On February 3, 2026, United States President Donald Trump announced that an agreement had been reached with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi regarding “tariffs” and “reducing Russian oil imports to zero” following a telephone conversation.[i] Trump announced that he would reduce tariffs on Indian goods from 50% to 18%, and in return, India would reduce and stop its purchases of Russian oil. In this context, Trump also announced that India had agreed to purchase oil from the US and Venezuela.[ii]
It is worth remembering that in August 2025, the Trump administration imposed additional tariffs on India due to New Delhi’s continued oil purchases from Moscow. At the time, Trump emphasized his role as a “mediator” in stopping the conflicts between Pakistan and India and claimed to have prevented a “potential nuclear war.”[iii] India, on the other hand, was uneasy about Trump’s highly proactive stance on the Kashmir issue, his attempts to gain leverage from it, and his rapprochement with Pakistan. During this period, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif repeatedly suggested that Trump should be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize and showed a tendency to improve relations with the Trump administration by visiting Washington. According to Western sources, during this same period, Modi rejected both Trump’s invitation to Washington and his requests for a phone call regarding tariffs.[iv]
Generally speaking, India, dissatisfied with the US’s improving relations with Pakistan, had a major confrontation with the Trump administration over tariffs and began seeking new cooperation opportunities with China and Russia in its foreign policy. In this context, Modi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Tianjin, China, on August 31-September 1, 2025, and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping after a long hiatus, sending a message of détente in relations. On the other hand, Modi visited Moscow in July 2025 and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and in December, he hosted Putin in his own country. In short, analyses in the world media over the last six or seven months have suggested that India is distancing itself from the US and shifting towards the Russian and Chinese axis, and that, so to speak, the US has “lost India to Russia and China”.[v] Many analysts have stated that India is seeking strategic autonomy in foreign policy, but the disagreement with the Trump administration has reached dangerous levels and jeopardized relations.[vi]
The current situation, where India has reached an agreement with the Trump administration on tariffs, can be interpreted as the beginning of a softening and normalization of relations with the US. This normalization bears similarities to the conjuncture before the start of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022. Indeed, before that date, India’s oil purchases from Russia were at a low level, and cooperation between Moscow and New Delhi in Eurasia had certain limitations. Before 2022, Russia was positioned as an important mediator, particularly in reducing disagreements between China and India. However, with Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2022, the harmony among the three actors was disrupted, and the “Ukraine issue” became a factor limiting India and China’s relations with Russia. However, India and Russia, seeing this as an opportunity, entered into significant cooperation in oil trade. This oil trade between Moscow and New Delhi, maintained under Western pressure, offered an attractive cooperation opportunity for both actors. However, during the 2022-2026 period, India recognized significant limitations in its cooperation with both Moscow and Beijing, and the challenges of forging a long-term, lasting alliance in Eurasia.
During this process, the US’s balanced management of relations with both Pakistan and India has been noteworthy. By showing signs of rapprochement with Pakistan and obtaining some concessions from India, the Washington administration similarly sought concessions from Pakistan through its policies of rapprochement with India. The events of the last six or seven months can be seen as an indication of this. However, what is particularly striking is India’s extremely pragmatic foreign policy. Choosing to purchase oil from the US and Venezuela instead of Russia represents a significant shift in India’s energy policies. The fact that India, which prioritized oil purchases from Russia with attractive prices and guarantees after 2022, will turn to the US and Venezuela by 2026 is a remarkable development. While defending oil trade with Moscow during this period, New Delhi stated that it could also purchase oil from the US if similar discounts and advantages were offered.
Trump, planning to generate significant revenue from oil sales in Venezuela, is seeking to redirect this oil to his allies. Believing he has a significant boost in oil supply, including Venezuela, Trump may be willing to move to forge new oil deals with allies in Europe and other Asia-Pacific regions, including India.
In conclusion, the changing circumstances in Venezuela appear likely to cause significant changes in Russia’s and China’s oil trade and the global energy market through a domino effect. From India’s perspective, being able to purchase oil from the US or Venezuela under similar conditions and in large quantities as in the oil agreement with Russia could be seen as a highly attractive scenario. From a political standpoint, it is important to emphasize that India has developed an unwavering relationship with Russia, recently declaring[vii] a “privileged strategic partnership.” Therefore, restoring relations with the US essentially means maintaining the strategic balance in India’s foreign policy.
[i] “US and India reach trade deal, Trump says after Modi call”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yve1x9zv0o, (Access date: 05 Feb 2026).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] “PM Modi avoided four Donald Trump calls, says German media, as US-India ties sour”, Times of India, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pm-modi-avoided-four-donald-trump-calls-says-german-media-as-us-india-ties-sour/articleshow/123529092.cms, (Access date: 05 Feb 2026).
[iv] Ibid.
[v] “Has the United States Really Lost India?”, GMFUS, https://www.gmfus.org/news/has-united-states-really-lost-india, (Access date: 05 Feb 2026).
[vi] “Avrasya’da İşbirliği Bağlamında Hindistan’ın Batı’dan Uzaklaşması Mümkün mü?”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/anka-analizler/avrasyada-isbirligi-baglaminda-hindistanin-batidan-uzaklasmasi-mumkun-mu/, (Access date: 05 Feb 2026).
[vii] “Russia Proposes Cooperation with India to Develop Shipbuilding Industry”, Maritime Executive, https://maritime-executive.com/article/russia-proposes-cooperation-with-india-to-develop-shipbuilding-industry, (Access date: 05 Feb 2026).
