Since his inauguration, Syrian President Ahmed Shara has visited Moscow twice and held constructive talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, where both parties demonstrated mutual agreement on several issues. It is noteworthy that within this short period, Shara has developed positive relations with both the United States (US) and Russia. The fact that two actors who previously stood on opposing fronts are now shaking hands and posing together once again shows that the interests of actors can change according to shifting conditions in international relations. At this point, one of the matters of curiosity and importance is how Syria’s new foreign policy will be shaped.
First and foremost, it is significant that despite Shara’s two visits to Moscow, no objections or warnings such as “we have taken note” have come from the US side, and specifically from President Donald Trump. This is particularly important because “relations with Russia” is one of the primary issues that Trump emphasizes and uses to pressure his allies. In this regard, Trump generally expects his allies to cease or reduce their dealings with Russia. However, Trump has expressed his support for Syria’s new administration at every opportunity by stating that he had “very good talks” with Shara and that he is “working very hard.[1]
In this context, Trump’s priority in Syria appears to be the construction of a Syria that can ensure the security of ISIS prisons, follows a peaceful foreign policy, is integrated with the world, and in this sense, remains economically open to the US. It can be said that one of the matters prioritized by the US is that the new administration in Syria does not pose a threat, particularly toward Israel. Indeed, when looking at President Shara’s foreign policy moves, it is observed that he avoids any action that contradicts American interests and attempts to follow a balanced and cautious policy by navigating a delicate line among great powers, a task in which he has been largely successful. For instance, it is noted that Shara maintains a distant stance toward Iran and China, which stand on the opposite front of the US. At this point, it is understood that Russia occupies a different position than both Iran and China. The assessment of Russia by both the US and the new Syrian administration is quite different from the approaches regarding Iran and China.
At this point, it is useful to analyze the differentiating position of Russia and the reasons behind it. First of all, Russia’s engagement in Syria dates back to the Cold War era, and one can speak of an economically and militarily integrated relationship structure. Therefore, it seems to be a very difficult possibility for the new Syrian administration to completely sever these ties. In this regard, it can be said that there may be certain matters where Russia could specifically provide economic benefits to Syria. In a Syria that is in a process of reconstruction and restoration, it does not appear to be a reasonable option for the Shara administration to exclude these economic benefits. Furthermore, during his previous visit to Moscow, Shara stated that he would remain faithful to all agreements made with Russia in the past.[2] These words were interpreted as an indication that Russia’s economic and military presence in Syria would continue in some form.
It is well known that Russia maintains a sensitive and fluctuating relationship with both the US and Israel. Consequently, it is unlikely for the new Syrian administration to ignore these dynamics. Additionally, Russia’s positive relations with Türkiye place Moscow in a position as an attractive actor for cooperation in the eyes of Syria. More importantly, Russia, which developed significant cooperation with Türkiye during the Astana Process, expressed its support for Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty during this period. It can be estimated that this support is viewed as highly valuable by the new Syrian administration. The consensus and agreement between the Shara administration and the Kremlin on clearing Syrian territories of the YPG/PKK terrorist organization is considered a concrete indicator of this cooperation.
Considering all these factors and looking from the perspective of the Shara administration, it can be interpreted that cooperating with Russia in certain areas would align with Syria’s national interests. These interests likely stem from the nature of the multi-dimensional relationships Russia has established with the US, Türkiye, and Israel. It can be commented that the Shara administration wishes to act by taking these dynamics into account. This requires Syria to follow a delicate balancing strategy in foreign policy. This policy entails following an extremely careful line in relations with great powers, neighboring countries, regional powers, and other middle powers.
In the future, a set of principles is expected to emerge in Syria’s foreign policy. Among these, it can be predicted that the balance policy will be the primary priority. Furthermore, a proactive policy is anticipated to be followed to increase integration with the world. The foreign policy pursued by the Shara administration thus far has contributed to the emergence of a sovereign Syria accepted in the international arena. Therefore, it is estimated that Syria will continue to act with the win-win principle and conduct multi-dimensional diplomacy in its future foreign relations. These policies will, above all, contribute to the construction of a peaceful, developed, and world-integrated Syria.
[1] “ABD Başkanı Trump: Suriye Cumhurbaşkanı ile çok iyi bir görüşme gerçekleştirdik”, AA, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/abd-baskani-trump-suriye-cumhurbaskani-ile-cok-iyi-bir-gorusme-gerceklestirdik/3812494, (Access Date: 29.01.2026).
[2] “Şara’dan Putin’e taahhüt: Anlaşmalara sadığız”, DW, https://shorturl.at/aRC9N, (Access Date: 29.01.2026).
