Since 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party(LDP) has been a decisive actor in Japan’s political structure and continues to sustain its long-standing hold on power. Against this backdrop of historical continuity, the decision by Sanae Takaichi, who assumed office as prime minister on 21 October 2025, to dissolve parliament on 23 January—barely three months into her tenure—and to initiate snap elections for all 465 seats in the House of Representatives scheduled for 8 February 2026, stands out as a striking turning point in Japanese politics. Despite the fact that the term of the House of Representatives extends until October 2028, this decision has prompted debates as to why Takaichi sought a new mandate from the public at such an early stage.
The practice of snap elections stands out as a political instrument frequently employed in Japanese politics. Historically, this authority has generally been exercised to secure public legitimacy for comprehensive policy initiatives or to strengthen control over the legislative body. In this context, the ability to implement a proposed policy agenda—particularly in highly sensitive areas such as the economy and national security—with reduced political resistance depends on the ruling power’s capacity to secure the necessary seat majority in parliament.
Within this framework, it can be argued that Takaichi—who has maintained a high level of public support since assuming office in October—aims to translate her existing societal legitimacy into a more solid and functional majority in the lower house, thereby reducing the political obstacles to the implementation of more comprehensive and ambitious policy initiatives. Indeed, according to a Japan News Network (JNN) poll published on 11 January, public support for the Takaichi Cabinet increased by 2.3 percentage points compared to the previous month, reaching 78.1% while support for the Liberal Democratic Party rose only marginally by 0.2 points to 29.7%. This picture clearly reveals the pronounced gap between Prime Minister Takaichi’s personal popularity and the level of support for her party.[i] This divergence stands out as one of the key factors reinforcing Takaichi’s pursuit of consolidating her current political position not only through opinion polls but also through electoral outcomes.
Indeed, having assumed the premiership through a parliamentary vote, Takaichi has openly expressed her discomfort with the fact that her cabinet has not yet been tested in an electoral process that directly reflects the will of the public; for this reason, she has regarded seeking a direct mandate from the electorate for the House of Representatives—the more dominant chamber of legislative power in Japan—as a strategic necessity.[ii] Under the current configuration, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is represented in the House of Representatives by 199 members—including three seats affiliated with independent supporters—and thus continues to hold its position as the largest party in the chamber. Nevertheless, the LDP and its right-leaning coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai), are entering the elections with a combined total of 233 seats, a numerical reality that renders the political calculations underpinning the decision to call a snap election all the more salient.
With Takaichi’s assumption of the premiership, Komeito—having served for many years as a coalition partner of the LDP—terminated this alliance and joined forces with the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), the country’s largest opposition party, thereby paving the way for the emergence of a new actor that has altered the political balance. The Centrist Reform Alliance that took shape in this process constitutes a new political formation formed through the convergence of these two entities and has emerged as the strongest challenger to the Takaichi-led LDP. The parties in question collectively hold a representative strength corresponding to a total of 172 seats in the Diet.[iii]
LDP Secretary General Shunichi Suzuki stated that the election in question would allow the new coalition formed by the Liberal Democratic Party with the conservative Japan Innovation Party to be tested before the electorate, following Takaichi’s decision last year to terminate the long-standing partnership with Komeito.[iv] Suzuki characterized this situation as one of the principal reasons for the dissolution of parliament, stating that the previous general election had been held during the LDP–Komeito coalition period and that the public had not yet had the opportunity to express its stance on this change in the coalition structure at the ballot box.[v]
However, the decision to call a snap election may be interpreted not solely as an outcome of domestic political dynamics, but also as a preference closely linked to Japan’s simultaneous foreign policy timetable. Indeed, according to media reports, it has been suggested that Prime Minister Takaichi is likely to visit the United States of America (USA) in the second half of March in order to place bilateral relations with Washington on a more solid footing and to establish direct contact with U.S. President Donald Trump ahead of his anticipated visit to China. [vi] In this context, the relevant institutions in both countries have already commenced the preparatory process, and the timing of the visit is expected to be finalized once the general election results have been clarified.
From this perspective, the decision to call a snap election can be understood as a strategic timing choice aimed at strengthening Japan’s foreign policy position ahead of forthcoming critical diplomatic engagements. Accordingly, it can be argued that Japan seeks to reinforce its alliance with the United States not only in security terms, but also through diplomatic timing and agenda-setting capacity. For Takaichi, emerging from the elections with a strong mandate would serve as a lever enhancing both her leadership capacity and negotiating power vis-à-vis Washington. In this context, the prospective visit may also be assessed as an effort to bring Japan’s strategic concerns onto the agenda at an early stage as the Trump administration’s China policy takes shape.
Nonetheless, despite the advantages that securing a strong mandate from the elections may offer in the sphere of foreign policy, converting this strategic gain into concrete electoral success in domestic politics requires the careful management of the prevailing political balance and coalition configuration. In the context of a potential snap election, although a relatively favorable political environment appears to have emerged for Takaichi, the party under her leadership does not exhibit a comparable level of popular support. Furthermore, the main opposition’s unexpected turn toward cooperation with the LDP’s former coalition partner has confronted the incumbent government with a more unified and well-organized opposition front. Within this equation, Komeito—drawing support from the Buddhist movement Soka Gakkai—emerges as a critical factor due to its strong organizational capacity for voter mobilization on election day; in the absence of such grassroots backing, the electoral performance of many LDP candidates is likely to be significantly weakened at the polls.[vii]
In addition to this domestic political landscape marked by shifting coalition balances and a restructured opposition, the long-accumulating structural problems of the ruling party stand out as another decisive factor constraining Takaichi’s room for maneuver during the snap election process. Despite her relative popularity at the leadership level, the LDP continues to face persistent erosion of public trust due to controversies surrounding political donations and financing practices, as well as its ties with certain religious organizations. This situation makes it difficult for the party’s electoral support to rise beyond a certain threshold. At the same time, issues such as inflationary pressures, the weakening of the Japanese yen, China-related economic risks, and Japan’s ongoing population decline accompanied by labor shortages remain prominent on the voters’ agenda.[viii]
In particular, economic conditions and inflation continue to rank among voters’ foremost concerns. Within this context, Takaichi’s approach—aimed at expanding budgetary expenditures, preparing a new national security strategy that would raise defense spending to 2% of national income, and increasing investments in so-called “strategic sectors” with high external dependence as well as in “crisis management” capacity—has generated public reservations regarding fiscal burden and practical feasibility.
Indeed, the JNN survey published on 11 January indicates that only around one third of respondents consider the government’s approach to rising prices to be satisfactory.[ix] Similarly, a separate public opinion survey released by NHK indicates that 45% of respondents regard rising prices as the country’s most urgent problem, while issues related to diplomacy and national security rank second at 16%.[x] When these data are considered collectively, it becomes evident that the Takaichi government’s policy priorities centered on security and strategic capacity-building do not fully align with voters’ short-term economic expectations.
In a context where concerns over economic stability and the cost of living remain elevated during the snap election period, a discourse centered on increasing defense spending and long-term strategic investments may generate only limited electoral mobilization. This situation carries the potential to transform Takaichi’s choices—arguably rational and coherent in the realms of foreign policy and national security—into a factor that produces electoral costs in domestic politics; accordingly, it underscores that the decision to call an early election entails structural risks for the incumbent, despite high levels of personal popularity.
In conclusion, Takaichi’s decision to call a snap election can be interpreted not merely as a tactical move to consolidate power in Japanese politics, but rather as a multidimensional strategic choice situated at the intersection of domestic political legitimacy, coalition balances, and foreign policy timing. While Takaichi seeks, on the one hand, to enhance her decision-making capacity by translating her high personal popularity into a parliamentary majority and to strengthen her leadership position ahead of forthcoming U.S.-centered diplomatic engagements, on the other hand she faces significant domestic political constraints stemming from a fragmented coalition structure, the re-consolidation of the opposition, and the LDP’s enduring structural legitimacy challenges.
In the current context, where economic problems and concerns over living costs have moved ahead of security and diplomacy on the voters’ agenda, the snap election process cannot be expected to automatically generate an advantage for the incumbent. Within this framework, the elections of 8 February 2026 constitute a critical turning point that will test not only whether Takaichi’s leadership is reaffirmed at the ballot box, but also the extent to which the structural divergence between leadership popularity and party support in Japanese politics can be effectively managed, as well as the LDP’s capacity to adapt to evolving political and societal demands.
[i] “Japan’s snap elections: A reckless risk or calculated gamble?”, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/20/japans-snap-elections-a-reckless-risk-or-calculated-gamble.html?msockid=03ed72267e296018026464ba7f3f61e3, (Date of Access: 22.01.2026).
[ii] “Japan PM Takaichi calls snap election three months after taking office”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1dk0x0v6pdo, (Date of Access: 21.01.2026).
[iii] “Japan PM Takaichi to call Feb 8 snap election on spending, tax cuts and defence”, MSN, https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/japan-pm-takaichi-to-call-feb-8-snap-election-on-spending-tax-cuts-and-defence/ar-AA1Uv9up?ocid=BingNewsSerp, (Date of Access: 20.01.2026).
[iv] “Japan PM plans snap election, party official says”, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/14/japan-snap-election-whats-next.html?msockid=03ed72267e296018026464ba7f3f61e3, (Date of Access: 21.01.2026).
[v] Ibid.
[vi] “Japan’s Sanae Takaichi calls snap election next month: ‘Staking my own future as PM’, Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/japan/japan-sanae-takaichi-snap-election-b2903048.html, (Date of Access: 22.01.2026).
[vii] “Takaichi’s Big Election Gamble: Will It Pay Off?”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/takaichis-big-election-gamble-will-it-pay-off/, (Date of Access: 21.01.2026).
[viii] “Even With High Approval Ratings, Is Takaichi’s Snap Election a Political Gamble?”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/even-with-high-approval-ratings-is-takaichis-snap-election-a-political-gamble/, (Date of Access: 20.01.2026).
[ix] Ibid.
[x] “Japan PM Takaichi to call Feb 8 snap election on spending, tax cuts and defence”, MSN, https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/japan-pm-takaichi-to-call-feb-8-snap-election-on-spending-tax-cuts-and-defence/ar-AA1Uv9up?ocid=BingNewsSerp, (Date of Access: 20.01.2026).
