The meeting between the Russian Ambassador and the Prime Minister of Burkina Faso in Ouagadougou brought the Sahel’s first joint telecommunications satellite to the table. This contact carries meanings far beyond a technical infrastructure initiative. This process, conducted with Moscow under the umbrella of the Sahel States Alliance (AES) formed by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, signals a deepening partnership in satellite technology.
This cooperation represents a critical threshold in terms of the region’s quest for sovereignty, the new security architecture being built, and foreign policy orientation. This step is particularly significant in a context where France and other Western actors are withdrawing their military presence. This satellite, planned to be placed in orbit, has the potential to redefine the geopolitical coordinates of the Sahel along with its sky.
The first layer of the telecommunications satellite planned by AES can be interpreted through concrete communication services and public diplomacy. The details of the project were clarified during the meetings in Bamako.[i] The priority among the objectives is to make television and radio broadcasts available throughout the AES region. It is also intended to provide internet and telephone services using VSAT technology in rural areas and border areas where infrastructure deficiencies are felt.[ii]
Providing uninterrupted and encrypted official-military communication capabilities is also one of the pillars of the project. Once the network reaches full capacity, a significant increase in internet interaction in Sub-Saharan Africa can be expected. The surge seen in the case of Angola is an example of this. Following the AngoSat 2 initiative, Angola increased its internet users by approximately three million within a year. There was also an increase of more than nine million in the number of mobile line subscribers. Therefore, the project is grounded in concrete technical terms with the goal of “access to unreachable points” in the eyes of AES.
The second layer of the issue takes shape in terms of security and surveillance. The bilateral satellite program agreed upon between AES and Roscosmos includes telecommunications as well as Earth observation capabilities.[iii] The planned Earth observation satellite will be used for border monitoring and wide-area surveillance. High-resolution image streaming will be provided to track the movements of terrorist groups and observe natural disasters and environmental shocks.
Terrorist groups are capable of attacking airports and frequently target border posts. In such an environment, real-time or near-real-time satellite imagery is of vital importance. This data will empower decision-makers across a wide range of areas, from the deployment of troops in the field to logistical activities. In this context, the orbital platform acts as a force multiplier that reinforces the AES’s common defense discourse on both technical and institutional levels.
The third layer is directly linked to the AES’s discourse on sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Alliance leaders have recently emphasized concepts such as “self-determination,” distancing from external interventions, and a new partnership architecture. The satellite program is developing as one of the concrete manifestations of this discourse. This structure will produce critical data on its own territory and project an image of political unity around a joint space project. Thus, a new claim to subjectification is being put forward at the regional and global levels. It is particularly important that television and radio broadcasts are carried out via a satellite belonging to the AES. This is seen as a strategic gain in terms of both the circulation of information and symbolic sovereignty.
At this stage, discussions regarding the satellite program’s operating model are also gaining seriousness. Current agreements indicate that the design, production, and launch processes of the satellites will be undertaken by the Russian side. AES will access this capacity through service procurement. However, the necessity of an institutional framework such as an “AES Space Agency” has already begun to be discussed.
In the long term, issues such as the management of orbital slots and the operation of ground stations will become relevant. Spectrum allocations and revenue sharing will also require technical and political decisions within AES. Such an institutionalization move will increase the alliance’s capacity. This will create opportunities for joint policy-making in digital and space domains beyond security.
How the satellite program is perceived by external actors is also important in terms of understanding the new layer of Sahel geopolitics. From the perspective of Paris and Brussels, the deepening of AES’s cooperation with Moscow in the telecommunications and space file is a cause for concern. This situation means a further narrowing of an already weakening sphere of influence. Some warnings in the European Union’s latest strategic documents are noteworthy.[iv] Emphasis is placed on Russia’s capacity to shape the information landscape in Africa and expand its disinformation networks.
On the Washington front, the satellite issue is approached differently. There is a possibility that the military-technological presence of Russia and other actors in the Sahel will become permanent. For this reason, new revisions in security planning may be necessary. In analyses from NATO and US sources, the Sahel line is now considered a “strategic depth area” in the context of energy, migration, and information security.
The situation is also sensitive at the regional level for actors such as ECOWAS and Algeria, Nigeria, and Mauritania. AES’s satellite initiative may trigger various reactions. On the one hand, increasing communication and surveillance capacity in the region is beneficial. It may indirectly contribute to tracking cross-border threats. On the other hand, military regimes in the Sahel gaining a new power projection tool will shift the balance. This situation may intensify political balance and competition dynamics. Therefore, the satellite program is a new factor in the geopolitics of the Sahel and its surroundings. This move may create new areas of conflict and cause friction points to emerge.
The satellite file also raises critical questions in the context of data sovereignty and cyber vulnerability. It is important where the data obtained from telecommunications and Earth observation satellites will be stored. Uncertainty remains regarding which infrastructures will be used to process the data and who will control software updates and maintenance processes. These details will directly affect the AES’s long-term level of technological dependence.
There are certain risks associated with a system connected to Russian-made platforms and ground stations. Control of encryption keys, network management protocols, and software components could pass to Moscow. This could give Russia significant leverage. This situation calls into question the nature of the satellite program. It will be debated whether the project is a tool that reinforces sovereignty or a channel that creates new dependencies.
All these elements can be evaluated with a holistic approach. AES’s satellite initiative could transform the region within a few years. It has the potential to reshape the security fabric, information infrastructure, and foreign policy landscape of the Sahel. The telecommunications and Earth observation satellites planned for launch are not simple devices. They are more than just technical tools that expand AES’s coverage area.
The components of a new vision of sovereignty, where borders, resources, migration routes, and conflict lines can be read from space, are taking shape. This new line drawn across the Sahel sky must be carefully managed. Otherwise, it could expose the region to further dependencies. If properly designed, however, the outcome will be different. AES will have the ability to rearrange fragile equations on Earth from orbit.
[i] “Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger Turn to Russia to Build the Sahel’s First Shared Telecom”, Business Insider Africa, 22 Ocak 2026, https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/lifestyle/burkina-faso-mali-niger-turn-to-russia-to-build-the-sahels-first-shared-telecom/efg8sh6, (Access Date: 23.01.2026).
[ii] “La Russie Pourrait Lancer un Satellite de Télécommunications au Profit des Pays du Sahel.” Kosmos News, 22 Ocak 2026, https://kosmosnews.fr/2026/01/22/la-russie-pourrait-lancer-un-satellite-de-telecommunications-au-profit-des-pays-du-sahel/, (Access Date: 23.01.2026).
[iii] “La Russie et le Burkina Faso ont Discuté de la Possibilité de Lancer un Satellite Russe de Télécommunications pour les Pays du Sahel”, Afrinz, 22 Ocak 2026, https://afrinz.ru/fr/2026/01/la-russie-et-le-burkina-faso-ont-discute-de-la-possibilite-de-lancer-un-satellite-russe-de-telecommunications-pour-les-pays-du-sahel/, (Access Date: 23.01.2026).
[iv] “AES : Le Burkina Faso et la Russie en Négociations pour un Satellite de Communication.” La Nouvelle Tribune, 22 Ocak 2026, https://lanouvelletribune.info/2026/01/aes-le-burkina-faso-et-la-russie-en-negociations-pour-un-satellite-de-communication/, (Access Date: 23.01.2026).
