The concept of “strategic autonomy,” echoing through the corridors of Brussels, has transformed from a romantic ideal into a cold security dilemma by January 26, 2026. European capitals are caught between the allure of creating their own armies and the comfort offered by the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This predicament is bringing about an unprecedented mental divide in the continent’s security architecture.
The recent statements that ignited the debate indicate a widening gap between Washington and Europe. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s emphasis at the Davos session titled “Can Europe Defend Itself?”—that Europe needs to increase its defense spending far beyond current targets to be able to defend itself without the United States—further sharpened this perceived gap.[i] However, the real danger may not lie in the widening of this gap. The real risk is the decision-making weakness that will arise from the prolongation of this debate.
Changing the defense architecture is like dismantling a building’s foundation and building a new one. When the foundation is dug up, the building hangs in the air for a while. The process of realizing the idea of a European Army marks precisely this vulnerable “hanging” period. The cost breakdown highlighted by the NATO Secretary General at the recent meeting in Brussels shows just how painful this transition process will be.[ii]
For Europe to formulate its defense without US logistics and nuclear support could require exponentially increased current budgets. Warnings voiced in Davos that Europe would have to allocate a significant portion of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defense if it wanted to undertake its defense without US support, highlight the political weight of this financial burden. This could be political suicide for governments unwilling to compromise the welfare state.
Moscow’s satisfaction with this situation stems more from political arithmetic than from military balances. Russian strategic thinking tends to view the Western alliance not as a bloc, but as a collection of weak links. The debate over a European Army could provide Moscow with these very weak links by disrupting the alliance’s cohesion. The chasm between Paris’s demand for an independent army and Warsaw’s request for American guarantees creates diplomatic maneuvering space for the Kremlin. While it’s difficult to make moves against a unified NATO, it may be far less costly to make moves against a Europe engulfed in internal struggles over “who will command.”
In the current climate, the parallel between energy security and military security is striking. The European Union’s (EU) decision to completely ban Russian LNG by the end of 2026 is, on paper, a clear declaration of intent. [iii] However, when the details of implementation are examined, the objections of countries like Hungary and Slovakia reveal the fragility of the Union’s collective decision-making mechanism. The fact that pipeline gas will be cut off in September 2027 has already pushed these countries to seek alternatives. This fragmentation in the energy sector can have far more devastating consequences when extended to the defense sector. When the energy valve is closed, there is an economic price to pay; when the defense umbrella is closed, the price is paid with territorial integrity.
Technological capacity and industrial infrastructure are among the most tangible barriers to the realization of the European Army dream. The modern battlefield is shaped more by data flow speed and satellite intelligence than by the number of tanks. The European defense industry still exhibits a highly fragmented structure in high-tech production. Each country’s reflex to protect its own national champions prevents the establishment of a common supply chain. As long as this fragmentation continues, a European force could appear as a “paper tiger” lacking operational capability. Moscow, knowing that this is the reality on the ground, may not take Europe’s rhetorical toughness seriously.
Developments on the northern flank represent a shift in this debate from theoretical to real-world realities. Recent disputes over Greenland and the Arctic region have heightened the importance of NATO’s northern flank. Denmark’s decision in January 2026, in close coordination with allies, to expand its military presence in Greenland and conduct more intensive exercises throughout the year, demonstrates just how critical this region has become for the alliance.
During the same period, the Copenhagen and Nuuk administrations emphasized that Greenland’s status would not be a subject of negotiation within the alliance in the context of discussions against the Trump administration, thus reaffirming the sensitivity of the Arctic for both Russia and its allies. France’s desire to increase its presence in the region and its claim to do so on behalf of Europe may raise questions among other actors in the region. Competition in such a delicately balanced region as the Arctic requires a unified voice within NATO. Dissenting voices within Europe could become an argument that Russia uses to legitimize its military buildup in the north.
The atmosphere at the end of January calls into question the realism of the 2035 targets. The commitment of some member states to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP could be a heavy burden for the European economy, which is showing signs of economic stagnation. Capitals unwilling to shoulder this burden may resort to shifting security responsibility onto each other. This avoidance of responsibility is the greatest poison to the spirit of the alliance. Moscow expects this poison to spread to European capitals and is basing its strategy on this disintegration.
The biggest drawback of the idea of a unified European army is the lack of a strategic culture. Historically, the threat perception of a German officer and a Polish officer are vastly different. One side prioritizes dialogue, the other deterrence. Reuniting these two different mindsets in a single command center is far more difficult than integrating weapons systems. Any step taken without this mental integration could lead to a deadlock in decision-making mechanisms during a crisis. A deadlocked European defense represents a predictable and manageable risk for Russia.
The greatest advantage the NATO umbrella provides for the EU is that Washington assumes the role of ultimate decision-maker. In the European Army scenario, there is no authority to act as an arbiter. The leadership rivalry between Germany and France could transform the defense project into a power struggle. This competitive environment could lead to insecurity in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. These countries, unwilling to leave their security to the initiative of Paris or Berlin, may establish separate lines of communication with the US or the UK through bilateral agreements. Such a scenario could trigger not the unification of Europe, but rather its “Balkanization” in terms of defense.
These dissenting voices within the alliance must be quelled before the upcoming NATO summit. Otherwise, the summit could turn into a crisis management meeting rather than a show of force. The leaders’ family photo may not be enough to conceal this underlying tension. Diplomatic courtesy does not lighten the weight of the difficult issues on the table. Russia will focus more on the leaders’ body language and the underlying disagreements than on the final communiqué of the summit.
The most rational step Europe could take in the field of defense might be to strengthen the European pillar within NATO, rather than replacing it. Maintaining the current command structure while increasing the logistical and ammunition production capacities of European countries is a more achievable goal. This approach could both meet the US demand for burden sharing and maintain the image of a united front against Moscow. Any adventure in the opposite direction will trap the continent’s security in an uncertain transitional period.
In conclusion, Moscow’s strategic calculation is based not on the quantity of Europe’s military capacity, but on the quality of its will to utilize that capacity. The debate over a European Army serves the Kremlin’s interests as long as it fragments this will. Even if the debate itself doesn’t lead to a conclusion, the mental disarray it creates slows down Europe’s reflexes. Slowed reflexes mean surrendering the advantage on the geopolitical chessboard to the other side. While pursuing its dream of creating its own army, Europe risks undermining its strongest shield: alliance solidarity. If this risk materializes, it is clear that Brussels will not be the winner.
[i] “NATO chief wishes ‘good luck’ to those who think Europe can defend itself without U.S. help”, NPR, 27 Jan 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/01/27/nx-s1-5689791/nato-chief-europe-defense-us, (Access date: 27 Jan 2026).
[ii] “Europe can’t defend itself without the US, NATO’s Rutte warns”, Politico, 26 Jan 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-defense-nato-mark-rutte-us-politics-threats-gdp/, (Access date: 27 Jan 2026).
[iii] “AB, Rusya’dan gaz ithalatını sonlandırmaya onay verdi”, AA, 26 Ocak 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/ab-rusyadan-gaz-ithalatini-sonlandirmaya-onay-verdi/3811055, (Access date: 27.01.2026).
