The Republic of Kazakhstan stands at a critical threshold in managing the projected energy deficit of 17 billion kWh by 2035. The decision regarding the country’s first nuclear power plant is far beyond being a mere technical infrastructure choice; it possesses a historical quality that will determine the state’s geopolitical orientation and strategic autonomy capacity for the next fifty years.
With its strategic position on the Middle Corridor, Kazakhstan evaluates the nuclear energy decision as a multidimensional foreign policy test. For the Astana administration, this process constitutes a venue where national sovereignty capacity is tested within global power competition, alongside the procurement of energy security. The choice to be made between the historical and structural influence of the Russian Federation on one side, the technological standards of Western actors on the other, and the rising pragmatic influence of the People’s Republic of China will determine whether Kazakhstan will be a regional element of balance or a geography subject to the strategic moves of great powers.
One of the fundamental elements shaping Kazakhstan’s nuclear energy decision is the historical legacy inherited from the Soviet Union era, conceptualized as “path dependency.” The deep compatibility of existing energy transmission lines and engineering infrastructure with Russian standards supports Rosatom’s candidacy with a structural advantage. However, beyond technical alignment, this situation is also examined as Moscow’s quest to consolidate its strategic influence over Astana.
When the historical process in the nuclear energy sector is examined, it is observed that the legal and political crises experienced in previous administrations of Kazatomprom are associated with Kazakhstan’s efforts to become independent in the nuclear fuel cycle. In the current conjuncture, the Ukraine Crisis raises serious question marks regarding the operational sustainability of the Rosatom option and the risks of technological isolation. In this context, a partnership with Russia, while offering short-term conveniences, carries the potential to restrict long-term strategic flexibility.
Despite being the world’s largest uranium producer, Kazakhstan still lacks enrichment capacity, which is the most critical stage of the nuclear fuel cycle. This strategic paradox turns the nuclear power plant tender into something much more than a simple purchase; it becomes a search for the technology transfer needed to process domestic resources into final products.
The approaches of supplier candidates toward this technological deficiency are among the primary criteria determining the strategic dimension of the decision. Despite the sensitivities of actors such as the United States (Westinghouse) and South Korea (KHNP) regarding technology transfer, the People’s Republic of China (CNNC) offers a more flexible ground for cooperation on the localization of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the Astana administration took concrete steps toward breaking Russia’s monopoly in this field through joint ventures established with China in 2021, a comprehensive technological integration is needed for full autonomy.
The candidates considered in the tender process represent different strategic trajectories for Kazakhstan. The Rosatom option brings the risk of deepening integration within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union and articulation into a regional great power. While the proposal from the French EDF offers an opportunity for alignment consistent with the European Union’s normative values and vision of strategic autonomy, the proposals of Chinese and South Korean origin promise foreign policy flexibility shaped through cost-effectiveness and pragmatic balances. Public opinion surveys indicate that a significant portion of society places more trust in Western-originated technological solutions. This social expectation necessitates the government to also consider the factor of social legitimacy in decision-making processes.[i]
The hedging strategy, one of the cornerstones of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy doctrine, also finds a field of application in the nuclear power plant project. It is assessed that the Astana administration tends to create a multilateral consortium by dividing the project into different stages instead of remaining dependent on a single supplier. This approach aims to transform the competition between great powers into a balancing mechanism in line with national interests. For instance, proceeding with one actor in reactor technology while utilizing the expertise of another in safety supervision and engineering standards is seen as a rational choice that can maximize strategic autonomy. Kazakhstan aims to realize its energy transformation without establishing full dependence on any power by using its uranium resources as a diplomatic instrument.
Kazakhstan’s preference for a nuclear power plant is a geopolitical choice that will define the state’s positioning in the international system and its borders of sovereignty, far beyond the provision of energy supply security. This decision process will be an indicator of the extent to which a middle power, claiming to be an active subject in Central Asia, can make independent decisions under global pressures. Consequently, Astana’s “atomic test” is not merely a choice of technology but a certification of the route that the national strategic vision will follow for the next half-century.
[i] “Kazakhstan-Russia Relations After 2022: Sources of Contention, Points of Pressure”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/feature-articles/item/13903-kazakhstan-russia-relations-after-2022-sources-of-contention-points-of-pressure.html, (Date Accessed: 28.01.2026).
