state intervention.
Russia’s rapid remobilization of its Soviet industrial legacy, reaching two to three times Europe’s total munitions production capacity within just one year, brings with it a multi-layered scenario expected to influence military balances in the near term not only on the Ukrainian front but across the entire Eurasian geopolitical space. This production superiority allows Russia to transform conventional warfare into a prolonged attrition strategy; meanwhile, the limited impact of the EU’s sanctions and the cracks in transatlantic cohesion are providing Moscow with broad room for maneuver. Should current trends continue, it is anticipated that by the end of 2025, Russia will pursue a strategy not confined to Ukraine alone but one that expands regional instability zones by escalating federal tensions along the Moldova-Gagauzia line and exerting hybrid pressures on the Baltic states via Belarus. In this scenario, the European security architecture is expected to evolve into a fragile plane where military superiority based on production capacity replaces classical deterrence, alliance systems experience a loss of internal resilience, and regional responses remain fragmented.
In alternative scenarios, if the EU and its allies transform their current sanctions approach from a quantitative to a qualitative level–complementing economic constraints with advanced technological isolation, strategic energy restrictions, and defense alliances centered on production–Russia’s war economy sustainability could weaken in the medium term. In particular, measures discussed in the 18th sanctions package, such as removing more than 20 Russian banks from the SWIFT system, sharply lowering the price cap on oil, and halting the flow of dual-use products, are expected to reduce the momentum of Moscow’s defense production. However, in such a pressure environment, Russia is also projected to intensify efforts to establish a “new resilience bloc” by building alternative technology and energy corridors with certain allied actors. In this respect, the effectiveness of sanctions in a multipolar international system will be redefined not only in terms of the impact on the target country but also depending on the institutional capacity and strategic solidarity level of the opposing blocs.
In conclusion, the Russia-Ukraine War has demonstrated how production capacity and defense industry infrastructure can become a strategic lever in modern conflicts. Russia’s rapid activation of its Soviet legacy to surpass Europe’s total munitions production has increased its capacity to determine the course of the war through logistical superiority, while the EU’s sanctions have proven insufficient to halt this rise. On the other hand, if the West does not qualitatively transform its sanctions policy, it is expected that Russia will deepen alternative economic and technological partnerships with other actors. In this framework, the future of military competition in the international system is projected to evolve into a multipolar and protracted struggle shaped by production power, strategic resilience, and inter-bloc alliance capacity.
[1] “Zamkomandira VS RF: VSU v Otradnom Ubivali Sosluzhivtsev za Popytki Sdatsya v Plen”, TASS, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/24038333, (Access Date: 24.05.2025).
[2] “Nad Krymom, Belgorodskoy i Kurskoy Oblastyami Unichtozhili Chetyre BPLA”, Rambler, https://news.rambler.ru/army/54715362-nad-krymom-belgorodskoy-i-kurskoy-oblastyami-unichtozhili-chetyre-bpla, (Access Date: 24.05.2025).
[3] “Rossiyskiye Voyennyye Nanesli Massirovannyy Udar po Kiyevu Raketami i Bespilotnikami. Yest Postradavshiye”, Meduza, https://meduza.io/news/2025/05/24/rossiyskie-voennye-nanesli-massirovannyy-udar-po-kievu-raketami-i-bespilotnikami-est-postradavshie, (Access Date: 24.05.2025).
[4] William Christou, “Russia Launches one of Biggest Drone Attacks on Kyiv Since Start of War”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/24/russia-drone-attack-kyiv-ukraine-war, (Access Date: 24.05.2025).
[5] “How Putin’s New Drone War is Getting Deadlier”, The Times, https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/fpv-drones-strike-anthony-loyd-sqgw92l2v, (Access Date: 24.05.2025).
[6] Martin Fornusek, “EU Approves 17th Package of Russia Sanctions, Targets Shadow Fleet”, The Kyiv Independent, https://kyivindependent.com/eu-adopts-17th-russia-sanctions-package-targeting-shadow-fleet-hybrid-threats, (Access Date: 24.05.2025).
[7] Alberto Nardelli ve Ewa Krukowska, “EU Weighs Cutting 20 Banks From SWIFT in New Russia Sanctions”, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-24/eu-weighs-cutting-20-banks-from-swift-in-new-russia-sanctions, (Access Date: 24.05.2025).
[8] Anna Fratsyvir, “Ukrainian Defense Firms Urge Zelensky to Lift Drone Export Restrictions in Open Letter”, The Kyiv Independent, https://kyivindependent.com/ukrainian-defense-firms-urge-president-zelensky-to-lift-drone-export-restrictions-amid-growing-industry-crisis, (Access Date: 24.05.2025).
