The high-profile visit by United States (U.S.) Vice President JD Vance to Baku and Yerevan in February 2026 constitutes a turning point in the decades-long geopolitical deadlock of the South Caucasus and is recorded as the most concrete declaration of a process that is fundamentally transforming the region’s security architecture. This diplomatic move demonstrates that Washington has moved beyond the role of a mere “mediator” or “observer” in its regional policies and has become a direct stakeholder in the physical and economic processes on the ground. This new period, shaped by the peace declaration signed in August 2025 and the subsequently initialed draft peace treaty, constructs the sustainability of peace not on military balances but rather on economic integration and mutual interdependence.
At the center of this strategic transformation lies the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,” abbreviated as TRIPP, which functions as the most concrete laboratory of the United States’ shift in foreign policy from the classical understanding of security guarantorship toward a model of economic guarantorship. This process disrupts the frozen conflict paradigm in the region by placing peace onto rails and aims to transform the South Caucasus into an indispensable component of global logistics networks. However, the success of this new architecture rests upon a fragile ground shaped by historical traumas, domestic political dynamics, and the resistance of revisionist actors in the region.
The TRIPP doctrine can be considered as an initiative that goes far beyond being merely an infrastructure project or a transportation route, aiming instead to overcome a geopolitical deadlock through commercial logic and strategic investment. The Zangezur Corridor issue, which has remained unresolved for years and has kept regional states on the brink of military confrontation, is being addressed through this doctrine by means of an innovative model that takes into account the sovereignty rights of both sides. Through this move, Washington is seen to assume the role of architect in the transition from conflict management to the construction of prosperity, while simultaneously bringing to life a strategy to strengthen the Middle Corridor that bypasses Russia and Iran.
One of the most striking aspects of TRIPP is the ownership and governance structure of the corridor. The establishment of the TRIPP Development Company has transformed Washington’s engagement in the region from temporary diplomatic support into a long-term institutional commitment. According to the agreement, the allocation of seventy-four percent of the company’s shares to the United States and twenty-six percent to Armenia for the initial forty-nine-year period directly links the project’s security and operational standards to American national interests and Western legal norms. This structure secures Armenia’s sovereign rights over its own territory while simultaneously meeting Azerbaijan’s demand for unhindered access to Nakhchivan under an international guarantee. Consequently, the project assumes the identity of a multimodal development corridor encompassing railways, highways, energy pipelines, and fiber-optic digital infrastructure, rather than a purely military corridor.
This new economic architecture is also structurally undermining Russia’s logistical and security monopoly that has prevailed in the South Caucasus for decades. The Kremlin’s greatest leverage in the region—its position as an “indispensable arbiter”—has begun to lose its functionality with the advent of TRIPP. While the 2020 ceasefire agreement placed control of the corridor under the Russian FSB Border Guards, effectively confining the region’s critical infrastructure to the oversight of the Russian security apparatus, the American-led consortium that became operational as of 2026 has fundamentally altered this equation. Western operational standards, digital customs controls, and transparent logistics management processes are rendering Russia’s physical presence on the ground unnecessary, thereby eroding Moscow’s strategic influence over the region.
The most evident manifestation of this erosion is Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s sharp ultimatum directed at the Russian state-owned company operating Armenia’s railways, stating that it must “either modernize the lines or we will do it ourselves.” This challenge reflects Yerevan’s realization that it has now found a genuine alternative to Moscow and its determination to break its strategic dependency. Indeed, the symbolic competition observed in November 2025 between Russian and Kazakh freight trains transporting wheat to Armenia via Azerbaijan serves as tangible evidence that the monopolistic structure in the logistics sector has begun to give way to a competitive market. Moscow, for its part, has responded to this process with a dual strategy: on the one hand, conveying moderate messages through official channels to signal an apparent acceptance of change; on the other, attempting to destabilize Armenia’s domestic politics through hybrid methods and disinformation operations.
The reactions of regional actors to this new configuration constitute the main dynamics that will determine the project’s future trajectory. For Armenia, TRIPP represents a “gateway of existence,” offering a means to overcome the country’s historical isolation and to escape its asymmetric security dependence on Russia. However, for the Pashinyan government, this process simultaneously entails significant domestic political risks. The ultimate success of both the peace agreement and the project is contingent upon critical thresholds such as the planned constitutional referendum in Armenia and the 2026 parliamentary elections. Azerbaijan, by contrast, has combined its military victory with diplomatic rationality, transforming the “Zangezur” issue from a source of tension into a global logistics project. Baku’s initiation of direct energy deliveries to Armenia as of December 2025 stands as one of the most concrete and hopeful examples demonstrating that economic rationality can prevail over historical hostilities.
Turkey, through this project, has seized the opportunity to realize its strategic vision of reaching the Turkic world in Central Asia directly by bypassing Iran. This development reinforces Ankara’s central position in Eurasian geopolitics and aligns TRIPP with Turkey’s strategic objectives. On the Iranian front, however, the situation presents the opposite picture. Tehran perceives TRIPP as a “geopolitical vise” directed against its national security, viewing the emergence of a U.S.-administered corridor along its northern border and the weakening of Iran’s traditional transit role as a major threat. The north–south highway constructed by Iran in the Syunik province, which physically cuts across the TRIPP route, stands as a concrete manifestation of the geopolitical competition in the region.
As a result, this process, which will continue with Vice President Vance’s visit to the Caucasus, is redefining the meaning of peace in the Caucasus in the twenty-first century. The new realpolitik is being constructed not on military alliances or buffer zones, but on interconnected railways, high-speed fiber-optic networks, and shared economic interests. Washington’s doctrine, which views economic integration as the key to peace, carries the potential to transform the region from a basin of conflict into a platform of prosperity for Eurasian connectivity. However, serious obstacles still stand in the way of this vision. The constitutional reform process in Armenia, Russia’s hybrid intervention capacity, and Iran’s security concerns will test how resilient this new diplomacy built on rails will prove to be.
