The news that the Rafah Crossing will be reopened in a controlled and limited manner entered the global agenda in a single, simple sentence.[i] Yet behind this brief statement lies a massive diplomatic construct, such as the Peace Council Charter signed in Davos. Intense political pressure from Washington on the Netanyahu government, along with a new architecture to determine the future of the ceasefire in Gaza, constitute the cornerstones of this process. Developments that appear to be merely technical border management decisions are, in essence, revealing the political balance sheet of the war. To understand the regional balance of power in the coming period, it is essential to examine the background of this decision. The true framework of what is described as the “second phase” in Gaza is becoming clear through these three fundamental headings.
The ceremony in Davos, where Trump announced the “Peace Council” in front of cameras, marked the symbolic starting point of the process.[ii] In the ceremonial text and accompanying speeches, Gaza was not mentioned as expected. Instead, the document emphasized a more general, abstract, and global discourse of “peace and stability.” This preference indicates that the council is not intended to be a narrow monitoring body focused solely on Gaza. Rather, this new structure gives the impression of being conceived as a Washington-centered instrument of political influence spanning a wide spectrum from regional crises to global rivalries. However, Ankara’s presence at this table should not be read as endorsing the flaws of the structure, but rather as a strategy to prevent Gaza’s fate from being left entirely to external actors and to balance the process from within.
The council’s membership structure and financing design make this picture even more apparent. High financial thresholds and participation fees limit entry to only selected states. Global business circles are also intended to be integrated into this structure. This model represents a logic entirely different from the inclusive and pluralistic structures centered on the United Nations.[iii] Access to crisis zones no longer passes through broad coalitions of states sharing responsibility. Instead, it passes through a privileged club that concentrates power and resources in a single hand. This club possesses the capacity to transform the concept of peace into a tool of governance and control. The Gaza case can thus be read as a test field for this new model of global crisis governance.
This strategic framework has a direct and harsh impact on Gaza’s ceasefire plan. The announced “second phase” draft envisages the gradual withdrawal of Israeli ground forces from within Gaza.[iv] Security control is planned to be transferred to a technocratic Palestinian administration stripped of political ambitions. While Hamas’s military presence is to be dismantled, the political sphere will also be reshaped according to rules designed externally. This arrangement points to a hybrid trusteeship model that limits the will of local actors and is entirely designed from the outside.
Washington’s recent diplomatic maneuvers clearly reveal the urgency of this intent. For example, senior U.S. representatives have exerted intense pressure on Netanyahu to move to the second phase of the ceasefire.[v] At the center of this pressure lies the reopening of the Rafah Crossing. The opening of the crossing can be presented both as the first concrete success achieved by the Peace Council on the ground and as a powerful asset for the Trump administration’s narrative of a “new peace architecture.” For this reason, the Gaza arena has become a strategic laboratory for Washington.
The model announced by the Israeli government responds to this pressure while preserving its own security priorities. The Tel Aviv administration has, in principle, accepted the reopening of Rafah. However, it has stated that crossings will be limited to pedestrian traffic only. No timetable has been provided for vehicle crossings or the entry of commercial goods. It has also been announced that the process will proceed in line with progress on the hostage case. This approach demonstrates the continuation of a line that transforms humanitarian access from a right into a bargaining instrument. Unfortunately, the issue of humanitarian aid has been reduced to a mechanism of political concession.
The symbolic burden of Rafah on the ground becomes even heavier due to these restrictions. For the people of Gaza, this crossing is far more than a border point. It functions almost as the city’s breathing tube. Humanitarian aid flows, evacuations of critically ill patients, and civilian mobility must be carried out through this point. It is no coincidence that Gaza’s newly appointed administrator has described Rafah as a “lifeline and gate of hope.” The reopening of the crossing could initiate a period in which daily life partially loosens under harsh siege conditions. However, the announced model confirms that this loosening will be kept under very tight control.
The role played by the Peace Council in this equation brings a new governance debate to the fore. On paper, the council is presented as a neutral and technical observer of the ceasefire. Nevertheless, its membership composition and decision-making mechanisms create a form that amplifies the weight of powerful actors. The representational capacity of Palestinian parties and local society within this structure appears quite limited. This setup may give the impression of an elite table that uses the concept of peace to generate legitimacy. The gap between realities on the ground and plans at the table is steadily widening.
From Gaza’s perspective, the emerging picture is highly complex. The second phase ceasefire is being framed as an interim regime rather than a permanent solution. Israel remains extremely reluctant to loosen its security control. Hamas, meanwhile, seeks to preserve its underground and aboveground presence. The Peace Council and the Trump administration aim to reshape the field through economic and political incentives. At the intersection of these three actors, a system may emerge in which the siege is softened while political autonomy is narrowed. This system may produce partial stability. At the same time, it may accumulate a fragility that lays the groundwork for future waves of conflict.
The optimistic atmosphere that has formed in international media in the days following the Rafah decision may obscure this complex picture. The phrase “the gate is opening” creates a sense of approaching peace in public opinion. Yet the details of implementation point to a security logic that measures freedom of movement down to the millimeter. Conditions tied to the hostage file turn humanitarian access into a tactical pressure tool. Gazans’ access to their most basic needs has been indexed to the outcome of political bargaining. Such an equation creates a limited opportunity for the people of Gaza to catch their breath. At the same time, it may also function to reinforce the fundamental pillars of the status quo.
For this reason, the reopening of Rafah should not be evaluated in isolation. It is essential to read this development together with the Peace Council architecture and the negotiations along the Washington-Tel Aviv axis. What we are witnessing is a transition from the hot and destructive phase of war to a form of controlled stability engineering. This transition may proceed with a logic that is not based on ending the conflict, but on keeping it at a manageable level.
The fundamental question regarding Gaza’s future thus becomes clear. Will this second phase create a transformation that strengthens the political agency of the people? Or will it mark the beginning of a prolonged interim regime sustained by controlled breathing spaces? The answer to this question has the potential to affect all regional balances in the period ahead.
[i] “Israel agrees to reopen Rafah crossing only for Gaza pedestrians”, Al Monitor, 25 Ocak 2026, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/01/israel-agrees-reopen-rafah-crossing-only-gaza-pedestrians, (Day Accessed: 26.01.2026).
[ii] “Trump launches Board of Peace at signing ceremony in Davos”, Al Jazeera, 22 Ocak 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/22/trump-launches-board-of-peace-at-ceremony-in-davos, (Day Accessed: 26.01.2026).
[iii] Hugh Lovatt, “Welcome to the jungle: Trump’s Board of Peace goes global”, ECFR, 23 Ocak 2026, https://ecfr.eu/article/welcome-to-the-jungle-trumps-board-of-peace-goes-global/, (Day Accessed: 26.01.2026).
[iv] “US envoys urge Netanyahu to move into Gaza ceasefire’s second phase”, The New Arab, 25 Ocak 2026, https://www.newarab.com/news/us-envoys-urge-netanyahu-move-gaza-ceasefires-second-phase, (Day Accessed: 26.01.2026).
[v] Ibid.
