Following the deadlock in the peace negotiations held in Pakistan, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Moscow and the messages he delivered there have revealed, from a geopolitical perspective, how closely aligned Russia and Iran are. As confidence in Pakistan’s neutrality diminished[i] from Iran’s perspective, Araghchi sought new mediators by visiting countries such as Russia and Oman and engaging in diplomatic contacts. At this point, Araghchi’s decision to visit Russia rather than China may be seen as an indication that Iran considers Russia a more suitable partner than China for resolving the crisis.
In his statement following his meetings in Moscow, Araghchi emphasized that Iran is resisting and will continue to resist Israeli–United States (US) aggression and will not surrender under any circumstances.[ii] These statements demonstrate that Iran and Russia share similar perspectives on “struggle against the West” and, in this context, may follow similar paths in terms of the tools and methods they employ in crises and conflicts. From this perspective, Iran, which perceives Pakistan as increasingly aligning with the US and no longer trusting it sufficiently[iii] has intensified its contacts with Russia and Oman to find a “closer mediator.” This orientation has been influenced by factors such as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s close relations with US President Donald Trump, as well as the convergence of views between Iran and Russia on issues such as enriched uranium and the security of the Strait of Hormuz.
From the US perspective, Russia is also considered an unreliable actor, and it is assumed that Moscow and Tehran will act in coordination. Therefore, although Russian mediation is not considered reasonable from the US standpoint, Moscow may still play a facilitating role in the peace process. First, Russia could help find a middle ground regarding uranium enrichment levels and the handling of existing enriched uranium stockpiles. Second, regarding the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf, Russia has long proposed establishing a mechanism known as the Collective Security Concept.[iv] This proposal has also been supported by Iran and China for many years. Furthermore, over the past decade, energy agreements have been concluded with Russian companies to develop certain oil fields along Iran’s southern coastline. Iran has also sought to establish deterrence by conducting military exercises with Russia and China along the coasts of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Overall, Russia’s positions are likely to be regarded as “unacceptable” by the US and other Western countries.
China’s approach to crises is also highly significant in this context. For instance, China’s 12-point peace proposal regarding the war in Ukraine has,[v] in many respects, conflicted with Russia’s interests. Among the most striking messages conveyed by China were the principles of “respect for the territorial integrity of all countries” and “avoiding a Cold War mentality.” These principles constituted an important message directed at Russia. At the same time, China seeks a balanced stance regarding the Iran Crisis. Beijing avoids providing open support for Tehran, given its relations with Washington. In doing so, China also calculates the impact that the prolongation of the war has had—and may continue to have—on energy, trade, and the broader economy.[vi] From the perspectives of both Russia and China, the prolongation of the war in Iran may be seen as advantageous insofar as it could drag the US into a difficult situation and weaken it. However, when considering long-term effects, the rapid conclusion of the war in Iran would be more aligned with China’s interests in particular.
Russia, in general, may provide more decisive and open support to Tehran, believing that Iran’s struggle will harm the West. China, on the other hand, is expected to adopt a principled stance in the Iran Crisis, as it has in the Ukraine Crisis. In this regard, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s four-point Middle East Peace Plan[vii] contains principles similar to those in the 12-point Ukraine Peace Plan. These can be listed as “peaceful coexistence and a regional security architecture,” “respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity,” “adherence to international law,” and “balancing development with security.” China has consistently emphasized, particularly since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine War, the need to avoid Cold War-style bloc politics and conflict dynamics. Iran, however, as Araghchi emphasized in Moscow, maintains that it “will not surrender under any circumstances.” Tehran’s stance, in this respect, more closely resembles that of Moscow. By contrast, China’s principled foreign policy approach to crises does not fully align with Iran’s interests.
In conclusion, while Russia may act as a more revisionist actor inclined to turn crises into opportunities, China, as one of the countries that benefits most from the global economic system, is more sensitive to instability. From a diplomatic perspective, Russia may at times employ a more confrontational and assertive rhetoric. China, by contrast, tends to emphasize general principles such as “restraint,” “dialogue,” “avoidance of Cold War mentality,” and “respect for sovereignty.” As Tehran’s resistance to the West intensifies, Russia’s strategic room for maneuver expands accordingly; however, the same situation poses a direct threat to the Chinese economy due to its significant impact on energy prices and trade routes. As Iran continues its search for a “closer mediator,” it can be clearly stated that it is unlikely to find support from China that fully aligns with its expectations.
[i] “Pakistan not a suitable intermediary, says Iranian MP amid stalled talks”, India Today, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/pakistan-mediation-role-questioned-by-iranian-lawmaker-as-araghchi-holds-islamabad-talks-2901983-2026-04-27, (Access Date: 29.04.2026).
[ii] “Putin’den Arakçi ile kritik zirve sonrası ilk açıklama”, Hurriyet, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/putinden-arakci-ile-kritik-zirve-sonrasi-ilk-aciklama-43160573, (Access Date: 29.04.2026).
[iii] “‘Pakistan Not Suitable Intermediary For Negotiations’: Iran Questions Islamabad’s Pro-US Bias”, News18, https://www.news18.com/world/pakistan-not-suitable-intermediary-for-negotiations-iran-questions-islamabads-pro-us-bias-ws-l-10059001.html, (Access Date: 29.04.2026).
[iv] Unalmış, A. N. ve Tamer, C. (2025). Iran’s Policies Towards the Southern Coastline. Gazi Akademik Bakış, 19(37), 332.
[v] “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”, MFA-PRC, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367485.html, (Access Date: 29.04.2026).
[vi] İran’daki savaşın Çin ekonomisine potansiyel etkileri için bkz. “The Iran War Is Starting to Expose Cracks in China’s Economy”, Nytimes, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/27/business/china-economy-iran-war.html, (Access Date: 29.04.2026).
[vii] “China’s Xi puts forth four-point Mideast peace plan”, TRT World, https://www.trtworld.com/article/137fd1fb69c1, (Access Date: 29.04.2026).
