In the conflict between the United States (US)/Israel and Iran, despite growing opposition to the US/Israel alliance within European Union (EU) countries—particularly Spain and Italy—and the EU’s pursuit of ‘strategic autonomy’, Greece, as both a Mediterranean country and an EU member state, continues to support the aforementioned alliance and, whilst maintaining a certain balance (with an emphasis on restraint and international law), continues to adopt a stance aligned with the US/Israel, increasingly viewing Iran as a threat.
Although Greece refuses to participate directly in military operations against Iran in order to preserve the deep strategic partnership it has established with Israel and the US over the past fifteen years, it permits the use of its bases (particularly Suda Bay on Crete) for logistical and defence purposes, and, within the framework of Iran’s rhetoric and assessments regarding the potential targeting of British/US bases in Greece and Cyprus, is putting EU countries—particularly France and the UK—on high alert. The reason for Greece’s such deep engagement with the US/Israel alliance lies in the security- and defence-focused, aggressive foreign policy strategy it has implemented in recent years.
The Economic Crisis, the Rise of the Right and Relations with the EU
Greece, which joined the European Communities (EC) in 1981, turned its foreign policy issues—notably the problems it faced in its relations with Türkiye and, in the 1990s, with North Macedonia—into EU issues, and pressured the EU to resolve these issues in line with its own national interests; this led to Greece being criticised from time to time within the EC during the 1980s , which led to Greece occasionally being criticised within the EC; however, the initiation of a process of detente with Türkiye towards the end of the 1990s and Greece’s recognition of Macedonia as the Republic of North Macedonia on 12 June 2018, followed by the signing of the Prespa Agreement with North Macedonia, have enhanced alignment with the EU in foreign policy. The most significant turning point in Greece’s relations with the EU, alongside increased economic support through EU funding, was the “Greek Debt Crisis (Eurozone Crisis)”, which began as a result of the 2008 Economic Crisis and plunged Greece into a severe debt crisis in 2015.
The first crack in relations emerged in 2009 when the newly elected PASOK government revealed that the previous government had manipulated the budget deficit figures and that the deficit was twice the announced amount, triggering a serious ‘crisis of confidence’ towards Greece within the EU. The “Troika” – comprising the EU, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – imposed extremely harsh austerity measures (wage cuts, tax increases, privatisations) in exchange for the bailout packages granted to Greece, leading to anti-EU sentiment within the Greek public over these policies, this situation led to the left-wing party SYRIZA coming to power and, although it eventually bowed to pressure, it also brought about a rebellion against the EU’s demands. In the same year, at the height of the economic crisis, the arrival of refugees fleeing the Syrian Civil War via the Greek islands to Europe created new tensions; while Greece accused the EU of leaving it to bear the burden of refugees alone, some EU countries (particularly those in Eastern Europe) accused Greece of failing to secure its borders adequately.[i]
Both the economic crisis and the rising numbers of refugees have fuelled anti-EU sentiment and the rise of the right and nationalism in Greece; with the end of the bailout programmes in 2018 and the subsequent arrival of the New Democracy government led by Kyriakos Mitsotakis, domestic issues have once again taken precedence over the EU in foreign policy, whilst the old “threats” (Türkiye) have been re-framed as “major threats”, while former allies such as Russia and Iran have been added to the list of new threats. Today, Greece is seeking to incorporate these national threats into the EU’s security policy, receiving significant support from France in particular, and is striving to strengthen its ties with Brussels by assuming the role of a “fortress” defending the EU’s borders in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the belief that the EU has been inadequate and ineffective in the economic and security spheres has led Greece to adopt a foreign policy approach dependent on the US in the 2020s.
The US-Centric Aggressive Approach to Security and New Enemies
Greece, which has been a NATO member since 1952 and whose relations with the US have historically been up and down, has sought to balance its security relations with the EU against its relations with the US, particularly during the Mitsotakis government, and has entered into a close strategic partnership with the US, including the alliance it forged with Israel. The primary reason for Greece—which, since the 1980s, had not supported US policies towards the USSR/Russia and the Middle East, and where anti-US sentiment was quite prevalent in public opinion—becoming so aligned with US policies has been the economic crisis and the rise in nationalist rhetoric resulting from refugee migration in domestic politics, while in foreign policy, it was the competition with Türkiye over energy fields in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Towards the end of the 2010s, the US, began to view Greece as its “new strategic anchor” in the region following tensions with Türkiye over the S-400 crisis and Syria policies; Greece seized this opportunity and permitted the US to increase its military presence in the country, particularly by establishing a major logistics centre in Dedeağaç, close to the Turkish border. This rapprochement was further cemented by the US’s approval of the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act in 2019 and steps such as declaring Greece and Cyprus strategic partners whilst imposing an F-35 embargo on Türkiye. During this period, Greece has pursued a strategy to modernise its military capabilities and has signed significant defence agreements with both the US and France.[ii]
Greece’s US-centric, aggressive approach to security has shifted towards a more distant stance towards Russia and Iran—countries with which it had maintained amicable relations prior to 2018–2019—to the extent that these nations are now perceived as security threats. Greece, which has cultural and religious bonds with Russia and pursued a pro-Russian foreign policy, particularly in the 1990s, began to perceive Russia as a threat in 2018 due to its growing alignment with the US and its unease regarding the positive trajectory of Türkiye-Russia relations; this perception of threat has almost turned into a hostile stance following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War on 24 February 2022. On the day the war began, Greece was among the countries that condemned Russia most strongly, fully complied with the EU’s sanctions against Russia, and decided to send military aid (weapons) to Ukraine; in response, Russia characterised Greece’s dispatch of Soviet-made armoured vehicles (BMP-1) to Ukraine as “direct hostility”. Russia’s immediate addition of Greece to its official list of “Unfriendly Countries” subsequently led to Greece becoming more closely aligned with the US in security matters.
Greece, which maintained balanced and positive relations with Iran until the 2020s, has become so closely aligned with the US-Israel alliance that this has affected its relations with Iran; the defence cooperation established by Athens with Israel and the military base facilities it provides to the US (Suda Bay) are viewed by Iran as a ‘hostile encirclement’, Greece, which in the past served as a bridge country advocating for dialogue with Iran within the EU, has now entirely relinquished this role in favour of a profile as a “loyal ally” operating within the US-Israel alliance. Consequently, by becoming more dependent on US policies to address its defence and security gaps, Greece has alienated countries with which it previously maintained amicable relations, such as Russia and Iran, and, paradoxically, has begun to feel an even greater sense of insecurity. What is interesting, however, is that the primary cause of the defence and security gap it sought to close is not Russia or Iran, but rather the fact that, following a return to the “Threat from the East” narrative from the 2010s onwards, it has come to view Türkiye as the “greatest security threat”.
The Re-securitisation of Türkiye
Since the mid-1950s, Turkish-Greek relations have been marked by several unresolved issues, primarily the Cyprus Issue, as well as disputes over the Aegean, the status and militarisation of the islands, airspace and the FIR line. The rapprochement that began in 1997 entered a new phase in 1999 with Greece’s support for Türkiye’s candidacy for the EU. In fact, Greece’s endorsement of Türkiye’s EU candidacy was intended to integrate bilateral issues into the broader context of Türkiye-EU relations, and Athens supported the reforms because it believed that Türkiye would become a more predictable neighbour within the EU. With the consultative talks that began in 2002, Aegean issues (continental shelf, airspace, etc.) were addressed for the first time in such a comprehensive and regular manner, In 2004, whilst Türkiye and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) supported the Annan Plan prepared for the resolution of the Cyprus Issue, the rejection by the Government of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) was the greatest disappointment of the period; however, although the issues remained unresolved, they were frozen on both sides in such a way that they would not be raised within the framework of well-intentioned relations.
During this period, both Greece and Türkiye aimed to develop mutual economic, political and cultural relations. However, the economic crises of the 2010s, the discovery of energy fields in the Eastern Mediterranean and the dispute over which country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) these fields fall within have transformed the positive atmosphere in relations into fierce competition. As previously noted, when the deep economic crisis in Greece, the influx of refugees, tensions with the EU and the rise of nationalist rhetoric were added to this competition, Türkiye was once again positioned as “the country Greece perceives as the greatest threat” and thus securitised.[iii]
In this context, the gas reserves off the coasts of Israel (Leviathan) and Egypt (Zohr) have driven Greece and the GCASC to pursue the dream of becoming an ‘energy hub’; attempts to exclude Türkiye from this equation (the EastMed project) have led Ankara to implement its ‘Blue Homeland’ doctrine; and the refusal of Greece to extradite soldiers who fled following the 15 July 2016 FETÖ coup attempt has fundamentally shaken political trust. The failure of the Cyprus talks held in Crans-Montana, Switzerland, in 2017 triggered the deadlock and led both sides to make tougher moves on the ground (through drilling ships and naval activity). Furthermore, the Aegean Sea, which serves as a transit route for millions of people fleeing the Syrian Civil War to Europe, has become both an area of cooperation and a focal point for reciprocal accusations between the two countries.
Türkiye’s dispatch of seismic research vessels to disputed areas, accompanied by the navy, during 2019–2020, and Greece’s reciprocal response, brought the two countries to the brink of armed conflict for the first time since the 1996 Kardak Crisis. The Maritime Jurisdiction Areas Agreement signed by Türkiye with Libya in 2019 was declared “null” by Athens because it legally undermined the strategy Greece had established through Crete; consequently, Greece and the GCASC have established trilateral mechanisms with countries such as Israel and Egypt, effectively excluding Türkiye. Türkiye, however, has viewed this situation as an attempt to confine it to its own coasts. The US’s increase in its military presence in Greece, and in particular the establishment of a major logistics centre in Dedeağaç near the Turkish border, has been perceived by Ankara as a threat and a balancing factor, whilst Greece has begun to voice more frequently its desire to militarise the Aegean islands, which, under the terms of the Lausanne and Paris Treaties, are supposed to have a non-military status. While Türkiye argues that this situation calls into question the sovereignty of the islands, Greece has claimed that it exercised its right to self-defence, citing its decision that Türkiye would regard any extension of its territorial waters to 12 miles as a ‘casus belli’ (cause for war). Although there has been a relative thaw in relations between the two countries following the 2023 earthquake in Türkiye and the signing of the Athens Declaration that same year—which encompassed continuous, constructive consultations on political dialogue, a positive agenda and confidence-building measures—the perception that Türkiye is a ‘security threat’ has not changed significantly.
Consequently, Greece’s aggressive security doctrine, which identifies Türkiye as the primary threat, has made it dependent on the US-Israel Alliance. This dependency has led Greece to include Russia and Iran, alongside Türkiye, among the countries it considers security threats, and its security needs in foreign policy have increased rather than diminished. It remains highly debatable how this dependency will affect Greece’s position within the EU in its quest for ‘strategic autonomy’ in the coming days, and how this foreign policy framework—which perceives Türkiye as a threat—will be influenced by the EU’s stated desire to establish a ‘geostrategic partnership’ with Türkiye.
[i] Angelos Chryssogelos. 2019. “Europeanisation as de-politicisation, crisis as re-politicisation: the case of Greek foreign policy during the Eurozone crisis”. Journal of European Integration, 41(5).
[ii] Mehmet Uğur Ekinci, “Yunanistan’ın Stratejisi”, Kriter November 2021 / Year 6, Issue 62, https://kriterdergi.com/dis-politika/yunanistanin-stratejisi, (Date of Access: 27 April 2026).
[iii] Cihan Dizdaroğlu-Başar Baysal. 2022. “Güvenlikleştirme Çerçevesinden Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkilerinin Analizi”, in Berk Esen and Başar Baysal (eds.) Eleştirel Güvenlik ve Türkiye: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Alternatif Yaklaşım, (329-362), İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.
