In international relations, discourse is a fundamental instrument through which states construct identities, shape power relations, and legitimize political agendas. Structuralist and critical approaches inspired by Foucault’s concept of discourse emphasize that discourse is not merely a mode of communication, but a practice that produces truth and reorganizes relations of power. Within this framework, climate change and green energy policies have emerged as a new arena of contemporary great power competition. The strategic rivalry between the United States (U.S.) and China, extending from trade wars to technological competition, is also reflected in the field of renewable energy, where both the ideological and economic dimensions of this rivalry become visible.
In his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump’s remarks regarding China clearly reveal the discursive dimension of this rivalry. Trump claimed that despite being the world’s largest producer of wind turbines, China does not make use of wind energy within its own territory, stating: “China produces almost all of the wind turbines, but I couldn’t find a single wind farm in China.”.[i] The tension between Trump’s populist-nationalist discourse and China’s narrative of responsible global leadership affects not only energy policies but also the future of the global climate regime.
Trump’s Discourse: Populism, Anti-China Rhetoric, and Fossil Fuel Hegemony
Trump’s remarks on China in his Davos speech represent a continuation of his long-standing populist rhetorical trajectory. Within the framework of the “America First” policy, Trump has consistently positioned China as an economic threat and legitimized the tariff measures implemented between 2018 and 2020 as a means of reducing the trade deficit. In the context of wind energy, his portrayal of China’s turbine exports as a “cunning” strategy constructs China as an actor that exploits global free trade mechanisms to its advantage. Moreover, the reference to “unwitting buyers” implicitly demeans Europe and developing countries, while simultaneously calling for the formation of a “smart” bloc under U.S. leadership.[ii]
This discourse also reflects Trump’s broader skeptical stance toward renewable energy. In his previous speeches, Trump has characterized wind turbines as “expensive,” “ugly,” and “inefficient,” and has even claimed that they pose health risks. His description of wind energy as a “new green scam” in the 2026 Davos speech further demonstrates his effort to protect the fossil fuel industry and what he frames as national interests.[iii] This rhetoric reflects the influence of coal and oil lobbies in U.S. domestic politics, while at the international level it seeks to undermine China’s dominance in green technologies.
From a discourse-analytical perspective, Trump’s claim constitutes a clear example of “post-truth” politics. China’s wind power capacity, which exceeded 600 GW as of November 2025, directly contradicts Trump’s assertion that he “could not find a wind farm” in China. This capacity surpasses that of the rest of the world combined and reflects China’s uninterrupted global leadership in wind energy for the past fifteen years.[iv] Trump’s disregard for these facts reveals the ideological function of his discourse: to slow China’s rise and to reassert U.S. energy independence through fossil fuels.
China’s Counter-Discourse: Responsible Great Power and Global Green Leadership
China’s response to Trump’s claims was rapidly articulated through state-affiliated and international media outlets. These media organizations directly refuted Trump’s narrative by visualizing China’s massive wind farms located in deserts, offshore areas, and mountainous regions. This counter-narrative positions China as a responsible global actor committed to its “dual carbon goals”—achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 and peaking carbon emissions by 2030—thereby reinforcing its image as a leader in global green transformation.[v]
China’s discourse is grounded in the concepts of “win–win cooperation” and a “community with a shared future for mankind.” By emphasizing that it produces approximately 80 percent of the world’s photovoltaic modules and 70 percent of global wind power equipment, China argues that its exports contribute directly to global carbon reduction efforts. Over the past five years, China’s green product exports have reportedly reduced carbon emissions abroad by approximately 4.1 billion tons. This narrative foregrounds cooperation with developing countries (such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan), thereby implicitly rejecting Trump’s characterization of these countries as “unwitting buyers.”[vi]
From a discourse-analytical perspective, China’s narrative extends the tradition of “South–South cooperation” into the field of renewable energy. By criticizing the Western-dominated climate regime while legitimizing its own leadership, this discourse constructs a counter-hegemonic narrative that advocates global climate justice. Concrete commitments, such as the target of exceeding 100 GW of offshore wind capacity and pledging 120 GW of new annual installations in the 15th Five-Year Plan, further reinforce the material basis of this narrative.[vii]
Trump’s 2026 discourse represents a continuation of the trade war that began in 2018. The tariffs imposed during that period specifically targeted China’s exports of solar panels and wind turbines. Although there was some easing under the Biden administration, tariffs were reinstated in 2025, this time encompassing green technologies as well.[viii] This competition carries both economic and geostrategic dimensions: China’s dominance over critical minerals and supply chains is countered by the U.S. strategy of “sourcing from friendly countries.”
From the perspective of climate diplomacy, Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement during his first term weakened the U.S.’s claim to global leadership and created a space for China to fill. By taking an active role in the 2021 Glasgow COP26 and subsequent processes, China consolidated its identity as a representative of developing countries. Green energy discourses are an extension of this historical shift: while the U.S. pursues a nationalist-isolationist narrative, China advances a multilateral and cooperative account.
Trump’s claims contradict empirical data. In 2025, China added over 50 GW of new wind capacity, bringing its total close to 580 GW. Its target of 120 GW annually by 2030 underscores China’s commitment to green transformation. These figures reveal that Trump’s discourse is largely an ideological construct, aimed at slowing China’s rise and consolidating a fossil-fuel–aligned base in U.S. domestic politics. China’s counter-discourse, while internally contradictory, is grounded in clear statistics. The country remains the world’s largest coal consumer and continues to build new coal-fired power plants. Yet its green exports and capacity expansions make a tangible contribution to global carbon reduction. This duality highlights the pragmatic character of China’s narrative: “simultaneously meeting domestic growth needs and securing international legitimacy.”[ix]
Trump’s Davos discourse and China’s response signal a deepening of U.S.–China competition in the field of green energy. China’s wind and solar capacity is expected to reach 1,200 GW by 2030, while U.S. incentives, such as the Inflation Reduction Act, attempt to respond to this challenge. However, the continuation of trade wars risks fragmenting supply chains and slowing global green transition.
Three potential scenarios emerge for the future: (i) Intensified competition – Nationalist policies in the style of Trump could restrict technology transfer, making green transitions in developing countries more difficult. (ii) Pragmatic cooperation – As seen in COP processes, a shared perception of climate change as a common threat could bring the parties to the negotiating table. (iii) China’s ascendancy – If the U.S. maintains its fossil-fuel–oriented domestic stance, China could consolidate its position as a global climate leader.
In conclusion, discourse analysis shows that green energy today is not merely a technical issue, but a new arena for identity and power struggles among great powers. The future of the global climate regime depends on how this discursive tension is managed. While opportunities for cooperation exist, current narratives point to a confrontational trajectory, highlighting the importance of strengthening multilateral diplomatic mechanisms.
[i] “From French drug pricing to ‘loser’ windmills: A rundown of who Trump criticized at Davos”, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/23/trump-davos-canada-carney-france-macron-spain-china-wind.html, (Accessed: 24.01.2026).
[ii] “Davos: China defends wind power strategy after Trump’s criticism”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-defends-wind-power-strategy-after-trumps-criticism-davos-2026-01-22/, (Accessed: 24.01.2026).
[iii] “‘They don’t spin’: Trump’s wind power disinformation rant at Davos”, Wind Power, https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1945886/they-dont-spin-trumps-wind-power-disinformation-rant-davos, (Accessed: 24.01.2026).
[iv] “Setting the record straight on China’s wind power”, People’s Daily Online, http://en.people.cn/n3/2026/0124/c90000-20418293.html, (Accessed: 24.01.2026).
[v] “Trump says China doesn’t use wind power. But here are the facts.”, CGTN, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2026-01-22/Trump-says-China-doesn-t-use-wind-power-But-here-are-the-facts–1K9f4iAR04M/share_amp.html, (Accessed: 24.01.2026).
[vi] Ibid.
[vii] “Beijing Declaration on Wind Energy 2.0”, GWEC, https://www.gwec.net/policy/beijing-declaration-on-wind-energy-2.0, (Accessed: 24.01.2026).
[viii] “Green-tech rivalry will complicate US-China climate cooperation”, MERICS, https://merics.org/en/comment/green-tech-rivalry-will-complicate-us-china-climate-cooperation, (Accessed: 24.01.2026).
[ix] “China to add 120 GW of new wind capacity annually starting in 2026”, Energies, https://energiesmedia.com/china-to-add-120-gw-new-wind-capacity-annually, (Accessed: 24.01.2026).
