The resolution of the European Parliament that foresees the end of imports of gas pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia until the fall of 2027 provides the legal foundations for a structural, irreversible break in energy relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia. Even though this decision was accelerated after the Ukrainian War, its roots stretch back to the Russia-Ukraine gas disagreements of 2006 and 2009. The mentioned crises clearly demonstrated that energy dependency creates a foundational strategic vulnerability, carrying the EU’s energy security discussions beyond temporary supply shocks.
Yet Europe’s energy dependency on Russia was generally evaluated on economic grounds, given that Russian gas was relatively cheap and stable, and an important factor supporting the competitive power of European industry. However, this dependency was not just a trade relation for Moscow, but also a geopolitical lever used to influence Europe’s foreign policy and security preferences. Thus, Europe’s total gas consumption being 45%[1] Russian-sourced before the war deepened this structural asymmetric mutual dependency.
The risks of this asymmetric relation became solid threats with the pipeline outages caused by the Russia-Ukraine disagreements of 2006 and 2009. These outages caused profound supply shocks throughout the EU, especially in Central and Eastern European countries. For instance, in 2009, Russian gas flows to Europe were cut entirely for approximately 2 weeks, and some countries experienced a 70% decrease in their gas supply.[2] This event showcased the systemic risks of geographic concentration in the EU’s gas supply, causing severe outages across industrial production to household heating, and proved that energy security is too strategic and geopolitical to be governed solely by market mechanisms.
In light of this historical background, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 transformed the current strategic vulnerability and turned the geopolitical risk into a practical crisis. Moscow began using natural gas as a foreign policy and pressure tool with the start of the war, creating intense economic and political pressure on Europe through pipeline outages, quotas, and price manipulation. Many EU members, particularly Germany, Italy, Poland, and Central European countries, are facing strategic defenselessness and are now forced to adopt emergency intervention policies and seek alternative supplies. Because of the European spot gas prices increasing[3] to 1000 USD/1000 m³ in the winter of 2022, energy costs are no longer just a cost element but also an immediate threat to macroeconomic stability and societal welfare.
In response to these crisis conditions, the EU initiated multi-dimensional measures, including expanding LNG infrastructure, increasing storage capacity, and improving joint purchasing mechanisms, starting with the REPowerEU strategy. Dependency on Russian gas has decreased to 12%[4] as a result of this intensive effort, indicating that the practical breakaway has occurred broadly. The 2027 goal aims to provide a legal and institutional framework for this practical situation. This confirms that the transformation in the energy field is not a temporary adaptation but a structural, permanent change. The decision is not a short-term reaction to crisis conditions, but rather Europe reflecting strategically its now changed energy and security reality.
This transformation phase redefines the relationship between the EU’s energy security and geopolitical autonomy. It is the neutralization of the lever that Russia acquired through energy exports and used for foreign policy. From Europe’s perspective, it has achieved tangible progress beyond merely aiming to remove energy dependence as a structural securityvulnerability. USA LNG, quickly switching to alternative global resources such as Norway, Algeria, Qatar, and the Eastern Mediterranean, diversified the EU’s energy supply security and enabled a more resilient, geopolitically autonomous position in the energy field. While the increase in the LNG export of the USA to Europe deepens and strengthens the energy dimension of the transatlantic relations, this has also become a geopolitical tool for Washington.
This energy transformation is also in line with the European Green Deal. The gradual abandonment of fossil fuels is not just critical for environmental sustainability but also for eliminating the Russian-dependent energy model. Sustainable energy, hydrogen, and increasing investment for energy efficiency decrease the EU’s dependence on foreign nations in the long term and base energy security on internal and controllable capacities. Energy has become a foundational element of security and geopolitical autonomy, beyond economic concerns.
From a Russian perspective, the strategic loss of the European market creates a structural vulnerability for its energy-export-based profits and foreign policy. While Moscow’s strategy to seek out Asian markets, especially China, provides short-term relief, insufficient pipeline infrastructure, imposed price reductions, and dependence on a single market limit the negotiating power and profitability of the Russian energy sector. The closure of the European market for LNG erodes Russia’s tech and financial capacity while making it harder for companies like Gazprom and Rosneft to develop new projects. This situation weakens Russia’s energy diplomacy in the mid- to long-term.
The ripples from the EU-Russia energy break reshape local geopolitics in Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean. With increasing LNG terminal capacity, especially TANAP and TAP projects, and transit passage potential, Turkey strengthens its energy central position as a critical juncture in Europe’s energy supply, now cleansed from Russia and diversified. The EU’s structural break from Russian gas strategy increases Turkey’s geopolitical importance in the region by turning this geographical and infrastructural advantage into a political value. Turkey becomes a more central actor for Azerbaijani natural gas and transferring potential Eastern Mediterranean resources to the West. This situation not only introduces a negotiation element into Turkey’s relationship with the EU, but also reaffirms Turkey’s role in the USA’s regional strategy.
From a global perspective, the EU’s structural break decision has a deep impact on international energy markets. The decision intensifies competition in energy markets and pushes global gas pricing towards a situation in which more and more geopolitical factors determine the outcome. Energy trade is shaped not only by supply and demand but also by alliances, strategic sanctions, and national security priorities. This situation demonstrates that energy has ceased to be merely an economic commodity in the international system and has become a primary instrument through which states project strategic power.
The EU’s 2027 target represents the final legal confirmation of the deliberate and planned abandonment of the symbiotic yet asymmetric model of interdependence established with Russia in the post–Cold War period. This radical development reveals that energy has become not a complementary component but a central and determining axis of Europe’s security architecture. In this new paradigm, where energy, economics, and geopolitics are deeply intertwined, the EU’s energy policy has ceased to be merely a technical issue of supply security and has evolved into a strategic instrument aimed at actively reshaping regional and global power balances. Within the context of this global transformation, Turkey’s regional transit position and the United States’ integration of energy and foreign policy stand out as key actors in the process. Consequently, the EU–Russia energy decoupling gains significance as a fundamental phenomenon demonstrating that energy security, strategic autonomy, and geopolitical competition are inseparably intertwined in the twenty-first century.
[1] “In focus: EU energy security and gas supplies”, Focus, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/focus-eu-energy-security-and-gas-supplies-2024-02-15_en, (Access date: 02.02.2026).
[2] Nesterov, Andrei. (2026). “Russia-Ukraine ‘Gas War’ Damages Both Economies”, WorldPress, https://www.worldpress.org/europe/3307.cfm?utm, (Access date: 02.02.2026).
[3] “Gas prices in Europe over $ 1,000 per thousand cubic meters, after Western sanctions”, Eurasia Business News, https://eurasiabusinessnews.com/2022/02/23/gas-prices-in-europe-over-1000-per-thousand-cubic-meters/, (Access date: 02.02.2026).
[4] “EU agrees to gradually end Russian gas imports by January 1, 2028”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/eu-agrees-gradually-end-russian-gas-imports-by-january-1-2028-2025-10-20/, (Access date: 02.02.2026).
