Despite the US President Donald Trump’s clear and decisive unilateral declaration of sovereignty over Greenland, the European Union (EU) has taken a normative stance supporting Denmark’s sovereignty; emphasizing the need to recognize common transatlantic interests in peace and security in the Arctic, particularly through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Washington viewed Brussels’ statements supporting Greenland not as a diplomatic disagreement but as resistance to its geostrategic interests and took the decision to impose punitive customs duties, putting forward economic tools as a mechanism of political pressure In addition to the tariff threat, the European Parliament suspended the approval process for the trade agreement with the US, after which Trump announced that he was canceling the tariff decision.[1]
This particular transatlantic conflict in Greenland can be interpreted in relation with Trump’s attempt to resolve the Ukraine War by leaving European countries out of the picture. Since the war began, the EU and European countries have taken on a significant portion of the economic, political, and military support for Ukraine, yet issues such as the future of the war and the peace order have been pursued through dialogue between Trump and Putin. In both cases, it is noteworthy that the EU and European countries are increasingly being excluded from decision-making processes in a way that cannot be explained by classic allied relations. Therefore, the Greenland Crisis, which is a concrete manifestation of this structural transformation in the transatlantic alliance, clearly demonstrates a rupture in US-EU relations.
The Greenland Crisis is significant not only for the tension it creates in transatlantic relations but also for forcing a choice between European ideals and Atlanticist tendencies within the EU’s internal workings. This is because the EU’s inability to establish a deterrent will—due to factors such as the weakness of its common foreign policy reflex, the prioritization of national interests in crisis areas, and the inadequacy of its defense capabilities— Meanwhile, under Trump’s leadership, the US has prioritized bilateral relations based on cost-benefit calculations over alliances, embracing a hierarchical understanding of NATO as a mechanism led by the US with other members conforming to its will. This increasingly pushes the EU, in the eyes of the US, into the position of an actor to be managed rather than an equal partner. Therefore, whether the EU shapes its future in line with an Atlanticist understanding or a Europeanist approach is important both for the fate of integration and for the EU’s position on the global stage.
As known, the pro-European approach aims to become an actor capable of making independent decisions from the US in the areas of defense, foreign policy, security, and energy, that is, to achieve strategic autonomy. In this regard, a foreign policy vision centered on normative power, multilateralism, and the interests of the Union is prominent. In contrast, proponents of the Atlanticist approach believe that European security and global influence are largely possible thanks to NATO and transatlantic ties under US leadership. In other words, while strategic autonomy requires Europe to be able to act against the US when necessary, the Atlanticist line views such a divergence as a risk. Until now, the EU has attempted to pursue both of these orientations simultaneously in its foreign and security policy. In crises such as the Iraq War, the intervention in Libya, and trade tensions, the EU has, on the one hand, emphasized its sovereignty and decision-making capacity, while on the other hand, consciously avoiding steps that would damage EU-US relations. However, the difficulty of continuing policies aimed at avoiding conflict with the US while preserving the EU’s sovereignty has become clear with the Greenland Crisis.
Indeed, rather than power politics, the EU’s normative principles, which defend the rule-based international order and the principles of respect for the territorial integrity of sovereign states, clearly contradict Trump’s unilateral rhetoric and pressure regarding sovereignty claims over Greenland, not implicitly but explicitly, within EU borders. This situation has brought the European-Atlanticist tension, which has long been managed within the EU, to the surface in the form of the Greenland Crisis.
Indeed, the Greenland issue is directly related to the EU’s normative values. France, Denmark, and many Western European countries have emphasized these values and found the US move unacceptable. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that EU countries would respond to the tariff threat in a united and coordinated manner and suggested using the EU’s most powerful trade weapon, also known as the bazooka.[2] Countries in Eastern Europe, approaching the issue from an Atlanticist perspective, are concerned about the weakening of transatlantic relations and NATO guarantees, and emphasize the need to preserve strategic cooperation.[3] Although the current situation suggests that pro-European and pro-Atlantic tendencies are being pursued in a simultaneous and complementary balance, the emphasis placed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on Europe’s independence at the World Economic Forum indicates that this balance is becoming fragile.
If the US deepens its unilateral pressure tactics, this fragile balance has the potential to rapidly turn into open tension. For if an issue that should be normatively opposed is tolerated on security grounds, the EU’s claim to strategic autonomy and its capacity to develop a common foreign policy may be weakened. Domestically, it would cause normative disappointment, particularly in countries with high sovereignty sensitivities such as France, Spain, and Denmark, and the pro-European approach would lose credibility.
The fact that pro-European rhetoric has become untenable could create a platform for the far right to express its anti-EU rhetoric more loudly and gain public support. On the other hand, the Soviet occupation, the experience of the Warsaw Pact, and the deepening Russian threat with the Russia-Ukraine War make the US an existential security guarantor, especially for Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania, and security takes precedence over normative values for these countries. The question dominating public opinion is not why we are not standing up to the US, but why we are confronting the US. Therefore, in countries where the Atlanticist stance prevails, adopting a pro-European discourse could result in political costs for governments.
Given today’s power balances, security dependency, and public opinion asymmetry, it can be argued that remaining on the Atlanticist track is easier for the EU than shifting toward a Europeanist track. While the necessity of staying on the Atlanticist track does not make the EU a proxy actor in the classical sense, it brings it closer to the position of an actor with effectively limited autonomy. At this point, it is important whether Germany can take on a transformative role in changing the dominance of the Atlanticist orientation within the EU. Although Germany, the Union’s largest economy, is dependent on the US in the security sphere, it can be said that it is the only EU country with the economic and institutional capacity to transform this dependency. At the same time, it is an actor with the capacity to exert a lasting and structural influence on the orientations of Eastern European countries integrated into the German economy. However, in the Greenland issue, although Germany made statements dominated by pro-European rhetoric, it is understood that in practice, it was reluctant to face the costs of security, political, economic, and geopolitical isolation that would result from entering into a strategic conflict with the US.[4]
As a result, Trump’s direct claim of sovereignty over Greenland has affected transatlantic relations and has emerged as a direct internal EU issue. Europe is faced with a scenario in which it must either pursue a more independent line to protect its own political ideals or compromise these ideals for the sake of loyalty to the transatlantic alliance. The fact that the process of determining whether the pro-European or pro-Atlanticist orientation will prevail is shaped by the moves of Washington, the game changer, creates an irony that contradicts pro-European claims. This situation shows that the EU prefers Atlanticist pragmatism in the current context. Opting for Atlanticist pragmatism may be considered rational in the short term; however, it must be interpreted as a choice that will erode European integration in the long term.
[1] Elisabeth Buchwald, Ana Nicolaci da Costa, “The EU pushed back on Trump’s latest tariff threats. Hours later, he backed down”, CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/21/business/eu-us-trade-deal-indefinitely-frozen, (Date Accessed: 21.01.2026).
[2] “What is the EU anti-coercion ‘bazooka’ it could use against the US over Greenland?”, France24, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20260119-what-is-eu-anti-coercion-instrument-could-use-against-us-over-trump-greenland-tariffs, (Date Accessed: 21.01.2026).
[3] “Polish president: Greenland tensions must not distract from war in Ukraine”, Polskie Radio, https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/7784/Artykul/3637004,polish-president-greenland-tensions-must-not-distract-from-war-in-ukraine,(Date Accessed: 21.01.2026).
[4] “Fact Check: German troops left Greenland after short, pre-planned mission, not due to tariffs threat”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/german-troops-left-greenland-after-short-pre-planned-mission-not-due-tariffs-2026-01-20/, (Date Accessed: 21.01.2026).
